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Abstract  
The sustainability of the global cocoa sector is currently being tested by acute 
deforestation, rampant poverty among cocoa farmers and fears of future cocoa supply 
shortages. Cocoa Sustainability Standards and their subsequent Certifications (SSC) are 
seen as a win-win solution to these challenges for both farmers and the industry. 
Nevertheless, questions regarding who is able to participate and potentially benefit from 
such interventions and, just as importantly, who is not, remain under-researched. Taking 
Ghana, the world’s second-largest producer of certified cocoa, as a case study, this 
thesis draws on actor and network approaches (Long, 1989; Latour, 1987), theory-based 
evaluation (Weiss, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 2004) and the Sustainable Rural 
Livelihoods framework (Scoones, 1998) to unpack selection processes. It uses primary 
qualitative data from industry informants and farmers from the Brong Ahafo region, as 
well as national level secondary quantitative survey data to understand how farmers are 
externally selected, through programme placement and participant targeting, and self-
selected into SSC programmes.  
Findings suggest that SSC placement is business-oriented when programmes are driven 
by SSC implementing actors, with farmer-centered criteria gaining influence when 
funding and certifying actors are involved. In terms of targeting, farmers lacking land 
entitlements, like sharecroppers and their wives, tend to be left out of SSC related 
activities and the distribution of benefits, even when producing certified cocoa. Further, 
farmers’ dependence on credit determines their selling strategies and therefore their self-
selection in or out of SSC programmes, when participation is conditional on selling to a 
particular buyer. In the absence of selling conditionality, selection is shaped by the 
farmers’ ability and willingness to adopt the standards.  
Overall, better-off farmers are more likely to participate in SSC programmes, while 
landless, credit-dependent and isolated farmers tend to be left out, suggesting that if 
SSC are to advance the interests of both farmers and industry, issues of inclusiveness 
need to be addressed both at the policy and implementation level.   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1. Introduction 
1.1.Research rationale 
Recent decades have seen a significant expansion in international agricultural trade and 
with it a growing concern regarding the social and environmental conditions of 
agricultural commodity production (Byerlee and Rueda, 2015; Oya, Schaefer and 
Skalidou, 2018). The cocoa sector has long been susceptible to consumers’ concerns 
regarding its social impact, particularly among a growing segment of female and 
wealthier consumers of ‘quality’ chocolate (Barrientos, 2011 & 2014; Vecchio and 
Annunciate, 2015). Such concerns are fuelled by rampant poverty and continuing 
reports of child labour in the cocoa fields (Barrientos et al., 2007; Fountain and Hütz-
Adams, 2015 & 2018), forcing chocolate companies to be among the first corporations 
to adopt measures to deal with social issues in their value chain (Off, 2006; Schrage and 
Ewing, 2005). Acute deforestation, an intrinsic part of cocoa production at least in West 
Africa (i.e. Hill, 1963; Ruf and Zadi, 1998; Amanor, 2005; Ruf, Schroth and Doffangui, 
2015; Gockowski et al., 2013; Dumont et al., 2014), is also troubling consumers caring 
about their environmental footprint. 
Moreover, fears that the cocoa supply is at risk, or will be in the near future, have 
intensified over the last years. It is indicative that in 2011 Armajaro, an important cocoa 
trader at the time, estimated a global cocoa shortage of 0.8 million metric tonnes (MT) 
by 2020 (Barrientos, 2016). More and better quality cocoa beans are expected to be 
needed to satisfy a long-anticipated rise in chocolate consumption in the emerging 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and 
Turkey) markets, as well as an increase in the consumption of dark, premium chocolate 
in the European and US markets (Whitehead, 2017; Nieburg, 2014; Salter, 2014). This 
increase in global demand cannot be satisfied by territorial crop expansion for the 
following reasons. Most of the land suitable for cocoa cultivation, particularly in West 
Africa, is either already in use, or protected by forest reserves (Dumont et al., 2014; 
Wessel and Quist-Wessel, 2015). In the case of Ghana, illegal mining is currently 
competing with cocoa production for land and labour (Nyame and Blocher, 2010; 
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Snapir, Simms and Waine, 2017; Schwartz Taylor and Taylor, 2018), putting extra 
pressure on the available land for cocoa production. Furthermore, climate change is 
expected to negatively affect cocoa growing areas in sub-Saharan Africa, making some 
directly unsuitable, while others will need adaptation measures in order to continue 
producing cocoa (Läderach et al., 2013; Schroth et al., 2016). The effects of this 
declining trend in the availability of land can be observed in the rise of land rent and 
even the eruption of armed conflicts, as the case of Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates (Woods, 
2003). Nevertheless, the fact that productivity levels, particularly in West Africa, remain 
below maximum capacity suggests that there is a margin for increasing global cocoa 
production by obtaining higher yields per hectare instead of territorial expansion 
(Wessel and Quist-Wessel, 2015). In the case of Ghana, for instance, it is estimated that 
the average farmer produces only 40 percent of the potential output (Barrientos, 2014). 
Low productivity is attributed to poor farm maintenance, lack of innovation and farm 
renovation investments and low uptake of fertilisers and pesticides (Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2011; Dormon et al., 2004; Gockowski et al., 2013). An ageing population of 
cocoa farms and farmers are also often blamed for the low productivity of the region 
(Anyidoho et al., 2012; Mohammed, Asamoah and Asiedu-Appiah, 2011; Kyei, Foli and 
Ankoh, 2011; Löwe, 2017; Barrientos et al., 2007).  
Cocoa Sustainability Standards and their subsequent Certifications (hereafter SSC), 
such as Fairtrade, UTZ and Rainforest Alliance, offer price and material incentives to 
producers (e.g. price and social premium, provisions of fertilisers on credit, free farming 
tools and equipment, etc.) in exchange for adopting specific production standards meant 
to increase productivity and hence cocoa income, but also to improve the environmental 
and social production conditions of the crop. They are seen, therefore, as a win-win 
solution that can benefit both the farmers involved in cocoa production and the cocoa 
and chocolate industry. Amid a broader tendency of SSC to cross to mainstream markets 
(Potts et al., 2014; Paschall, 2013; COSA, 2013), cocoa and chocolate companies are 
currently leading in the use of SSC in the confectionery market (Yu, 2017). More than a 
million MT of certified cocoa (including organic) was produced in 2015 by more than 
916,000 producers worldwide, accounting for 23% of the global cocoa area (Lernoud et 
al., 2017). This marks an increase of 338% in the production of certified cocoa in only 
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five years (Potts et al., 2014), a growing trend which is expected to continue in the years 
to come, as major cocoa-chocolate companies, such as Mars, Ferrero, and Hershey, have 
made public commitments to source exclusively certified cocoa by 2020 (Mars, 2018; 
Ferrerocsr, 2018; Nieburg, 2012).   
This impressive growth in the use of SSC in the cocoa sector in particular, and in 
agricultural commodities in general, is being reflected in an increasing number of 
impact evaluation studies seeking to assert whether claims of positive impact on the 
lives of producers and workers as well as on the environment made by SSC funding, 
implementing and certifying actors can be supported by evidence (e.g. Oya et al., 2017; 
Terstappen, Hanson and McLaughlin, 2013; Blackman and Rivera, 2010). The first 
wave of these studies (e.g. Bacon, 2005; Jaffee, 2007; Utting-Chamorro, 2005) had 
several methodological limitations, mainly failure to control for confounding factors 
that can be potentially correlated both with SSC programme exposure and outcomes, 
such as land size, labour and input resources, or social networks. After systematically 
reviewing the literature on the effectiveness of certification schemes, Oya et al. (2017) 
show that after 2008 there has been a substantial increase in the number of studies using 
adequate methodological designs to control for confounding (e.g. Becchetti, Castriota 
and Michetti, 2008; Riisgaard et al., 2009; Ruben and Fort, 2012; Cramer et al., 2014a; 
Schuster and Maertens, 2015; Chiputwa and Qaim, 2014; Minten et al., 2015; van 
Rijsbergen et al., 2016).  Nevertheless, although more and better evidence on the impact 1
of SSC is currently available, doubts remain regarding the ability of SSC programmes 
to tackle deep-rooted structural problems such as rural poverty, low productivity, gender 
inequality, or weak and flawed Producers’ Organisations (POs) (Oya et al., 2017). 
Beyond the impact of SSC on participant producers and workers, even less is known 
regarding how participants select in or out of such initiatives, in other words, who is 
able to participate and therefore potentially benefit from certification and, just as 
importantly, who is not.    
 For transparency purposes, it is noted  that the author of this thesis is a co-author of the 1
systematic review conducted by Oya et al. (2017). In particular, the author has contributed in the 
following tasks: protocol development, searching and critical appraisal of studies, data 
extraction, qualitative synthesis and reporting of findings.
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This thesis aims to unpack selection processes in cocoa SSC programmes in the 
Ghanaian context. The study regards selection as a three-stage process: first, the 
selection of particular geographical areas of programme implementation (i.e. 
programme placement); second the selection of the eligible population through direct or 
implicit targeting and eligibility criteria; third, the selection of participants into the 
programme. It is important to clarify that targeting and eligibility do not equal selection 
into the programme, as a farmer may be targeted or eligible to join a certification 
programme but may not become a participant. Both targeting and eligibility, however, 
are pre-conditions of selection, since participants are selected from the pool of already 
targeted and eligible farmers, as Figure 1 illustrates.  
Figure 1: Selection of cocoa farmers into SSC programmes in Ghana 
Taking Ghana, the world’s second-largest producer of certified cocoa as a case study 
(Lernoud et al. 2017), the thesis focuses on selection processes into the SSC 
programmes that are most common in cocoa production in the Ghanaian context: 
Fairtrade, UTZ and Rainforest Alliance. The organic certification is not covered here, as 
the Ghanaian production of organic cocoa is limited, accounting for less than 2.5% of 
the total certified production (ibid).  
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Eligibility criteria Participant selection 
Cocoa 
farmers in 
Ghana 
Farmers in 
areas targeted 
by SSC 
programmes 
Farmers 
eligible to 
join SSC 
programmes 
Farmers who join 
SSC programmes 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Programme 
placement 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. An overview of the current debates 
on the role of SSC in the global market is provided in section 1.2. This is followed by a 
focused literature review on the three stages of participant selection that guide this 
work: programme placement, eligibility criteria, and participant selection (section 1.3). 
Finally, section 1.4 provides the research aims and presents the structure of the thesis.  
1.2.The role of Sustainability Standards and 
Certification  
Sustainability standards and their subsequent certifications emerged between the late 
1980s and early 2000s, amid changing global trade dynamics dominated by the 
globalisation process. They were driven mainly by an increase in consumers’ awareness 
and sensitivity towards sustainability issues, as well as a growing recognition that 
public governance was limited in addressing sustainability concerns and that private 
action was needed in order to protect future global supply (Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; 
Barrientos, 2011; COSA, 2013; Potts et al., 2014). The pioneering Fairtrade certification 
first appeared in 1988 with a focus on improving “the welfare and livelihoods of small 
and disadvantaged producers” (COSA, 2013:10). This was the culmination of the ‘fair 
trade’ movement that emerged during the 1960s and initially operated through 
Alternative Trading Organisations (ATOs) buying directly from producers and selling 
directly to consumers through ‘solidarity’ or specialised retail shops (Jaffee, 2007; 
Murray and Raynolds, 2007). As the movement gained popularity and expanded during 
the 1980s, it evolved into a certification label with third-party audits exclusively 
conducted by the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) which verifies that the 
production meets the Fairtrade “economic, social and (increasingly) environmental 
standards” (Paschall, 2013:7). After receiving the initial Fairtrade certification, 
producers are inspected on-site on an annual basis, unless their POs have been fully 
compliant over several years, in which case they can enter a three year inspection cycle 
(Vartotojai, 2019). In the case of products like cocoa, Fairtrade certifies cooperatives of 
small-scale farmers and sets a minimum price along with a fixed premium which is paid 
directly to the cooperative.  
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Since the first appearance of Fairtrade certified products, however, other voluntary 
standards-setting organisations operating through third-party certification have emerged, 
though each with varying priorities and approaches. Rainforest Alliance made its 
appearance in 1992 with a more environmental approach, focused on preserving 
biodiversity and natural reserves. UTZ Certified (initially UTZ Kapeh), on the other 
hand, emerged a decade later with a more business-oriented approach, emphasising 
“improved productivity” combined with “good social and environmental 
practices” (COSA, 2013:10). External audits against both standards are conducted 
annually, by independent certification bodies which can be for-profit private companies, 
such as IMO or non-profit organizations such as NEPCon (previously RA-Cert).  Both 2
Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified allow the certification of farmers not necessarily 
organised in cooperatives or POs. In terms of economic incentives to the producers, 
they provide no minimum price guarantees, while the price premium is not fixed but 
negotiated with the final buyer and paid to the farmers’ association, or directly to the 
farmers through a local buyer. Given these similarities between UTZ and Rainforest 
Alliance in particular, it is not surprising that the UTZ and Rainforest Alliance decided 
to merge in January 2018, although the two schemes will continue to operate in parallel 
until the activation of a single new program at the end of 2019 (UTZ, 2018a).  
Despite these differences across the main cocoa SSC (Fairtrade and UTZ/ Rainforest 
Alliance), however, a closer examination of their theories of change reveals that their 
strategies are similar. The basic idea is that by setting standards of production practices 
and business behaviour and supporting producers and their organisations to adopt them 
through training in Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and facilitation of inputs, 
production will become more efficient and yields will increase, preserving at the same 
time the natural resources and protecting the ones who are socially vulnerable. In the 
case of cocoa, this involves adopting measures against child or other forms of 
exploitative labour, banning certain pesticides which are hazardous for humans and the 
environment, and pruning and weeding cocoa farms on a more regular basis to control 
for pests and diseases. An example would be taking more systematic care of mistletoe, a 
 For more information see Ecolabelindex (http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabel/imo-2
certified) and NEPCon (https://www.nepcon.org/newsroom/two-leading-providers-
sustainability-certification-services-nepcon-and-ra-cert-join-forces)
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parasite plant that can reduce cocoa yields and ultimately harm the cocoa tree (Philips, 
1977). The adoption of standards is complemented by building the markets that will 
reward these changes with price incentives. Creating networks and alliances while also 
working to influence a sector's agenda and policies is another element that these 
theories of change have in common. The main underlying assumption, therefore, is that 
by increasing production yields and prices, while also caring for the environmental and 
social aspects of production, the livelihoods of producers will improve (See Fairtrade 
International, 2019; UTZ, 2017a; SAN & Rainforest Alliance, 2015 for the theories of 
change of each scheme). 
Overall, these theories of change describe the “hypothesized causal links” between the 
mechanisms of certification related interventions and “anticipated outcomes”, in other 
words they provide a ‘programme’ theory (Blamey and Mackenzie, 2007:445). It is 
important to note, however, that they only briefly and incidentally refer to contextual 
factors that can enhance or hinder the effectiveness of such interventions, despite the 
fact that context is a crucial component of the interplay between intervention 
mechanisms and outcomes (Greenhalgh et al., 2009; White, 2009) and plays a 
particularly decisive role in the case of SSC (Oya et al., 2017). Moreover, what is 
missing in all three cases, is what has been described as ‘implementation’ theory, i.e. a 
theory about how specific programme objectives are translated into “ongoing service 
delivery and programme operation” (Weiss, 1995:58, cited in Blamey and Mackenzie , 
2007:445). In the case of SSC that would be an implicit or explicit theory about who 
should be targeted (i.e. which groups of individuals involved in certified crop 
production should be trained and receive support and price incentives) and how (e.g. 
how should programme placement decisions be taken, what staffing levels and 
characteristics are needed to deliver effective support to producers and their 
organisations, etc.). An overview of the main cocoa SSC and their key characteristics is 
provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Key characteristics of the main cocoa SSC
Although initially confined only to specialty niche markets, SSC have crossed into 
mainstream markets during the last decade (COSA, 2013; Lernoud et al., 2017). Today, 
SSC are used by some of the largest multinational companies as a tool of “market 
recognition” (Potts et al., 2014:19) to support market claims that “products and 
Fairtrade Rainforest Alliance UTZ Certified 
Origin Social movement/ NGO Social movement/ NGO Firm
Stated vision 
according to 
theory of 
change
A world in which all 
small producers and 
workers can enjoy 
secure and sustainable 
livelihoods, fulfil their 
potential and decide on 
their future.
Sustainable resilient 
landscapes that:  
-conserve native 
biodiversity and 
ecosystem services 
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livestock efficiently & 
profitably  
- Equitably improve 
local livelihoods 
- are managed to adapt 
effectively to changing 
conditions
Create a world where 
sustainable farming is 
the norm: farmers 
implement good 
agricultural practices 
and manage their 
farms profitably with 
respect for people and 
planet; industry 
invests in and rewards 
sustainable 
production, and 
consumers can enjoy 
and trust the products 
they buy.
Target groups Primarily small farmers 
organized in 
cooperatives and 
workers organised in 
unions.  
Large and medium-sized, 
organised or not  
Producers of all sizes, 
organised or not 
Certification 
body 
FLO-Cert Private for-profit 
companies and non-
profit organisations 
Private for-profit 
companies 
Certificate 
holder 
Certificate is hold by the 
farmers’ association or 
the company that 
employs hired workers    
Certificate is hold by the 
PO/ cooperative or the 
local buyer. 
Certificate is hold by 
the PO/ cooperative or 
the local buyer. 
Price 
mechanisms 
Minimum price 
guaranteed  and a fixed 
premium paid directly 
to the cooperative.
No minimum price 
guaranteed. Premium is 
not fixed but negotiated 
with the final buyer and 
paid to the certificate 
holder     
No minimum price 
guaranteed. Premium 
is not fixed but 
negotiated with the 
final buyer and paid to 
the certificate holder     
Source: Author’s creation based on Von Hagen, Manning and Reinecke (2010); Fairtrade International, 
(2018a);Fairtrade International, (2019); UTZ (2018f); UTZ (2017a); Rainforest Alliance (2018a); SAN 
& Rainforest Alliance (2015); author’s primary data.
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materials traded in complex, global supply chains have been produced in an ethical and 
environmentally benign way” (Petrokofsky and Jennings, 2018:2). Lernoud et al. 
(2017:3) further argue that the use of SSC increases the transparency in the value chain, 
allowing consumers to be better informed on the origin and the production conditions of 
the final products they purchase and helping companies to manage “reputational risks” 
and safeguard their corporate image. SSC are also being used as a supply risk 
management tool to avoid resource shortfalls, mainly through yields improvements, 
while also ensuring that the social and environmental conditions necessary to maintain 
(and increase) supply are in place (Lernoud et al. 2017; Potts et al. 2014). 
Regarding the benefits resulting on the production side of the value chain, SSC are 
commonly regarded as “an avenue for improving the environment and reducing poverty 
levels among agricultural producers” by introducing more resource-efficient and 
environmentally friendly farming practices that can lead to yield improvements and 
lower environmental and health risks; improving product quality that can facilitate 
better access to markets and higher prices; and encouraging just social relations that can 
contribute to safer working conditions, non-discrimination and freedom to associate 
(COSA, 2013:11). Nevertheless, whether these intended goals are actually met or not 
remains highly contested (Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and Nunn, 2014; Oya et al., 2017). 
Arguments on what SSC can or cannot do diverge among scholars who examined the 
issue using microeconomics models and theories (e.g. Henderson, 2008; Smith, 2009; 
Haight and Henderson, 2010; de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet, 2012; Tedeschi & 
Carlson, 2013; Griffiths, 2014; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005) or impact evaluation 
methods (Cepeda et al., 2013; Dragusanu and Nunn, 2014; Stathers and Gathuthi, 2013; 
Beuchelt, Zeller and Oberthur, 2009; Nelson and Martin, 2013; Sen, 2009, among 
others). In an effort to provide an overall assessment of the impact of SSC, several 
reviews of the existing literature have emerged over the last decade (International Trade 
Centre, 2011; Blackman and Rivera, 2010; Nelson and Pound, 2009; Vagneron and 
Roquigny, 2010; Terstappen, Hanson and McLaughlin, 2013; Oya et al., 2017; 
Petrokofsky and Jennings, 2018). These reviews vary considerably in their methods and 
quality, however, it is safe to say that the overall picture they provide is at best one of 
mixed effects of SSC on producers and workers involved in certified production.  
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Although further discussing the SSC effectiveness debate is beyond the scope of this 
work, the following points are relevant to selection issues that guide this research and 
therefore worth highlighting. First, as SSC move into the mainstream, they tend to 
become increasingly market-driven (Paschall, 2013). This contrasts with the early years 
of SSC, where governmental and aid actors (i.e. national and international NGOs, aid 
agencies, religious organisations) appear to have played a key role in funding and 
implementing SSC programmes (Milford, 2012 & 2014; Arce, 2009; Dowdall, 2012; 
Fraser, Fisher and Arce, 2014; Rotter, 2000). Paschall (2013) argues that this shift to the 
mainstream results in decisions regarding where and with which groups of producers to 
implement a SSC programme being increasingly taken by mainstream buyers following 
business criteria. Such criteria involve minimising certification costs, skipping more 
difficult to reach and to certify farmers, prioritising implementing SSC programmes in 
areas that offer opportunities of fast and inexpensive expansion and an increasing 
marginalisation of farmers’ needs and benefits in the certification process. As a result, 
buyer-driven SSC programmes appear to be targeting and externally selecting producers 
that are more accessible and better prepared to adopt and comply with the standards.  
Second, there has been a general focus of the literature on the ‘average’ impact of SSC 
on a ‘homogenous’ body of ‘smallholder’ producers, which neglects the presence of 
heterogeneous effects on differentiated and diverse producers and workers (Luetchford, 
2008; Cramer et al., 2014a; Hansen and Trifkovic, 2013). Over the last years, more 
studies suggesting that not all producers benefit equally (or at all) from standards and 
certification have emerged. Breimer and de Vaal (2012), for instance, using a 
heterogeneous firms model found that only the most productive producers will join the 
Fairtrade certification, as higher production requirements and entry costs will hinder 
low-productivity producers from adopting the standard. A paradox thus is created: 
“when Fair Trade succeeds in its inherent workings - better standards, secure trade 
channels, and so on- the consequence is that it will help the better off, not the least 
advantaged” (ibid: 3). Moreover, Hansen and Trifkovic (2013:2), use empirical data to 
examine the effect of voluntary food standards, such as GlobalGAP, on Vietnamese 
pangasius producers. They show that only the upper-middle-class farmers can benefit 
from larger returns, while effects are insignificant for the poorest producers of their 
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sample, pointing to “an exclusionary impact of standards for the poorest farmers”. 
Staricco and Ponte (2015) reach similar conclusions with their comparative study of the 
Fairtrade and conventional wine sectors in Argentina. The authors find that “instead of 
empowering the most vulnerable groups, those producing table wine for the domestic 
market, Fairtrade is actually further marginalizing them” (ibid:65). Furthermore, 
Cramer et al. (2017:17) observed that within certified cooperatives a minority of larger 
producers received the lion’s share, while farmers with smaller plots and production 
volumes benefited to a lesser extent, therefore concluding that Fairtrade “aggravates 
rural inequality”. This is echoed by Carimentrand and Ballet (2010) and Staib (2012) 
who report tensions between larger and smaller producers within certified POs, often 
resulting in the exit of the smaller ones from the PO and therefore also from the 
certified market. Overall, such findings sharply contradict claims of poverty reduction 
related to the impact of SSC, and especially older proclamations of Fairtrade related 
organisations that the certification particularly targets “the poorest of the poor” or the 
“weakest producers” (Cramer et al., 2017:841).  
Third, within the “poorest rural people” participating in certified production, wage 
workers employed by so-called ‘small-holder’ farmers have received even less 
attention, both by scholars and policymakers (Luetchford, 2008; Cramer et al., 2014a; 
Oya et al., 2017). This is mainly due to the (false) assumption that smallholder farmers 
draw mainly on family labour, while their use of wage labour is insignificant (Cramer et 
al., 2017). The lack of official standards and guidelines for hired labour employed by 
smallholder farmers clearly contributes to the invisibility of wage workers vis a vis SSC 
funding and implementing actors (Shreck, 2002; Heller, 2010). Even when standards for 
wage labour in smallholders’ farms are in place, however, their monitoring and auditing 
are reported to be poor and ineffective (Trauger, 2014; Heller, 2010). As a result, the 
few studies that have examined this issue suggest that certification related benefits tend 
to accumulate in the group of farm owners/employers and rarely trickle down to wage 
labourers. For instance, Cramer et al., (2014b:120) after investigating the effects of 
Fairtrade in coffee, tea and flower production in Ethiopia and Uganda, conclude that 
“Fairtrade has made no positive difference – relative to other forms of employment in 
the production of the same crops – to wage workers”. Dragusanu and Nunn (2018) 
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reach similar conclusions in their study on the effects of Fairtrade on coffee producers 
and workers in Costa Rica. While they find positive effects on income for farm owners, 
their analysis shows no effects on seasonal workers, such as coffee pickers. This is 
because cooperative members, who tend to be farm owners, are unlikely to use the 
Fairtrade premium to increase the wages of seasonal workers. Another example of 
unequal distribution of benefits across the population involved in certified production is 
provided by Nelson, Tallontire and Collinson (2002) who find a lack of clear benefits 
for porters and shellers participating in the production of Fairtrade Brazil nuts in Peru. 
Finally, studies comparing labour conditions in certified and non-certified coffee 
processing plants or mills also fail to provide evidence that SSC benefit wage workers 
(Valkila and Nygren, 2008; Walsh, 2004). Overall, such findings suggest a targeting or 
selection paradox: despite the fact that wage workers contribute, often significantly, in 
the production of certified commodities, they are not considered officially as SSC 
programme participants and are commonly excluded from any accruing SSC related 
benefits.  
1.3.Selection processes in certification  
The above discussion highlights the importance of reviewing how issues of selection 
into SSC programmes are dealt with so far in the existing literature. While the issue of 
farmers’ choice of selling strategies as a proxy to understand self-selection in 
certification has received some, although probably not sufficient, attention (Dammert 
and Mohan, 2014), broader issues of targeting through programme placement or 
eligibility criteria so far lack systematic reporting in the SSC literature (Oya et al, 
2017).  
Programme placement processes have received little attention in the broader 
development literature. Bebbington (2004) highlights that patterns of how and why 
development interventions (and NGO presence) vary across space and their implications 
for uneven local development have rarely been mapped or analysed. While there has 
been some discussion about the concentration of development professionals in urban 
over rural spaces (e.g. Chambers, 1983; Mercer, 2002), Bebbington (2004) argues that 
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there are more factors affecting the distribution of development interventions, which 
can be related to the socio-economic as well as historical and political context. 
Furthermore, Cramer et al. (2017:843) underline that “locally specific agronomic and 
microclimatic features” can also affect the placement of an intervention and therefore 
confound comparisons between ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ areas.  
SSC programmes, at least until recently, were commonly driven by “benevolent 
external” actors with a ‘poverty reduction’ mission, such as NGOs, religious 
organisations, or aid agencies (Milford, 2012:18). Such actors are likely to have 
particularly targeted poorer or more marginalised areas. In the case of Chiapas, Mexico, 
for instance, Milford (2012) reports that certified coffee cooperatives were formed in 
areas were the population was more disadvantaged in terms of access to information and 
bargaining skills. This points to a ‘negative’ selection process, where the least better off 
are selected into SSC initiatives. Nevertheless, other authors argue that SSC funding 
and implementing actors, whether aid or market related, are more likely to target areas 
with already organised farmers, which tend to be in areas with better infrastructure in 
terms of roads, access to education and health care, etc. Fountain and Hutz-Adams, 
(2015:7), for instance, highlight that “low hanging fruits” areas with already organised 
farmers are more likely to be included in cocoa SSC or Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) programmes. Areas with unorganised farmers, on the other hand, tend to remain 
largely excluded from such initiatives. This view is echoed by studies which show that 
SSC funding and implementing actors are more likely to work with larger and more 
consolidated POs which are reliable providers both in terms of volumes and quality of 
certified commodities, while less established POs may struggle to enter certified 
markets (Pongratz-Chander 2007; Kariuki, 2014; Beall, 2012).  
Moreover, following the established notion of the ‘homogenous’ rural population, 
eligibility criteria appear to be a grey, undefined area for SSC programmes where the 
eligible target group is described by general terms such as “producers”, “farmers” or 
“suppliers”. Among the SSC present in the Ghanaian cocoa sector, UTZ probably 
provides the most unambiguous definition of who is eligible to participate in its 
certified groups, by defining the (eligible) producer as “the person or organization who 
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represents the farm and has responsibility for the products sold by the farm” (UTZ, 
2015:11), making explicit that this person can be “the actual operator of the farm (e.g. a 
sharecropper), and does not need to be the landowner” (UTZ, 2015:10). In a similar 
tone, Rainforest Alliance defines a group member as “the owner or responsible person 
of one or more member farms of a producer group” although no clarification on the role 
of “responsible” person (i.e. tenant, sharecropper or other actor) is provided (Rainforest 
Alliance, 2017b:19). Fairtrade, on the other hand, uses the general term “smallholder 
farmer” or “small producer” to describe the members of certified groups of producers. 
Cocoa farmers making use of hired labour on a permanent basis are in principle non-
eligible to become Fairtrade certified (Fairtrade International, 2011). However, it is 
unclear whether farm owners making use of sharecropping labour, a common form of 
‘permanent’ labour in Ghana (Robertson, 1987) are eligible or not. The eligibility status 
of sharecroppers themselves is also unclear, as Fairtrade guidelines make no mention 
whatsoever of the eligibility of farm operators (Fairtrade International, 2011).  
The few studies which have empirically examined how eligibility applies in practice, 
reveal that SSC programmes often target producers organised in POs and therefore the 
eligibility criteria that apply to the POs end up applying to the SSC programmes 
(Dammert and Mohan, 2014). This can be problematic for the inclusiveness of SSC in 
cases where POs officially exclude the poorest farmers on the basis of lack of land 
ownership or insufficient land size (Bernard and Spielman 2009; Ito, Bao and Su, 2012; 
Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer 2003). For instance, owners of smaller farms may be 
formally excluded from certified PO membership (e.g. Nelson and Martin, 2013; 
Laroche, Jiménez and Nelson, 2012; Staib, 2012), the argument being that they require 
more extension support while contributing small production quantities, making thus 
their inclusion in the certified PO economically problematic. Female farmers can be 
particularly susceptible to PO entrance barriers, as in many cases they have been 
traditionally excluded from land ownership. This can result in their exclusion from SSC 
programmes, despite being heavily involved in the production of certified crops, as in 
the case of Tanzanian female coffee farmers (Sutton, 2014). Moreover, labourers and 
youths who do not own or sharecrop farms can also be excluded from certified POs, as 
Ingram et al. (2014) report in the case of Ivorian cocoa farmers. Finally, sharecroppers 
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farming certified farms are reported to be both eligible (Ingram et al., 2014) and non-
eligible (Nelson et al., 2013:33) to join certified POs, confirming that eligibility is 
ambiguous for non-farm owners.  
Finally, the processes by which individual producers select in or out of SSC initiatives 
have certainly received more attention than programme placement and eligibility issues. 
Nevertheless, so far participant selection into SSC has been mainly studied as a farmers’ 
choice between selling to the conventional market or to a certified buyer (cooperative, 
PO, or private company). This view suggests a narrow focus on self-selection which 
neglects possible processes of ‘external’ selection, where the inclusion or exclusion 
decision, although disconnected from official targeting or eligibility criteria is not made 
by the potential participant producers but by other actors. ‘External’ selection processes, 
however, are often in place. Bakker (2014), for instance, reports that certified tea 
factories in Argentina consciously and intentionally selected in their supplying base 
larger farms that were already better prepared to meet the standards as a way of 
minimising the effort and costs of incorporating them in their (certified) production 
chain. Breukers (2015) describes a similar situation occurring in Colombia, where the 
national coffee growers federation is reported to have selected farmers that already had 
cultivation practices close to the certification requirements in order to lower the costs of 
bringing them into a certified status, while those with small production volumes and/or 
living in remote areas were excluded. At the same time, farmers on good terms with the 
programme’s extension staff were more likely to be included, a finding which points to 
the importance of social capital in selection processes.  
In terms of self-selection, Oya et al. (2017), after reviewing qualitative evidence from 
136 studies, conclude that the main factors that appear to affect producers’ likelihood to 
join a SSC programme are, first and foremost, the ability (and willingness) of producers 
to bear the extra costs of certified production. These can be related to higher labour 
costs linked to the implementation of standards and to the entrance and participation in 
certified POs/ markets (i.e membership fees, ability to withstand payment delays, 
dedicate time in meetings, etc.), as well as other follow-up costs (e.g. costs of audits). 
Additionally, producers’ ability to attract and secure external financial support by aid 
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and/or commercial actors to finance the certification process is also reported to be 
important. Finally, producers’ attitude towards risk and gender inequality limiting 
women’s access to SSC are also found to be significant. As a result, variables related to 
farmers’ natural, economic and human capitals, (i.e. land tenure and size, access to 
family and hire labour, farming experience and degree of market integration, access to 
credit, income diversification, educational and literacy levels) can determine self-
selection into certification. Social status and connections, gender divisions of labour and 
the broader socio-cultural context, can also play a role. Overall, Oya et al. (2017) 
suggest that self-selection into SSC tends to be positive, as the wealthier producers, and/
or those with stronger human and social capitals are more likely to become certified.  
In order to complement the above qualitative findings, Figure 2 provides a summary of 
the determinants found to have a statistically significant, positive or negative, influence 
on selection into SSC, as reported by studies that have quantitatively explored the 
probability of producers’ participating in certified POs (e.g. Milford, 2014; Fort and 
Ruben 2009; Jena et al., 2012; Mueller and Theuvsen, 2015 ) or directly adopting 
certification standards (Parvathi and Waibel, 2016; Asfaw, Mithöfer and Waibel, 2007; 
Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 2011).  A table providing a detailed account of determinants 3
of participant selection into SSC programmes by study is provided in Appendix 1.  
 These are studies that have been identified, appraised and included in the systematic review on 3
the effectiveness of certification schemes conducted by Oya et al. (2017), of which the author of 
this thesis is a co-author. It is worth noting that the study conducted by Oya et al. (2017) was 
guided by a different review question and searches were concluded in November 2015 with 
some key references added in July 2016. This means that the evidence presented here is not the 
result of a systematic search and therefore does not represent an exhaustive account of all the 
available relevant and trustworthy evidence. Nevertheless, given the broad scope of the searches 
conduced by Oya et al. (2017), the evidence presented here can be considered as a fair 
representation of the existing literature up to July 2016. 
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Figure 2: Literature review of determinants of selection into SSC 
Results broadly support the proposition that producers’ natural (e.g. land size and 
fertility), economic (e.g. livestock, farming equipment, access to credit) and human 
capital (e.g. education, extension training, farming and exportation experience) 
positively influences selection into SSC programmes. Access to household labour and 
connectivity to markets (i.e. number of buyers accessible/used and farm distance to the 
road) also appear to have a positive effect. Nevertheless, contradictory findings also 
emerge, with some studies suggesting that land size or education may actually be 
negatively related with SSC participation. For instance, while land size is broadly 
reported to be positively associated with the likelihood of participation in SSC, in the 
case of Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel (2007) it had a negative influence on the adoption 
of the GlobalGap standard for horticulture, as farmers with larger plots tended to 
produce cash crops such as coffee and tea, instead of the vegetable crops certified by 
GlobalGap. What can be noted from the above findings is that the focus of the existent 
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literature is mainly placed on quantifiable observable variables, such as farm size 
(Milford, 2014; Parvathi and Waibel, 2016; Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 2007), 
education (Jena et al., 2012; van Rijsbergen et al., 2016), household labour (Milford, 
2014; Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 2007; van Rijsbergen et al., 2016), while 
characteristics harder to observe and quantify, such as farmers’ relations with buyers or 
extension staff, motivation to adopt the standards, attitude towards risk and new farming 
techniques, or the propensity to work closely with other farmers within a cooperative 
framework remain unexplored (The role of observable and unobservable characteristics 
is further discussed in section 3.3.1).  
1.4.Research aims and thesis structure   
The previous section has shown how the limited existing literature points to rather 
positive participant selection processes, where already wealthier and better prepared to 
adopt the standards are more likely to join SSC programmes. At the same time, 
producers with smaller or no landholdings, farming in remote areas and less able to 
switch to farming under certification standards tend to be excluded. Additionally, labour 
workers, sharecroppers included, as well as women or youths farming on leased or 
family land tend to be considered non-eligible to join SSC initiatives, mainly on the 
basis of lack of land ownership, despite the fact that they contribute  (often heavily) 
with their work to certified production.  
Having identified clear gaps in the literature, this research aims to further investigate 
selection processes into SSC programmes by providing empirical evidence from the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector. To do so, this thesis focuses on the following overarching 
research question:  
How are different farmers selected (or not selected) into cocoa certification programmes 
in Ghana? 
Following the breakdown of selection processes into the three stages (see Figure 1), 
three sub-questions guide the analytical work presented in the thesis:  
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RQ1: How is the placement of cocoa SSC programmes determined? 
RQ2: How do farmers become eligible for participation in cocoa SSC programmes?  
RQ3: How do farmers select in or out of cocoa SSC programmes?   
By exploring the above stated questions, this thesis aims to test the limited but emergent 
theory on selection processes into SSC, and to contribute to the generation of new 
theory by suggesting new hypotheses. The research intends to facilitate deeper 
understandings of the reach of SSC programmes, and address concerns of positive 
selection that might contribute to increasing inequalities among producers and workers 
at the local level. Additionally, it hopes to make valid and useful contributions to the 
broader body of the impact evaluation literature by elucidating the importance of 
programme placement, targeting and eligibility criteria, and participant selection 
processes and their implications for the effectiveness of social or economic programmes 
in terms of who gets to benefit from such initiatives (Pawson and Tilley, 2004). 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the contextual background of this 
research, both at the global and local level of cocoa production and cocoa SSC. Chapter 
3 presents the conceptual foundations that frame this work. It does so by reviewing how 
concepts around social and development interventions and selection have evolved in the 
literature and explains the conceptual choices made in each case. Chapter 4 introduces 
the methodological approach of the research, outlining the research design as well as the 
data collection and analysis methods, complemented with details on how these were 
implemented. The chapter also discusses the limitations of this study from a 
methodological point of view, and the ethical issues that emerged. The following three 
chapters comprise the core empirical analytical work of this study: Chapter 5 focuses on 
programme placement issues (addressing RQ1), chapter 6 on participant eligibility 
criteria (addressing RQ2), while chapter 7 explores participant selection dynamics into 
cocoa SSC (addressing RQ3). Finally, findings from these three chapters are synthesised 
in chapter 8. The final chapter also presents the main implications of the findings in 
terms of policy and future research. 
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2. Research context  
2.1.Introduction 
Context plays a crucial role in understanding the implementation dynamics and the 
effectiveness of development programmes in general (White, 2009) and of SSC 
programmes in particular (Oya et al., 2017). Oya et al. (2017) list a number of 
contextual factors that influence SSC programme  implementation and by consequence 
their selection processes: the power relations between producers and buyers; the 
historical and institutional context that shapes the dynamics of commodity and labour 
markets; and socio-economic heterogeneity which can cause the exclusion of certain 
type of producers and lead to elite capture of certification benefits. This chapter builds 
around these factors to set out the broader context of this research, in order to enable the 
reader to better engage with the analytical chapters that follow.  
The chapter is structured as follows: first it discusses the the power relations between 
cocoa buyers and producers at the global level (section 2.2). This is followed by a 
review of the historical and institutional context shaping the dynamics of the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector (section 2.3), and its socio-economic structures (section 2.4). Section 2.5 
provides an overview of the SSC programmes studied in this research, while the final 
section concludes.  
2.2.Power relations between producers and buyers  
More than four million MT of cocoa beans are produced every year (ICCO, 2017) for a 
chocolate industry which is worth an estimated $110 billion a year (Torre and Jones, 
2014; Percival, 2015). More than 70% of these beans are produced in West Africa, with 
Côte d’Ivoire alone producing about 42%, and Ghana accounting for 17% of the global 
cocoa production (ICCO, 2017). Between five and six million farmers are estimated to 
be involved in cocoa production, two million of which in West Africa, using about ten 
million hectares to produce the crop (Potts et al., 2014). Consumption, on the other 
hand, is heavily concentrated in Europe, with Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, UK and 
	 	
 31
Norway leading in the per capita consumption of chocolate (McCarthy, 2015). Figure 3 
visualises the volumes (thousand MT) of cocoa produced and consumed across the 
globe. 
Figure. 3: Global cocoa production and consumption (thousand MT) 
Growing cocoa is a labour intensive process with little margin of mechanisation. The 
crop is “delicate and sensitive” and farmers must protect the trees from wind and sun, 
while also constantly observing for signs of pests and disease (WCF, 2018: na). Cocoa 
pods, which contain around 20 to 30 cocoa beans each, may ripe at any time, although 
in most cocoa producing zones there are two main periods of peak production, one 
heavier than the other, each lasting several months (ibid). The need to monitor trees 
continuously for ripe or infested pods makes human presence on the farm necessary on 
a year-round basis. Ripe pods are manually harvested and opened to extract the beans, 
while the fermentation and drying of the beans also require frequent attention to attain 
exportation quality standards. These tasks are therefore undertaken on or very close to 
the farm, allowing few economies of scale (Kaplinsky, 2004). As a result, most cocoa 
beans are -and historically have been - produced on small or medium-sized, family-run 
farms (WCF, 2018; Kaplinsky, 2004), making use of a combination of family, 
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The previous two Barometers were instrumental in kick-starting the 
conversation on farmer livelihoods. Now that a living income is seen as a 
keystone for the cocoa sector, this Barometer goes in depth into this could 
be achieved, in the focus area “Ensuring a Living Income”. In addition, 
cocoa farming need to see a viable local infrastructure, including schools, 
health care, and access to markets. There is a key role for both companies 
and specifically governments to play on that level. The second focus 
area on “Transparency and Accountability” takes a deeper look into the 
prerequisites for this. 
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sharecropping, and hired labour (Barrientos, 2014; Robertson, 1987; Okali, 1983). 
Although cocoa cultivation has been considered mainly a male occupation in West 
African societies, women have been systematically supplying labour related to planting, 
caring for young trees, harvesting, pod breaking, carrying, fermenting and drying of 
cocoa. This has been documented as “unpaid family labour” by Barrientos (2014:792), 
although Guyer (1980:364) notes that at least among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria and 
the Beti of South-Central Cameroun “systems of reward in kind for agricultural services 
rendered by wives to their husbands” that applied to other crops were also extended to 
cocoa. Moreover, wage labourers and sharecroppers are reported to significantly 
contribute to the production of the crop in Ghana, with labour migration from the north 
of the country and from Burkina Faso being documented as early as the 1910s (Okali, 
1983; Roberston, 1987).  
Over the last decades significant changes have marked the dynamics of the global cocoa 
production network. At the cocoa production level, there has been a critical reduction of 
the role of the state in the regulation, marketing and pricing of the crop. This was 
reflected mainly in the abolishment of state-owned cocoa marketing boards amid market 
reforms and structural adjustment programmes driven by the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Fold, 2002; Barrientos, 2014; Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2011; Barrientos, 2011; Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2008). Ghana’s Cocoa 
Board (COCOBOD) is an exceptional survivor, as discussed in the next section. The 
effect of the withdrawal of state protectionism is disputed, with some authors arguing 
that effective reforms led to increased prices for producers (Akiyama et al., 2003), while 
others suggesting that they caused a decrease, deterioration and elimination of public 
extension services, provision of inputs, and export facilitation, which lead to a decline 
of the productivity of small farmers, as well as a decrease in the quality of the exported 
beans (Fold, 2002; Barrientos, 2014).  
At the processing and manufacturing level, on the other hand, an increasing corporate 
consolidation is being observed, following a series of merges and acquisitions between 
traders, grinders and manufacturers (Losch, 2002; Kaplinsky, 2004; Fold, 2002; Ryan, 
2011; Barrientos, 2014). One of the most characteristic cases is Kraft’s (hostile) 
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takeover of Cadbury in 2011, which then got restructured and gave birth to Mondeléz 
International, currently the second larger confectionary manufacturer in the world 
(Moeller, 2012; Walker, 2016).The $1.2 billion acquisition of ADM by Olam in 2015 
has further consolidated the processing sector, which is now dominated by only three 
cocoa processing firms (Barry Callebaut, Cargill and Olam) operating across the globe 
(McFarlane and Hunt, 2015). At the manufacturer front, the six biggest chocolate 
manufacturers (Mars, Mondelez International, Nestlé, Ferrero, Hershey, Lindt & 
Sprungli) accounted for 60% of the global chocolate market in 2016, while Hershey and 
Mars alone controlled over 70% of the US market in 2017 (Statista, 2018a & 2018b).    
These two trends, market liberalisation and corporate consolidation, create a market 
asymmetry: a concentrated cocoa-chocolate market on the one hand, and a 
heterogeneous, fragmented and unorganised base of producers, sharecroppers and hired 
labourers on the other (Barrientos, 2011). Coupled with the absence of supporting 
structures, most of which collapsed with the liberalisation of the market, the average 
cocoa farmer is left with a daily income far below the poverty line of $2/day and more 
exposed to the volatility of the international market (Barrientos, 2014; Fountain and 
Hutz-Adams, 2015). Many industry stakeholders argue that this market asymmetry is 
putting global cocoa production at risk and call for collective action to make the cocoa 
economy operate in a “more sustainable and cooperative manner” (World Cocoa 
Conference, 2012:1). The Abidjan Cocoa Declaration, signed by 29 cocoa and chocolate 
companies, organisations and producing countries, also makes particular mention of the 
necessity to provide “opportunities for smallholder farmers to move out of poverty and 
to improve their livelihoods”, placing poverty reduction at the centre of the future 
actions the industry should take (ICCO, 2013:no page number).  
2.3.The historical and institutional context  
Literature on the early years of Ghana’s cocoa economy suggests that its development 
and expansion at the end of the 19th century was largely driven by the initiative of local 
farmers (Okali, 1983) without the involvement of “foreign owned plantations or foreign 
settlers” (Beckman (1976:37) or even agricultural experts (Gordon, 1976), heavily 
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contrasting with the development of plantations for export crops at the same time in 
East Africa (Milburn, 1976). The establishment of the crop is largely attributed to 
farmers from the Eastern region of Ghana, whose business orientation drove them 
westwards to acquire virgin forest land from the local chiefs for cocoa cultivation (Hill, 
1963 & 1970, Berry, 1993; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011). 
These 'migrant' farmers spent long periods working on their farms in the new lands, 
"like sailors taking very long voyages" away from their homelands, while maintaining 
strong links with their original communities (Hill, 1963:1, quoting Dr M.J. Field). 
Characterised by a commercial attitude towards farming, they continuously sought to 
expand to virgin lands and systematically re-invested cocoa profits in new farms, as 
well as in transportation and other complementary businesses (Beckman, 1976). 
Breaking the stereotype of the inefficient small African peasant, Hill (1963:3) reported 
that these ‘rural capitalists’ were “remarkably responsive to economic incentives [and] 
remarkably dedicated (within the framework of cocoa-farming) to the pursuits of 
economic ends”, and saved, accumulated and invested in the long run to expand the 
cultivation of the crop. Gradually cocoa farming was also adopted by non-migrant 
farmers throughout the already populated areas, and in some districts 'native farmers' 
prevailed (Beckman, 1976; Hill, 1963), developing, however, different cocoa farming 
organisational structures particularly regarding access to land and labour (Okali, 1983).  
Besides its contribution to the family economy, cocoa was seen by the Ghanaian state as 
a legitimate public good, a "national resource" to fund the country's development plans 
after independence (Mikell, 1992:140; Ryan, 2011). Like in other cocoa producing Sub-
Saharan countries, cocoa in Ghana was heavily taxed and controlled by the state 
through its cocoa board (McMillan, 1998; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011). Unlike other 
cocoa producing countries, however, Ghana resisted international pressure to abolish 
COCOBOD. The sector was only partially liberalised in 1992 by allowing private 
Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) to buy cocoa beans at the farm level through 
Purchasing Clerks (PCs), usually themselves cocoa farmers. It is estimated that about 28 
LBCs operate today in the country (PBC, 2018). COCOBOD not only grants these 
companies license to operate, but also provides them with operating capital at the 
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beginning of the cocoa season. It also fixes a unique minimum farm gate price for 
farmers, which is supposed to be 70% of the Free On Board (FOB) cocoa price (Victor 
et al., 2010), although others report that it does not exceed 60% (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 
2017). Moreover, COCOBOD is still present in all the steps of the cocoa chain: it 
provides extension services to farmers; ensures the quality of the beans; controls both 
internal and external markets, regulates farm-gate prices and remains the only exporter 
of Ghanaian cocoa (Kolavalli et al., 2012; Laven, 2010; Mohammed, Asamoah and 
Asiedu-Appiah, 2011; Barrientos, 2014). It is due to COCOBOD quality controls that 
Ghanaian cocoa have a market reputation of exceptional quality that attracts a 
“substantial quality premium compared with cocoa from other countries” (Quarmine et 
al. 2012:7). This semi-liberalised model is also deemed to provide protection to farmers 
against international price fluctuation and to ensure the efficiency of both internal and 
external marketing (Williams, 2009; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011; Kolavalli et al.. 2012). 
Although the value of COCOBOD’s services is generally recognised (Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2011), it is also argued that full liberalisation of the sector (i.e. elimination of 
COCOBOD, privatisation of state-owned assets, reduction in taxes, increased role of 
private sector in providing inputs and credit to farmers) would free up financial 
resources, improve market effectiveness, and reduce distortions in cocoa prices, the 
combination of which would eventually lead to an increase in the producers' share of the 
FOB price (Akiyama et al., 2003; Gilbert and Varangis, 2004; Vigneri and Santos, 
2008). 
Currently, cocoa provides 20% (US $ 2.6 billion) of the total Ghanaian exports (US $ 
13.2 billion) (Sulaiman and Boachie-Danquah, 2017), and remains closely linked to the 
country’s economy as the popular saying ‘Cocoa is Ghana and Ghana is cocoa’ 
suggests. Nowadays 700,000 farmers in the southern tropical belt of the country are 
estimated to produce more than 800 thousand MT cocoa beans per year (ICCO, 2017; 
Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011). It is not clear what percentage of these beans are certified 
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due to double certification practices.  It is reported, however, that in 2015 Ghana 4
produced 169,057 MT of UTZ, 103,954 MT of Rainforest Alliance, and 79,678 MT of 
Fairtrade certified cocoa (Lernoud et al. 2017). Ghana’s cocoa growing areas and 
administrative regions are depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Ghana’s cocoa growing  and administrative regions 
Although cocoa cultivation initially emerged in the Eastern region, data on COCOBOD 
purchases from 2010 to 2015 per region indicate that today the bulk of cocoa production 
is currently located in the Western region, with an average of 470 thousand MT per 
year, equaling more than half of the national average production (see Table 2). The 
Ashanti region comes second with 17.13% of the national supply, followed by the 
Brong Ahafo, Central and Eastern regions with percentages ranging from 8.5 to 10 
percent of the total Ghanaian cocoa supply. The Volta region produces clearly much less 
 Double (or multi-) certification, common also in the case of certified coffee (Ruben and 4
Hoebink, 2015),  occurs because some standards are very similar (see UTZ and Rainforest 
Alliance) which means that once a farmer complies with one standard, adding the second one 
does not require a significant extra effort. For this reason, farmers and POs often opt for 
multiple certifications to maximise their market access opportunities. According to the UTZ 
2016 Cocoa Statistics Report, for instance, 22 percent of the cocoa certified as UTZ was also 
Rainforest Alliance certified, while 10 percent was also Fairtrade certified (UTZ, 2017b).
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than the rest of the cocoa producing regions with an average of 3.5 thousand tones, 
accounting for only 0.40% of the national production.  
Table 2: COCOBOD cocoa purchases in MT by cocoa district 
An illustration of the Ghanaian production per cocoa district from 2010 to 1015 is 
presented in Figure 5, indicating that although volumes purchased in the North of the 
Western region have decreased in the season 2014-205, the Western region as a whole is 
by far the leader in national cocoa production. 
Region\ 
Season
2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 Average % of 
total 
Ashanti 168’815 131’981 137’379 156'902 136’568 146'329 17.13
Brong 
Ahafo
103’463 74'587 88'034 87’116 81’130 86'866 10.17
Central 75'232 69'467 71’540 85'446 71'647 74'667 8.74
Eastern 78'384 65'326 75’912 80’692 68'842 73'831 8.64
Western 
North
330'284 282’947 242’899 239'346 115’816 242'258 28.36
Western 
South 
253’401 235’710 215’031 243'933 186'516 226'918 26.56
Volta 3’241 3'499 4'495 3’481 2'647 3’473 0.40
Total 1’012'820 863’518 835’289 896’917 663’167 854’341 100
Source: Author’s creation based on data provided by Cocobod
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Figure 5: Ghanaian production per cocoa district (2010-2015, cumulative) 
2.4.Socio-economic mobility and structures 
Cocoa cultivation in Ghana, at least at the early years, appears to have contributed to a 
"widespread, if modest, upwards mobility” (Berry, 1993:158), as the practice of 
converting virgin land into cocoa farms provided opportunities of socio-economic 
differentiation not only to the wealthier farmers but also to the ones with less resources. 
Hill (1963:16) highlights that the "company" system of purchasing land, which 
facilitated collective land purchases where each member of the company was allocated 
a strip of land proportional to the its financial contribution, allowed “rich and poor 
alike” to purchase land. Maybe for this reason, the expansion of the crop did not result 
in vast accumulations of land. Cocoa production remained in small family farms of six 
to seven acres producing around a ton of output, using seasonal labour at peak periods 
of the year (Young, Sherman and Rose, 1981:165). Larger farms did emerged, but these 
were usually divided in smaller plots and left in the care of sharecroppers, who received 
one third of the crop in exchange, the so-called ‘abusa’ (i.e. one-third in the Twi 
language) (Takane, 2000).  5
 Twi is a dialect of the Akan language spoken in southern and central Ghana. It is currently 5
used as the common language between cocoa farmers, even for non Akan farmers. 
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Abusa productive relationships have been fundamental to the development of the 
Ghanaian cocoa economy, with Polly Hill attributing the production of “as much as 
three-quarters of Ghanaian cocoa” in the 1950s to such sharecropping arrangement 
(Robertson, 1987:53, citing Hill, 1956:9). Still today, abusa sharecroppers (also locally 
referred to as ‘caretakers’) work on already developed cocoa farms and are “responsible 
for spraying, weeding and harvesting” (Knudsen and Fold, 2011:379). Abusa contracts 
tend to be long-term arrangements, which can provide the sharecropper with “a very 
secure relationship to the land and the product of his labour” after a decade or so of 
work (Robertson, 1987:73). Nevertheless, decisions regarding when and to whom the 
cocoa should be sold remain with the landowner who may reside nearby and oversee the 
sharecropper’s work (Knudsen and Fold, 2011) or be an ‘absentee’ farmer, i.e. a farmer 
who no longer resides in the community, but only sporadically visits to oversee the 
sharecropper. Overall, there is an ambiguity around the figure of the sharecropper which 
can be considered both as a tenant farmer and a labourer, “dependent yet independent”, 
at the same time (Robertson, 1980:412). In fact, according to Robertson (1987:71), 
sharecroppers gradually mature from 'abusa labourers’, while the owner supplies them 
with farming tools and inputs, to ‘abusa tenants’, when they assume greater 
responsibility in managing the farm, and start using their own farming tools instead of 
those of their farm-owners (Iliffe, 1983). Robertson (1987) notes that an indication of 
the transition from labourer to tenant is the permission given to the sharecroppers to set 
up a food crop farm for their own subsistence. In general, however, it appears that 
sharecroppers remain a hybrid between the two, being paid their share as ‘labourers’, 
but also paying over a share of the crop as ‘tenants’ (ibid). Currently abusa contracts are 
still widespread in the Ghanaian cocoa sector (Boni, 2005; Takane, 2000), despite their 
numbers being underestimated by survey data (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2018).  
Despite being "treated and paid poorly in times of declining farm incomes”, landless 
sharecroppers and hired workers, were also commonly able to move “into self-
employment”, by acquiring their own land (Berry, 1993:149). Land-labour exchange 
contracts, called ‘abunu' are likely to have enable these farmers to become landowners, 
particularly after the 1970s when opportunities for accessing low cost virgin land started 
to decrease (Ruf, 2014; Boni, 2005). Abunu, which means ‘division in two’ in Twi 
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(Takane, 2000), are agreements between landowners and tenant farmers by which 
tenants are given a specific number of years to establish a cocoa farm by clearing the 
land and “taking full responsibility of all farm tasks (planting of seedlings, weeding, 
spraying and harvesting)” (Knudsen and Fold, 2011: 379). While the tenant farmer 
receives no reward until the cocoa trees mature, once the trees become harvestable, 
landowner and tenant split the revenue from the sales in two. More important, when 
cocoa production is stabilised and the work is considered completed, the cocoa farm is 
divided into two equal parts, one for the farm owner and one for the tenant who acquires 
“permanent farming right over his/her share" (Boni, 2005: 193). As a result, by entering 
an abunu contract, a tenant farmer acquires land entitlements to half of the farm, 
assuming that the he/she will be successful in the completion of the agreement. Like 
abusa, abunu contracts are also very popular up to date (Takane, 2000; Boni, 2005).  
Both abusa and abunu arrangements and the possibilities of socio-economic mobility 
they offer- mainly through land ownership- are further discussed in chapter 6. It is 
worth noting here, however, that overall, cocoa farming in Ghana provided 
opportunities for wealth accumulation and social differentiation which lead to the 
emergence of “a class of rich farmers who were able to access formal education for their 
children, both locally and overseas” (Anyidoho, Leavy and Asenso-Okyere, 2012:22, 
citing Nukunya, 1992). This trend may have decreased over the last decades, 
particularly due to the now scarce opportunities of accessing virgin land. Nevertheless, 
during the 1990s, cocoa farming-households were reported to experience significant 
improvements in their living conditions compared to food crop farmers (Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2011:206, citing McKay and Coulombe, 2003). General statements on wealth 
creation and land accumulation, however, tend to regard cocoa farmers as a 
homogeneous group, overlooking the complexity of the socio-economic organisation of 
the production of the crop. In reality, under the term ‘cocoa farmer’ there are farmers 
with different access to resources and to profits from cocoa production, differentiated by 
migrant status, gender, land ownership and labour arrangements (Hill, 1963; Takane, 
2002; Deppeler, 2014). The literature suggests that not all farmers involved in cocoa 
production benefited equally from wealth creation opportunities. Okali (1983) and 
Amanor (2005) report cases of concentration of land and wealth, while according to 
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Berry (1993: 157-158), farmers with less resources and negotiation power, such as 
landless sharecroppers and workers or women working on family land, have been 
"systematically excluded” from the distribution of profits resulting from cocoa 
commercialisation. 
2.5.Overview of programmes studied in this research  
Three main models of cocoa SSC programmes dominate the Ghanaian context. The 
cooperative model, where the certificate is owned by a farmers’ cooperative and farmers 
are supposed to sell the certified cocoa to the certified cooperative; the LBC model, 
where the certificate is owned by an LBC and farmers are supposed to sell the certified 
cocoa to the certified LBC; and the Cocoa Life model, where the certificate is owned by 
a farmers’ cooperative which, however, does not purchase cococa and therefore farmers 
can sell the certified cocoa to the LBC of their choice. These three models are 
represented in this research by three cases of SSC programmes presented below. 
• The Fairtrade certified cooperative/LBC Kuapa Kokoo 
Kuapa Kokoo (‘good cocoa farming' in Twi) was formed in 1993 by a group of farmers 
following the internal liberalisation of the Ghanaian cocoa market (Tiffin et al., 2004; 
Doherty and Tranchell, 2005). It started operating in 1993 across 22 villages (Tiffen, 
2002) with the support of a start-up loan from the British NGO Twin and village-level 
training from the Dutch NGO SNV. In 1995 Kuapa Kokoo became the first Fairtrade 
certified cocoa cooperative in Ghana and a special channel was created within 
COCOBOD for Fairtrade cocoa (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). As the first Fairtrade 
certified, farmer-owned, cooperative-LBC in Ghana, Kuapa Kokoo has attracted 
extended support from international institutions, NGOs and cocoa industry actors over 
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the years, possibly as a result of the ‘honey pot effect’.  Today Kuapa Kokoo is among 6
the five larger LBCs of the country (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011) and is estimated to 
have more than 100,000 members across 1,300 cocoa growing communities (Kuapa 
Kokoo, 2018).  
Kuapa Kokoo can be regarded as an “open doors” certification programme, since there 
is no limit to the number of farmers that can join the cooperative. Any farmer who 
grows cocoa, is over the age of 18, and willing to pay the membership entrance and 
yearly fees is in principle eligible to do so (private communication with Kuapa Kokoo 
officers). In 2016 Kuapa Kokoo went through a restructuring process which required all 
of its members to become co-owners of the cooperative. This meant that existing 
members had to re-register and buy a share in order to confirm their membership. As a 
result, at the time of data collection it was still unclear the exact amount that farmers 
would need to pay to remain or become members of the ‘new’ Kuapa Kokoo. It was 
also unclear whether this process would be open to farm operators. Sharecroppers have 
been previously reported to be excluded from Kuapa Kokoo membership (Nelson et al., 
2013) and the eligibility of non-farm owners remained an ambiguous issue through the 
re-registration process (see also section 1.3). Cooperative members are expected to sell 
their produce to the LBC Kuapa Kokoo, which means that participation in the SSC 
programme is conditional on the selling channel. 
• The Fairtrade certified cooperatives of the Cocoa Life programme  
Cocoa Life is a $400 million cocoa sustainability programme funded by corporate giant 
manufacturer Mondelez, which currently operates in six cocoa producing countries: 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, India, the Dominican Republic and Brazil (Cocoa Life, 
2018). The programme built on the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP), a programme 
 The “honey pot effect” is a term used to described cases where certified producers’ 6
organisations and cooperatives become the “focus of aid” for channeling funds towards 
producers in developing countries (Oya et al. 2017:121; Nelson, Tallontire and Collinson, 2002; 
Griffiths, 2011).In the case of Kuapa Kokoo it is characteristic that in 1998, with support from 
Christian-Aid and Comic Relief, the cooperative became the co-owner of the Day Chocolate 
Company (now Divine Chocolate Company Limited) along with Twin Trading and the Body 
Shop.Two years later and with the the support of Twin and DfID, Kuapa Kokoo Credit Union 
was formed, to provide credit to members at competitive rates (Kuapa Kokoo, 2018b; Vigneri 
and Santos, 2008). 
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initiated by Cadbury in 2008, before passing to the ownership of Mondelez in 2010. 
Under the CCP seven cooperatives, including numerous local societies of farmers, were 
created and later encouraged to become Fairtrade certified. Nevertheless, in 2015, 
Mondelez decided to gradually switch from Fairtrade certification to verification. This 
means that the final product will no longer bear the distinctive Fairtrade logo, but 
FLOCERT, the auditing body of Fairtrade, will provide verification, using a ‘tailor-
made’ system to verify the quantities of cocoa grown under the Cocoa Life program and 
to validate whether premiums are paid to the POs (Nieburg, 2015). The move confirms 
a broader tendency for companies to switch to in-house sustainable schemes (Sahota, 
2017).  
Cocoa Life cooperatives are in principle an open doors programme, i.e. there is no limit 
to the number of farmers that can become members of a cooperative. Farmers need to 
pay an entrance fee to join the group and then a monthly fee to remain members. Both 
are supposed to be fairly affordable for all farmers. According to the president of 
Asunafo North, the Cocoa Life cooperative based in Goaso, Brong Ahafo, each local 
society decides the exact amount of both the entrance and monthly fees, which in 
general are “around 5 GHS” for the entrance fee and 1-2 GHS for the monthly fee.  7
During data collection, however, farmers reported higher amounts of both entrance and 
monthly membership fees (i.e. 60-70 GHS to enter the cooperative and a monthly due 
of 5GHS).  This increase was decided by the general assembly of the group on the basis 8
that new members should pay more to enter an already consolidated organisation where 
older members have already invested more time and money. Although these were still 
largely affordable amounts, some farmers reported not being able to pay their dues on a 
regular basis.  
Another key characteristic of the Cocoa Life cooperatives is that they are not licensed to 
buy cocoa. This leads to the paradox of a farmers’ cooperative that does not 
commercialise its members’ produce. Instead, farmer members can sell their cocoa to 
the PC/LBC of their choice. This is because Mondelez, who buys (part) of the cocoa 
 This would be the equivalent of 0.73 GBP to enter the cooperative and between 0.15-0.30 GBP  7
to remain a member. 
 Around 9-10 GBP to enter the cooperative and 0.73 GBP of monthly fee. 8
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produced by the groups as Fairtrade certified,  is implementing a ‘mass balance’ system, 9
which does not require the cocoa to be traceable back to the producer.  This peculiarity 10
means that participation in the SSC programme is not conditional on the selling channel 
and farmers can sell to the PC/LBC of their choice and still join the programme. The 
absence of selling conditionality makes it easier for tenant farmers and sharecroppers to 
join the Cocoa Life activities, which are open to both members and non-members in the 
community. Nevertheless, the eligibility status of non-land owners remains unclear as in 
other Fairtrade programmes.  
• The UTZ certified Touton-PBC programme 
This programme is the result of a partnership between the LBC Produce Buying 
Company (PBC) and the French cocoa processor Touton, who is the buyer of the 
certified cocoa. The partnership is strategic, since PBC, previously the cocoa buying 
subsidiary of COCOBOD, remains Ghana’s largest LBC buying around 30% of the 
country’s cocoa according to data provided by COCOBOD. It has the most extensive 
buying network throughout the country and enjoys a special status among farmers as it 
is still often seen as a trusted government related actor, despite the fact that the company 
has been privatised during the market liberalisation process (PBC, 2018).  With the 11
technical support of the Dutch-based NGO Solidaridad, an UTZ certification 
programme was set up in 2010-2011. The programme has a predetermined upward limit 
 It is noted that Mondelez was previously buying Fairtrade cocoa from Kuapa Kokoo. 9
However, when the Cocoa Life groups became Fairtrade certified, Mondelez started to 
gradually replace these volumes by cocoa produced by the Cocoa Life cooperatives, which are 
part of Mondelez sustainability programme. 
 The ‘mass balance’ system allows processors and manufacturers to use non-certified cocoa to 10
produce certified products, as long as a company purchases the equivalent amounts of certified 
cocoa it sells as certified. The concept was developed to facilitate the use of certification in 
complex supply chains where product traceability is logistically challenging and costly and 
therefore can have detrimental effects on the demand of the certified crop (Fairtrade 
International, 2018a; UTZ, 2018b). Traceability in the cocoa chain can be indeed challenging, as 
cocoa beans from different sources tend to be mixed during shipping and manufacturing and 
therefore keeping certified separated from non-certified cocoa throughout the whole supply 
chain can be problematic (UTZ, 2018c). Currently all the main cocoa sustainability certification 
standards use the mass balance system (UTZ, 2018c; Fairtrade International, 2018a; Rainforest 
Alliance, 2016). 
 The government of Ghana still controls about 35% of the shares of the company, while 11
another 35% belongs to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and the rest 
to other private investors (Private communication with PBC manager).
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of the farmers it can enrol in each society (i.e. initially 50 and then 58), meaning that 
not all the eligible farmers willing to join the programme can do so. In other words, this 
is a “closed doors” certification programme that can only enrol up to certain number of 
farmers. On the other hand, the fact that the programme is implemented through an 
LBC, in this case PBC, means that the presence of a PO or cooperative of farmers is not 
necessary. There is no entrance or monthly fee for the farmers who wish to join the 
programme, however, participation is conditional on selling to the PC of PBC. Being an 
UTZ programme, tenant and sharecropping farmers are, at least in theory, eligible to 
join the certified groups (see section 1.3). Table 3 summarises the key characteristics of 
the three SSC programmes which are relevant for understanding their selection 
processes.  
Table 3. Key characteristics of studied certification programmes 
SSC programme 
Key characteristics Kuapa Kokoo Cocoa-Life Touton-PBC 
Standard Fairtrade Fairtrade UTZ
Funded by Cocoa buyers 
(various) & NGO 
support 
Cocoa buyer 
(Mondelez)
Cocoa buyer (Touton) 
Certificate owner Kuapa Kokoo Cocoa-Life 
cooperatives 
LBC PBC 
Membership fee Unclear. Farmers 
need to buy a share 
of Kuapa Kokoo to 
enter and then pay 
annual fees. 
Unclear, exact 
amount is decided 
at the local s
No membership fee
Participation Unlimited (open 
doors)
Unlimited (open 
doors)
Limited (closed doors) -
max 58 farmers/society
Selling channel Participant farmers 
are expected to sell 
the certified cocoa to 
Kuala Kokoo (selling 
conditionality)
Farmers can sell to 
any LBC (no 
selling 
conditionality) 
Participant farmers are 
expected to sell the 
certified cocoa to PBC 
(selling conditionality)
Eligibility Land owners who are 
not making use of 
permanent hired 
labour. Unclear for 
sharecropping and 
tenant farmers. 
Land owners who 
are not making use 
of permanent hired 
labour. Unclear for 
sharecropping and 
tenant farmers. 
The person who 
represents the farm and 
is responsible for the 
production, land owners, 
tenant and sharecropping 
farmers included. 
Source: Author’s creation based on primary data
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2.6.Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide the reader with the contextual background of 
cocoa SSC programmes studied in this research. Starting by reviewing the power 
relations between producers and buyers at the global level, the chapter discussed how an 
oligopoly of corporations is increasingly controlling the processing and manufacturing 
side of the cocoa-chocolate global economy, while a fragmented body of mainly 
unorganised farmers is faced with decreasing productivity and deteriorating supporting 
structures. This market asymmetry is causing industry stakeholders to call for collective 
action in order to make the sector to operate in a more sustainable manner. The rapid 
growth of SSC programmes should be understood in this context. The discussion then 
focused on the particular historical and institutional context of the Ghanaian cocoa 
economy and highlighted how the sector was initially driven by the initiative of local 
farmers, before being hijacked by the Ghanaian state. The current role of COCOBOD 
was then described to elucidate  the sector’s operational structure. This was followed by 
a review of the socio-economic structures and mobility opportunities within the cocoa 
economy. Emphasis was placed on the contractual agreements ‘abunu’ and ‘abusa’ as 
they are relevant to the eligibility and participant selection processes discussed in the 
empirical chapters 6 and 7. Finally, the chapter provided an overview of the three SSC 
programmes whose selection processes are examined in this research, underlying two 
key characteristics that need to be kept in mind in order to understand the selection 
dynamics: first, whether the programme has the capacity to enrol an unlimited number 
of farmers (i.e. ‘open’ vs ‘closed’ doors), and second, whether participation in the 
programme is linked to selling to particular buyer (i.e. selling conditionality). The 
following chapter presents the conceptual foundations of this study, namely how 
development programmes and selection issues are understood in this work.  
	 	
 47
3. Theoretical and conceptual framework  
3.1.Introduction  
This chapter outlines the theories and concepts used in this study to understand how 
farmers select into SSC programmes. These types of programmes tend to be a hybrid 
between development and market interventions, blending elements from both realms. 
They are deeply embedded in the global industry of the certified commodity, but also in 
the local socio-economic, institutional and cultural context (Oya et al. 2017). 
Additionally, they involve multiple actors from different settings, each with distinct 
interests (i.e. private companies, government institutions, NGOs, POs, etc). To grasp 
this complexity, this chapter first reviews the concepts of intervention and outlines the 
approach adopted by this research (section 3.2). Then it discusses how the the concept 
of selection has been dealt with in different literatures and specifies how selection is 
understood in this study (section 3.3.). Finally, section 3.4 concludes.  
3.2.Development interventions, projects and 
programmes  
3.2.1.Actor-oriented approach  
The terms intervention, programme and project are all used to describe the relationship 
between policy, implementation and outcomes. Although the term intervention is often 
avoided due to its resonance with external (unsolicited) interference as well as with 
conflict, violence, or military action, some authors argue that it adequately captures the 
dynamics of international development as the result of an intentional activity which 
differs from a natural process (Kontinen, 2004; Cowen and Shenton, 1998). Rossi, 
Lipsey and Freeman (2003:29) use the terms ‘social intervention’ and ‘social 
programme’ interchangeably to describe “an organized, planned, and usually ongoing 
effort designed to ameliorate a social problem or improve social conditions”. Similarly, 
projects have been commonly delineated as sets of organised activities, using 
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predetermined resources within a planned timeline to achieve clearly defined objectives 
that aim at producing positive socio-economic change in specific geographic areas and 
populations (Hirschman, 1967; Rondinelli, 1983; Gittinger, 1985; Honadle and 
Rosengard 1983). Rondinelli (1983) particularly emphasised the role of development 
projects as financial investments for policy implementation.  
This view of policy interventions as a neatly planned set of activities has been criticised, 
both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. At the empirical level, Brinkerhoff 
(1991) expressed concerns regarding the project modality in international development 
having undesired effects such as duplication of efforts between the public and the 
private sector, lack of continuity once the project resources are finished, ‘brain drain’ in 
the public sector, etc. At the conceptual level, Morgan (1983) criticised the failure of the 
project structure to grasp the complexity and urgency of development needs through its 
narrow rationalism. Ferguson (1994), on the other hand, questioned that development 
projects are simple reflections of the donors and implementers’ interests and objectives, 
and highlighted the importance of accounting for the unintended, and often unnoticed, 
effects of an intervention.  
Furthering this critique, Long (2001) argued against seeing the relationship between 
policy, implementation and outcomes as a linear process which progresses orderly from 
policy objectives to materialised outcomes. According to Long and van Der Ploeg 
(1989), social interventions are not disconnected from the social dynamics and the 
interplay of the different actors involved and cannot be exclusively confined to 
(artificial) time and space boundaries. The concept of ‘project’ therefore is problematic, 
as it fails to capture the multiplicity and complexity of the development processes, 
where actors (from implementers and ‘experts’ to recipient populations) and structures 
reciprocally and continuously influence each other (Long, 2004; Long, 1999; Long and 
van Der Ploeg, 1989; Kontinen, 2004). Instead, Long and van der Ploeg (1989) 
suggested that interventions are embedded in the actions and interactions of state and 
civil society, which shape their conception, design and implementation. For instance, 
interventions can be influenced by people’s memories of previous experiences of 
interventions, accounts of other people’s experiences, as well as by other livelihood 
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experiences and concerns, therefore making any “clear beginning” or “final cut-off 
point” of an intervention meaningless to those involved (Long and var Der Ploeg, 1989: 
229; Long, 2004). Given these considerations, Long and van der Ploeg (1989) stressed 
the importance of understanding how interventions are inserted in the lives of 
individuals and groups, and how they enable or constrain their social strategies. Overall, 
Long (2001:25) argued that he concept of development intervention as a carefully 
planned set of actions, discrete in time and space, with predefined expected outcomes 
needs to be deconstructed, “so that it can be seen for what it is - an ongoing, socially-
constructed, negotiated, experiential and meaning-creating process”.  
Nevertheless, Long’s actor-oriented approach can be problematic if it creates the false 
impression that actors involved in development interventions are compartmentalised 
into mutually excluding groups of “aid givers” and “aid recipients”, while in reality the 
roles between donors and beneficiaries (or extension staff and farmers) are flexible and 
permanently renegotiated (Rossi, 2006:27; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). The approach has 
also been criticised for overemphasising the role of actors and playing down structural 
issues of wider politics and economics (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). According to Mosse 
and Lewis (2006), these drawbacks can be offset by complementing Long’s actor-
oriented approach with Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which rejects a priori separations 
between institutions and society.   
3.2.2.Actor network theory  
Resulting from the sociological studies of science and technology of Callon (1986), 
Latour (1987) and Law (1992), ANT argues that facts are not true because of their inner 
validity but because of a network of heterogeneous actors (i.e. human, material or 
conceptual), which cooperate to make them credible and accepted (Law, 1992). ANT 
explores how actor-networks form, how they grow in size and scale, how they 
consolidate and how they gain durability over time (Stanforth, 2009) or, “how pretty 
much anything can hold together and gain influence” (Scott-Smith, 2013:12). The 
approach is currently adopted, adapted and applied in all sorts of disciplines beyond 
science and technology (e.g. Murdoch, 1997; Hughes 2000; Müller 2012; Bockman and 
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Eyal, 2002; Hawkins 2011; Busch and Juska, 1997). It is used to unpack the ‘black 
boxes’ that keep things commonly taken for granted from being debated, and to 
examine how conventions, such as concepts, theories, or institutions, come into being 
and establish themselves (Scott-Smith, 2013). In this process, ANT also examines how 
and why some actor-networks are more successful than others in becoming solid, large 
and durable. Successful actor- networks involve ‘translating’ varying “perspectives and 
interests into one (apparently) coherent whole” (Long 2015: 36).  This process, by 12
which heterogeneous actors converge into one point and are treated as a single node in a 
wider network is referred to in ANT as ‘blackboxing’ (Latour, 1987; Law, 1992).  13
Using the ANT lens, development interventions can be seen as the result of a process 
which requires finding a point of convergence between varying and even conflicting 
interests of different actors, such as government institutions, aid agencies and NGOs, 
research institutes and private advisers and consultants (Mosse, 2005). ANT therefore 
allows assessing the success of development interventions on the basis of the quality of 
the alliances and consensuses built between actors and not in terms of its a priori design 
or policy (ibid). This perspective implies that development interventions do not have 
inherent superior or inferior qualities, but their success (or failure) depends on their 
ability to gain ‘robustness’ (Callon, 1991), i.e. to convince a significant number of 
actors that a project can advance their own interests (Scott-Smith, 2013). 
This notion of success is, of course, entirely different from the one found in impact 
evaluation of interventions, where success is measured in terms of effects on 
participants related to predefined outcomes. By detaching success from the stated 
objectives and measurable outcomes of the intervention, ANT allows capturing the 
The term ‘translation’ is used in ANT to describe how heterogeneous actors join a network, 12
aligning their interests and wills to end up with a single voice, as if the entire network was a 
single actor. By converting the heterogeneous wills of the actors involved in a network “into a 
single, larger will” (Scott-Smith, 2013:5), networks become able to act as a single ‘punctualised’ 
actor (Law, 1992).
 In ANT ‘black boxes’ refer to the things that are taken for granted, restricted from being 13
discussed and questioned. These can be seen as the building bricks of actor-networks. The more 
elements are placed in this “situation of agreement or indifference” (e.g. relationships, practices, 
ideas, objects, etc.) the larger and stronger an actor-networks becomes (Scott-Smith, 
2013:5).Black boxing, in other words, is a form of simplification of complex networks 
(Goodman, 1999), which when acting as a single block are “replaced by the action itself and the 
seemingly simple author of that action” (Law, 1992:4).
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broader context of concepts, organisations, persons and objects that shape the 
conception, design and implementation of development interventions (Scott-Smith, 
2013). It also illuminates how the intervention itself is shaped by the interests of those 
who engage with it and might even explain why development programmes, more often 
than not, fail to deliver on their predefined outcomes. The rationale is that development 
interventions need to build large and extensive alliances in order to establish 
themselves. Therefore, they tend to take “the least provocative path” and accept 
“dominant assumptions, by being non‐threatening, by being tame rather than radical, by 
forming alliances with powerful actors, and by avoiding some of the largest structural 
problems that keep social divisions in place” (ibid:28-29).  
With these reflexions in mind, this study uses the terms intervention, programme and 
project interchangeably to describe the relationship between voluntary sustainability 
standards, the different ways by which these standards are introduced to farmers and 
their intended and unintended outcomes. Drawing on actor-oriented approach and ANT, 
cocoa SSC programmes are characterised as an “ongoing, socially-constructed and 
negotiated process” (Long, 2004:27) whose success (or failure) depends on the ability to 
advance the interests of the actors involved (Mosse, 2005; Scott-Smith, 2013). These 
include. the chocolate manufacturers and cocoa traders and processors who purchase the 
certified beans.These will be referred to as funding actors. Then, the actors that 
implement (or overview the implementation) of the programme, like local NGOs, LBCs 
and in some cases also the COCOBOD, through its extension services.  These will be 14
referred to as implementing actors. Next, the actors who are in direct contact with the 
farmers and introduce the standards, such as PCs and agricultural extensionists. These 
will be referred to as facilitating actors. PCs are also responsible for buying the certified 
cocoa, and along with LBCs they also act as local trading actors. Then the producing 
actors, i.e. the farmers (landowners, tenants and sharecroppers) and their organisations 
(POs and cooperatives) as well as the often invisible temporal labourers. Finally, actors 
who set the standards and certify the cocoa, such as standard setting organisations (e.g. 
Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance) and auditing companies, which will be referred to as 
 For instance, the extension services of COCOBOD are involved in the implementation of the 14
Cocoa Life programme. 
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certifying actors. The whole cycle of a SSC programme with the actors involved in each 
step is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: SSC programme cycle and actors involved  
3.3.Selection 
3.3.1.Systematic selection 
The term selection is used to capture the ways in which certain individuals enter certain 
groups. This can be a random process (e.g. the winners of a lottery are randomly 
selected from a population of lottery players), however, in most real life situations this 
process is not random but systematic, i.e. driven by specific individual characteristics 
and life trajectories. The importance of systematic selection has been recognised by 
economists, particularly in the fields of labour economics and impact evaluation. Roy 
(1951) in his seminal study of purposive selection and income distribution, analysed 
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Source: Author’s creation 
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occupational choice recognising heterogeneity in inherent ability or human capital 
investments. He argued that "persons engaged in a particular occupation tend to be 
selected in a purposive manner from the working population as a whole" and examined 
under which conditions selection is positive, i.e. the ‘best' producers self-select in the 
most profitable occupation (ibid:135). The labour market literature has built on Roy’s 
model, showing that immigrants selling their labour force in host countries are 
systematically selected from their country of origin (Borjas, 1987).  
In the case of SSC, funding, implementing and facilitating actors externally select 
participants through targeting particular geographical areas and farmers’ groups but also 
through predefined participation eligibility criteria. At the same time, however, 
sustainability standards are voluntary, as producers have no legal obligation to abide by 
the standards but voluntarily decide to adopt them. This means that besides the external 
selection there is also a strong element of self-selection of participants into certification 
schemes (Dammert and Mohan, 2014; Becchetti, Castriota and Solferino, 2011; 
Chiputwa, Spielman and Qaim, 2015). As a result, participants who self-select into SSC 
interventions come from a pool of farmers who have been previously externally selected 
through programme placement and eligibility criteria. This bidirectional selection is 
observed in other interventions, such as micro-finance, where eligibility criteria shape 
external selection, while participants’ motivation to apply for a loan defines self-
selection (e.g. Khandker, 1998; Armendáriz  de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
Moreover, systematic selection can be driven by both observable and unobservable 
individual characteristics, as studies from different academic fields show (i.e. Borjas, 
Kauppinen, and Poutvaara, 2015; Goldhader, Brewer, and Anderson, 1999; Fernandez, 
2001). The distinction between observables and unobservables is mainly used by 
quantitative studies to denote the variables that can or cannot be observed by the 
statistical model (i.e. Vella, 1998; Durlauf, 1999). Observable characteristics are 
variables that can be objectively measured and are commonly picked up by surveys, 
such as age, sex, schooling level or farm size. Engaging with a SSC programme, for 
instance, can be related to the observables of land size, farming equipment and farming 
training (see section 1.3). On the other hand, unobservable variables such as ability, 
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motivation and entrepreneurship (Armendáriz  de Aghion and Morduch, 2005) are more 
difficult to measure in an objective way and therefore tend to escape quantitative data 
collection methods. Instead, they can be better captured by qualitative tools or 
experimental games (Duvendack, 2010). In the case of SSC programme for example, 
selection can be determined by farmers’ social networks and personal relations with 
buyers, extension or PO staff, as well as ability and motivation to adopt the 
sustainability standards.  
3.3.2.Selection as a bias  
In the impact evaluation literature, studies have been mainly concerned with the bias 
that systematic selection can cause when estimating the effects of an intervention. 
Impact evaluation studies seek to demonstrate that the identified changes in the well-
being of participants can be attributed to a specific intervention and not to other 
confounding factors (Khandker, Koolwal and Samad 2010). To do this, they draw on the 
potential outcome framework, also known as the Roy (1951)-Rubin (1974)-model 
(Caliendo and Hujer, 2005). The objective of the framework is to establish causality 
between a treatment (e.g. participation in a SSC programme) and the outcomes of 
individuals (e.g. income) by creating a counterfactual scenario to determine how 
individuals would have performed had they not participated in the programme 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; Ravallion 2001; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Russo, 
Wunsch, and Mouchart, 2011; Stern et al., 2012, among others). As the counterfactual 
cannot be observed, since it is impossible for an individual to participate and not 
participate in a programme at the same time, it is assumed that the outcome for 
participants had they not participated in the programme is the same as the outcome for 
non-participants (Rubin, 2005).  
This assumption, however, does not hold when individuals enter a programme in a non-
random way. This is because programme participation can be driven by observable and 
unobservable individual characteristics which can make participants "selectively 
different from randomly sampled persons in the population” (Heckman and Vytlacil, 
2007:4882), hence performing differently even in the absence of programme 
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participation (Caliendo and Hujer, 2005). As a result, it cannot be known whether 
outcomes should be attributed to the programme or to pre-existing differences in 
observable and unobservable characteristics between participants and non-participants, 
correlated both with programme participation and performance (Heckman, 1979). The 
resulting bias can lead to over-estimations of the impact of the programme, when 
participants are already better off individuals which would have out-performed non-
participants even without the intervention (i.e. positive selection), or under-estimations, 
when participants are the least better off which would have under-performed non-
participants anyway (i.e. negative selection). This bias is commonly referred to as 
'selection bias’ and is posing a great challenge in establishing causality between 
outcomes and social or development programmes when participant selection is not 
random (for more on selection bias see Khandker, Koolwal and Samad, 2010 and 
Ravallion, 2001 among others.) 
Similarly, assessing the effects of a programme by comparing participants and non-
participants from areas with and without the programme can lead to ‘placement bias’, if 
the programme placement is endogenous, i.e. if programme allocation across villages 
was not random but consciously designed based on the “wealth, attitudes or other 
attributes” of the villages (Pitt and   Khandker, 1998:961). Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1986) were among the first ones to show that  omitting to account for non-random 
spatial programme allocation leads to biased estimates. More studies highlighting the 
importance of accounting for systematic programme placement in order to avoid under-, 
or over-, estimations of programme effects have followed since (e.g. Pitt, Rosenzweig, 
and Gibbons, 1993, Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz, 1998; Pitt and Khandker 1998; 
Tedeschi, 2008). These studies show that programme allocation, from public health or 
education interventions to micro-finance programmes, is unlikely to be random. On the 
contrary, funding and implementing actors will place programmes according to the 
programme aims but also their own interests, two placement criteria that may be 
aligned, but they can also diverge. Family planning interventions, for instance, are 
likely to be placed in areas with high fertility, while health, education and nutrition 
programmes will probably target high poverty areas (Todd, 2007). A micro-finance 
lender, on the other hand, may choose to operate first in areas where the “economic 
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possibilities” are more favourable, i.e. where there are less chances of programme 
participants defaulting on their loans (Tedeschi, 2008: 512), and not necessarily where 
the programmes is most needed. Therefore, there can be cases of positive or negative 
programme placement, i.e. some programmes may be targeting areas where the 
potential participants are already better off than the population in other areas, while 
others may target more disadvantaged areas in terms of programme endpoint outcomes 
than the non-programme areas. Self-selection can also affect programme placement. For 
instance, communities with greater social capital are more likely to apply and obtain 
community development programmes whose objective is to build social capital (White, 
2009). Therefore comparing communities with and without the programme in terms of 
social capital is more likely to reflect pre-exiting differences than programme effects. 
Selection (and placement) bias can be addressed using Randomised Controlled Trials 
(RCTs), an experimental research design which randomly allocates people into 
treatment and control groups (Krauss, 2018) or quasi-experimental designs, such as 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Difference-in-Difference (DD) and Instrumental 
Variables (IVs) (for a discussion of the effectiveness and limitations of these methods 
see Deaton, 2009; Duvendack, 2010; Stern et al. 2012; Krauss, 2018 for RCTs; Smith 
and Todd, 2003 for PSM, among others). The common ground of these methods is that 
they aim at purifying the programme effect from the potential selection bias in order to 
produce unbiased estimates. Efforts are concentrated in directly eliminating the effect of 
selection bias by randomising participation in the programme prior to data collection in 
the case of RCTs, or by using specific techniques to correct for selection bias post data 
collection, like in the case of quasi-experimental methods. In both cases, systematic 
selection is conceptualised as a bias that needs to be eliminated (i.e. Heckman 1979; 
Caliendo and Hujer, 2005).  
3.3.3.Selection as a source of learning   
Systematic selection of participants, however, is not only a source of potential bias. The 
presence of selection bias indicates that some individuals with specific characteristics 
are more likely to participate in, and potentially benefit from, an intervention than 
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others. Unpacking selection processes, therefore, can delineate the reach of an 
intervention by visualising who is included and, just as importantly, who is not. It can 
illuminate barriers to participation for specific sub-groups of the population and cases of 
elite capture. It can inform on whether a programme is amplifying socio-economic 
inequalities by further benefiting the already better off, or whether it is reaching the 
most disadvantaged ones. Finally, it can tell us if a programme is effectively targeting 
the intended population and suggest ways to get to those who should be - but are not -
reached.  
For these reasons, this thesis argues that systematic selection is a valuable source of 
learning which deserves attention beyond the concern of obtaining unbiased effects. In 
other words, if we want to understand who can really benefit from a development 
intervention and who cannot, we need to move beyond the ‘black-box’ impact 
evaluations which are narrowly concerned with  whether an intervention works, and 
explore the mechanisms by which interventions “work or fail to work” (Scriven, 
1994:75). White box, or theory-based evaluations aim at doing exactly that: unpack the 
black box of an intervention in order to explore its “inner components or 
logic” (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010:365). Theory-based approaches to evaluation focus on 
the causal theory of the programme (Chen, 1994) and examine the “conditions of 
program implementation and mechanisms that mediate between processes and outcomes 
as a means to understand when and how programs work” (Weiss, 1997:41). They are 
also concerned with tracking “the contexts in which these mechanisms are 
triggered” (Kazi, 2003: 803). By doing that, they go beyond the ‘impact evaluation’ or 
‘effectiveness’ question (i.e. ‘Does an intervention work’?), to inform questions 
regarding the processes by which outcomes are (or are not) obtained, such as “What 
works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects, and how?” (Pawson and 
Tilley, 2004:2). Calls for adopting theory-based approaches to impact evaluation have 
first emerged in the 1960s (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010), and have intensified over the last 
years as evaluation users, such as policy makers, programme funders and researchers, 
stress the need to deal with the complexity of interventions and understand not only 
whether an intervention works or not, but also why, how and for whom (Stame, 2004; 
White, 2009; Marchal et al., 2012; Rogers, 2007).  
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The theory-based evaluation approach requires examining the theoretical underpinnings 
on which a programme is based, such as the sort of activities that are being conducted, 
the expected effect of each activity, and how these can lead to the theoretically expected 
outcomes (Birckmayer and Weiss, 2000). Nevertheless, theories of selection processes, 
from the targeting of specific geographical areas and social groups, to eligibility criteria 
and final enrolment of participants, remain largely under-explored even within the area 
of theory-based evaluation, despite calls for including at least targeting analysis in every 
impact study (White, 2009). Instead the analysis tends to focus on the individuals that 
are already enrolled in the programme and does not question how these individuals were 
externally selected or self-selected into the programme and whether this selection 
process fits the theoretical assumptions in which the programme is embedded. This 
could be attributed to unstated (Tilley, 2004) or not sufficiently elaborated (Rogers, 
2007) theories able to explain selection processes.  
In the case of cocoa SSC initiatives, although all three standard setting bodies operating 
in the cocoa sector have an explicit theory of change (see Fairtrade Foundation, no date; 
Milder and Newsom, 2015; UTZ, 2016), none makes reference to a ‘selection’ or 
‘targeting’ theory defining the intended target group of producers and how this group is 
supposed to be reached. Therefore, this study cannot use the theory-based evaluation 
approach to structure the analysis around theoretical assumptions that underly the 
intervention (Carvalho and White, 2004), since in the case of SSC interventions and 
selection processes these are not yet documented. Instead, theory-based evaluation 
principles are used to address the “for whom” question that theory-based evaluation 
poses, and to produce new theory that can facilitate a deeper understanding of such 
processes. This is done by following the five remaining key principles of theory-based 
evaluation, besides mapping out the programme theory (White, 2009): paying particular 
attention in understanding the context within which SSC programmes operate; 
anticipating heterogeneity in the way SSC programmes access and benefit participants; 
analysing the factual processes of programme placement, and participant eligibility and 
selection; and finally, mixing quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and 
analysis (see section 4.3 for the rationale for using mixed methods).  
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Finally, to compensate for the lack of an already existing ‘selection' theory that could 
guide the analysis, this research uses the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods (SRL) 
framework as an analytical  tool to assess the livelihood resources (natural; economic or 
financial; human and social capitals) that shape one’s “ability to pursue different 
livelihood strategies” (Scoones, 1998:7). From an SRL lens, SSC programmes are 
regarded as an agricultural intensification strategy, which is mainly labour-led, i.e. 
supported by “own labour labour and social resources and a more autonomous 
process” (ibid: 9), since the adoption of standards is commonly linked to an increase of 
labour input (Oya et al., 2017), but also capital-led, in the cases where the adoption of 
standards requests an increase in the use of fertiliser or farming equipment, such as 
pruning machines. 
3.4.Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to outline the main theoretical and conceptual foundations 
that frame this research. First, it reviewed the debate on the concepts of intervention, 
programme and project, focusing on the critique by Long's actor-oriented approach and 
ANT. It became clear that the relationship between policy, implementation and 
outcomes should be recognised as a dynamic process, continuously shaped by the 
interplay of the interests of different actors involved. This research sees cocoa SSC 
interventions through this conceptual lens. The discussion then turned to the concept of 
systematic selection and its centrality in impact evaluation as a source of bias. Drawing 
on theory-based approaches to evaluation, it was argued that there is value in regarding 
selection also as a source of learning, a “black box” that needs to be unpacked in order 
to understand for whom a programme may or may not work. Given the lack of theories 
related to selection processes into SSC programmes, it was detailed that the role of 
theory-based evaluation in this work is to orient the generation of missing theory 
through understanding context, anticipating heterogeneity, and using mixed methods to 
analyse factual processes (in contradiction to counter factual approaches). Finally, the 
chapter pointed out that the SRL framework and its classification of livelihoods 
resources (i.e. natural, human, social and economic capitals) is used to structure the 
analysis of the empirical chapters that follow. Figure 7 integrates the different 
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theoretical elements presented in this chapter into a single conceptual framework and 
draws links to the questions that drive this research. The next chapter outlines the 
methodological choices of this study and how they were implemented. 
Figure 7: Integrated conceptual framework 
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4. Methodological approach 
4.1.Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodological approach of this research. 
First, it presents how this research originated and how previous biographical 
experiences have affected the way this study was conducted (section 4.2). Then, it 
discusses the choices made regarding the research methodology and design (section 
4.3). This is followed by a justification and a description of the research location 
(section 4.4.). The next section discusses data collection, management and analysis 
methods, complemented with details on how these were implemented (section 4.5). 
Section 4.6 discusses the research limitations form a methodological point of view, as 
well as the ethical issues encountered throughout the research. Finally, section 4.7 
concludes. 
4.2.Research motivation and positionality  
The idea to investigate selection processes into SSC programmes first emerged in 2007, 
while I was doing fieldwork with cocoa farmers in the coastal areas of Ecuador for a 
master’s degree in international development. As a student, I was intrigued by the fair 
trade movement and I wanted to investigate what changes, if any, Fairtrade and organic 
certification were bringing to these cocoa farming communities. Speaking to both 
members and non-members of the certified PO, I observed that certified farmers, 
although by no means rich, were certainly better off than their non-certified neighbours. 
They had larger and more accessible farms, and better connections to the local ‘elite’: 
the small businessmen in the area and those involved in local politics. Non-certified 
farmers, on the other hand, had smaller farms in more remote areas and appeared to be 
more isolated socially as well. It became clear to me that these differences were not 
caused by programme participation, but the other way around. Programme participation 
was driven by these differences. This realisation contrasted heavily with the idea that 
Fairtrade offered a better deal to the most disadvantaged farmers, which was 
systematically cultivated by the discourse of Fairtrade related organisations. As I went 
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on to work for ATOs and consumers’ associations back in Europe I kept thinking 
whether SSC promoted by these organisations were just picking up the already better 
off instead of reaching the ones most in need of support. Increasingly fixated on this 
idea, in 2011 I decided to enrol for a Masters in Impact Evaluation. During the course I 
realised that although selection issues are central in impact evaluation, their 
mechanisms and social implications for the inclusiveness of interventions remain under-
explored. Such reflections provided the theoretical and technical foundations for a PhD 
proposal which was accepted in 2013.  
The original proposal was a mixed methods comparative case study on the impact of 
SSC in two value chains (cocoa and bananas) in the Ghanaian context. However, as the 
research evolved I realised that a narrower scope was needed. Additionally, during the 
first year of my PhD I became a mother, a personal event which transformed me also as 
a researcher. On the one hand, motherhood enabled me to focus on the things that 
mattered to me the most, or, as Polly Hill notes in an interview with Alan Macfarlane on 
her own experience as a mother-researcher, to “immediately [see] the point of what I 
was doing” (Macfarlane, 1996, 00:06:30). In my case, this meant dropping the 
effectiveness question (i.e. do SSC work?) and focus on the under-researched, and far 
more interesting to me, selection processes (i.e. for whom SSC may work?). These 
developments also affected the research methods I should and could use. Although I 
maintained the original mixed methods approach, qualitative data became more 
important, since the objective now was to investigate processes and not effects (White, 
2008). Additionally, I had to find creative ways to overcome the practical constraints 
resulting from doing research with a young child. For instance, data collection methods 
that would require extensive fieldwork, such as conducting ethnography or large scale 
surveys, were no longer a feasible option as it would mean separating my son from his 
father for a long period of time. To compensate for this limitation, I opted for faster 
methods of data collection such as different types of interviews and focus groups. The 
use of life history interviews in particular allowed collecting rich data on farmers’ 
trajectories, that probably would have been impossible to obtain through questionnaire 
interviews as Oya (2007) notes from his own experience. Additionally, secondary 
survey data were considered to complement primary qualitative data. As a result, the 
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composition of secondary datasets in terms of available variables also determined the 
quantitative analysis. In my case the presence of a variable capturing farmers’ 
membership in Kuapa Kokoo, the Fairtrade cooperative/LBC in a secondary data set 
enabled me to examine placement and membership likelihoods using a probit model. 
Finally, conducting fieldwork with a young child also meant that the chosen research 
location should provide some minimum facilities (i.e. using a hostel in a small town as a 
basis instead of residing in a farming community). Coupled with the childcare expenses, 
such accommodation requirements increased the cost of fieldwork considerably and 
therefore put further pressure on its duration.  
Moreover, my biographical professional and personal experiences have certainly 
influenced how I perceived those who participated in the research and the way they 
perceived me, and as result shaped how this research was conducted. For instance, 
although I perceived SSC programmes as generally well-intentioned, previous working 
and research experiences with certification schemes also made me sceptical of their 
actual impact. Furthermore, as an ‘external-outsider’, lacking previous research 
experience in Ghana, I had only a partial understanding of the “values, perspectives, and 
knowledge” of the cocoa farming community I studied (Banks, 1998:8). This was 
mitigated by the help of a native (female) interpreter who, coming from a cocoa 
growing family not only spoke Twi (the dominant language in the cocoa growing areas), 
but also had a deep understanding of the context. Her presence allowed overcoming 
linguistic and cultural barriers during data collection and helped me grasp nuances that I 
would have failed to comprehend on my own. It should be noted, however, that my 
understanding and interpretation of the context and the data collected are inevitably 
mediated by the observations and comments of my interpreter, who was also perceived 
as an outsider due to her higher education. Furthermore, the fact that I was a woman and 
a mother, juggling childcare and research duties in the field, allowed accessing female 
farmers who probably would not have been comfortable disclosing data to white male 
outsiders. At the same, my perception is that these characteristics did not hinder 
collecting data from male farmers either. Male participants openly discussed possibly 
sensitive issues such as income sources, debt, acquisition of land and marriage 
decisions. It is true, however, that more sensitives issues were not  discussed on the first 
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encounter with the participants (both male and female) but after a series of interactions 
and small gifts which contributed in building familiarity and trust between the 
researcher and the researched community. Finally, as a student and not a person 
employed by the cocoa or certification industry, I was commonly perceived by the 
professionals of the sector as an accessible, ‘non-threatening’ figure, driven by simple 
curiosity about their work, with no hidden agenda, a fact which facilitated data 
disclosure particularly with industry informants. 
4.3.Research methodology and design 
This thesis adopts a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis. The case 
for the use of mixed methods has long been made in the field of impact evaluation (e.g. 
Madey, 1982; Caracelli and Greene, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 2004; Adato, 2007; 
White, 2008; White, 2009; Bamberger, 2012). While quantitative methods are 
commonly used to asses the effects of an intervention, qualitative methods can reveal 
the processes by which these effects are obtained (White, 2009; Marchal et al., 2012) 
and therefore are particularly relevant in theory-based evaluations (Carvalho and White, 
2004). Mixed methods provide a "richer pool of data and greater analytic power” than 
qualitative or quantitative methods alone (Adato, 2007:6), as the first allow a greater 
“depth of understanding” through data saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), while the 
latter result in a greater “breadth of understanding” through generalisability (Palinkas et 
al., 2015:534). In short, combining quantitative with qualitative methods allows 
benefiting from the strengths of the two approaches, while mutually neutralising their 
weaknesses (Jick, 1979).  
Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989) identify five purposes for mixed methods 
evaluations: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation, and expansion. In 
this study quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis were 
mixed to triangulate, i.e. to assess whether the findings resulting from different methods 
converge or not. They were also used to complement findings on different aspects of the 
same phenomenon and thus reach more holistic understandings. For example, data from 
SSC membership lists were combined with data from structured interviews and life 
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histories in order to better understand which farmers are de facto eligible (and which are 
not) and how farmers with different land status perceived their own eligibility (see 
section 6.2.2). Given the absence of relevant theories on selection processes of SSC 
programmes (see section 3.3.3.), the use of mixed methods also served for development 
purposes. For instance, in the absence of a ‘placement’ theory that could guide the 
analysis, primary qualitative findings from semi-structured interviews with industry 
stakeholders empirically informed the probit model used to analyse secondary 
quantitative survey data in order to identify placement determinants (see section 5.2). 
The exploration of farmers’ selection processes into SSC followed an inverse process: 
the key findings of the multivariate analysis informed by the literature review presented 
in section 1.3 were used to structure the qualitative analysis and examine where results 
converged or diverged (see section 7.2). Finally, although initiation was not an original 
purpose of the research design - in fact, as Green, Caracelli and Graham (1989) 
highlight, purposeful initiation is rather uncommon in practice - the emergence of 
contradicting qualitative and quantitative findings prompted the suggestion of areas for 
further investigation, as well as new interpretations. The ‘expansion’ purpose, which 
refers to studies that “aim for scope and breadth by including multiple 
components” (ibid, 1989: 260) did not apply here, as this research sought to explore and 
understand programme processes, without aiming to expand the outcomes of these 
programmes. 
In terms of design, this study is conceived as a single case study with embedded sub-
units. This means that the study considers “different sub-units that are situated within a 
larger case” (Baxter and Jack, 2008:550), in this case different SSC programmes 
operating within the Ghanaian cocoa sector, that can illuminate different angles of the 
same phenomenon (Scholz and Tietze, 2002). Several reasons support this choice. First, 
case studies are suitable for studying present-day phenomena in their actual context, 
particularly when these are ingrained in the context to the extent that it becomes 
difficult to separate one from the other (Yin, 1981a &1989b), as is the case of SSC 
programmes (Oya et al., 2017). Furthermore, case studies are fitting for the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions posed by this study: How do selection processes occur in this specific 
context? Why do certification programmes operate in some areas but not in others? 
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How does a farmer become eligible to participate in a SSC programme? Why do some 
farmers enrol in SSC programmes and adopt the standards while others do not? This 
explanatory scope is supported by the case study approach, particularly since the 
behaviour of the actors involved in SSC programmes cannot be easily manipulated or 
controlled (Yin; 2013; Baxter and Jack, 2008). The case study design is also suitable for 
the intention of this research to test and generate theory by fostering new hypothesis and 
new research questions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2013) (see section 1.4). Finally, 
the case study design is compatible with the mixed methods approach (Yin, 1981a). 
Embedded case studies, in particular, often make use of a plurality of methods within 
the subunits (Scholz and Tietze, 2002). Theory-building in these cases can be further 
enhanced by the use of mixed methods as the triangulation of findings can strengthen 
and complement the construction of new hypothesis (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
4.4.Research location  
The larger case of this embedded case study is the Ghanaian cocoa sector. Ghana was 
chosen due to the country’s historically important connection to the crop (e.g. Hill, 
1963; Mikell, 1992) (see discussion in sections 2.2. and 2.3.). Additionally, the country 
has also been peaceful and stable, facilitating the production of a large and rich 
literature that could inform and orient the first stages of this research. On the subunit 
level, three different SSC programmes were purposefully selected for their diverse 
characteristics in terms of implementation model (i.e. the cooperative model, the LBC 
model and the Cocoa Life model, see section 2.5 for more), in order to inform different 
“theoretical categories” that would allow complementing and expanding the emergent 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). 
In practice, two rounds of interviews with professionals from the cocoa-chocolate, 
certification and aid industries were conducted (July 2015 and January-February 2016), 
to collect data both on the broader case and its subunits. Based on these interviews the 
cocoa district of Goaso in the Brong Ahafo region was chosen as a base for collecting 
farmer-level data (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Fieldwork area 
This choice was supported by the presence of the three main SSC models in the area 
and the existence of basic accommodation facilities where fieldwork could be 
conducted with a young child (see section 4.2). I opted for collecting farmer-level data 
only from one cocoa farming community, and not multiple research sites. This is 
because I aimed for reaching more nuanced understandings of the local socio-economic 
dynamics that can affect selection processes and therefore I prioritise gaining depth (by 
focusing in one location) over  breadth (by covering various sites). This choice also 
provided more data triangulation opportunities. The downside was losing the possibility 
to make cross-case comparisons and capture community-specific characteristics that can 
influence selection process.  
The study community was chosen according to the following criteria. First, at least two 
- but ideally all three- of the main SSC models should be present in the community to 
allow comparisons. Second, the size of the community should be small enough for data 
collection to be manageable, but large enough to provide sufficient data. Third, the 
community should be easily accessible by car from the town of Goaso to allow daily 
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Source: ‘Goaso’ (2018)
commutes. After a number of scoping visits, three cocoa growing communities meeting 
these selection criteria were identified. Finally, a community surrounded by nothing but 
cocoa farms at a distance of about 10 km from Goaso was chosen. The community, 
which for anonymity will be refer to as the ‘research’ or ‘case study’ community, had 
the following characteristics.  
Two SSC programmes operated in the community: the “open doors” Fairtrade- Cocoa 
Life programme and the “closed doors” Touton-PBC programme. Both programmes 
operated since the harvesting year of 2011-2012. Internal annual audits (i.e. controls 
conducted by the members themselves) were regularly conducted, however, by 2016 -
the year of data collection- the case study community had not received any external 
audit for any of the two programmes. This was possible because not every single farmer 
and community is inspected during an external audit. Instead, auditors sample 
communities and farmers to assess the compliance of the entire cooperative or group, 
and in this case, the research community had not never been sampled. Within the 
framework of the Cocoa Life programme, three ‘Susu’ (informal loan) groups were 
operating in the community, providing small amounts of credit to their members. 
Beyond certification, three PCs were based in the village, while another three operated 
in the surrounding areas. PBC, the LBC previously owned by the state, ran a short-term 
cocoa storage facility in the village as well. 
Most of the residents were third generation migrant farmers. The first migrants (i.e. the 
grand-parents of the current residents) arrived mainly from the Ashanti region in search 
of forest land to clear and plant cocoa. According to oral histories, they followed a 
spiritual leader who settled down by the river which crosses the community. Forest land 
was abundant at this time, so these first settlers were allowed to occupy as much land as 
they could clear and plant with the help of their relatives. No payments for land were 
involved at this stage, besides the traditional ‘gifts’ (usually a bottle of local spirit) to 
the local chief. At the time of data collection, and after three generations of cocoa 
farmers, the case study community was a village of around 100 constituents who were 
permanent residents. Nevertheless, there was also an undefined number of farmers with 
temporal residencies, while numerous smaller establishments, also known as Akuras 
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(villages in Twi) where spread around the community. These are settlements in the 
middle of large cocoa farms, usually at a considerable distance from the community and 
quite isolated from other settlements. Sharecroppers, landowners and their families tend 
to stay there while working on the farm, while they commute to the community for 
shopping and schooling. The population in the community and its surrounding areas 
was predominately of Ashanti origin, although there was also a significant part of Fantis 
and a growing population of northerners. The latter arrived mainly as labourers and 
sharecroppers, although some had already managed to transition to land ownership 
through abunu contracts (see also discussion in section 2.4).  
In terms of infrastructure and services, the research community had a primary school 
and a Junior High School (JHS). Six small shops/ kiosks selling basic goods, a 
pharmacy, a mill and four bars selling local spirits were also operating in the 
community. Other services included a seamstress and several hair dressers. The village 
had no electricity nor mobile phone coverage and the road reaching the village was 
unpaved. There was no bus transport to the village neither, with villagers having to 
commute by private means or shared taxis. Regarding governance, at the time of data 
collection there was no official chief. Instead, all community issues were handled by the 
group of elders. There was a group of communal work, in which all the residents were 
expected to participate to maintain and/or improve the basic infrastructure in and around 
the community.  
Finally, a group monitoring child labour issues was operating in the community by the 
farmers themselves. It is worth noting here that child labour, although apparently not 
widespread, was an issue of concern in the community, as the presence of a group 
monitoring the practice indicates. Cases of children not attending school during cocoa 
harvest were reported by the school’s headmaster (private communication). Children 
were also involved in the transportation of logs illegally felled in the nearby forest 
reserve. Despite the important implications of child labour and illegal deforestation, 
particularly in the context of social sustainability standards, this study did not further 
explore these issues. This is because it was deemed that both issues, though relevant to 
an impact evaluation study, were beyond the scope of a study investigating selection 
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processes. Additionally, both issues were clearly taboo, particularly when it came to 
foreign researchers, as there could be implications for the funding of current or future 
projects in the community. Therefore, bringing up these subjects, even casually, could 
have created mistrust and undermined other aspects of data collection which were 
directly relevant to the core research questions this study had set out to explore. As a 
result, even though these issues were not avoided (i.e. during the structured interviews 
farmers were explicitly asked whether their children contributed labour to cocoa 
farming and in which ways, as well as they were asked to list any non-cocoa income 
sources), they were not further investigated neither. The view of this research is that 
these issues could not have been adequately explored in the margins of this study.  This 
is because appropriate training, research design and methods are needed to properly 
investigate issues involving minors and illegal activities in order to ensure meaningful 
data collection as well as protecting vulnerable participants (like children) from any 
research resulting risk. 
4.5.Data collection, management and analysis  
4.5.1.Data collection methods  
This study used a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
analysis methods. Fieldwork was undertaken in two phases: first, a one month scoping 
visit in July 2015 during which semi-structured interviews with cocoa, certification and 
aid industry professionals were conducted. Second, a fieldwork period of three months 
which focused on collecting data from cocoa farmers through structured and life history 
interviews, as well as focus groups. The data collection methods are outlined below.   
• Semi-structured interviews  
A total of 43 focussed semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with key 
actors of the cocoa-chocolate (chocolate manufacturers, cocoa traders and processors, 
multi-stakeholder industry institutions, LBCs), certification (standard setters, auditing 
companies and private consultants), aid (NGOs, national aid agencies, UN 
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organisations), COCOBOD staff and research actors, as well as with representatives of 
producers organisations (see Appendix 2). These interviews were based on a mental list 
of topics that needed to be covered (Bernard, 2006), such as the interest of the particular 
actor in SSC and his/her perception of how placement, targeting and selection processes 
occur. Professionals of different sectors were identified through snowballing from initial 
contacts provided by scholars and NGO professionals working in the UK and in 
Switzerland as well as key informants in Ghana. The aim was to include professionals 
from as diverse organisations as possible in order to gain a broader perspective of the 
actors involved in the Ghanaian cocoa sector, and to capture their different interests in 
certification and how these influence the selection mechanisms. These interviews were 
conducted in English without research or translation assistance during the two data 
collection rounds (July 2015 and February 2016). Insights from the first round of 
interviews were used to inform the research questions, scope and design. Data from 
both rounds were used to gain a broader understanding of the national context and 
particularly to inform the analysis on SSC placement determinants (i.e. RQ1). 
• Structured interviews 
Structured interviews, in the form of a questionnaire, were conducted with 32 cocoa 
farmers (land owners and sharecroppers). Farmers were purposefully snowballed 
according to their distinctive characteristics in terms of gender, landownership status 
(i.e. owners, tenants, sharecroppers), particular socio-economic status (e.g. PCs buying 
in the community or board members of a certified group) and certification status 
(members of a certified group, non-members and drop outs). These interviews were 
conducted in Twi with the help of an interpreter. Collected data were used to address 
questions regarding participant eligibility and selection into SSC (i.e. RQ2 and RQ3). 
The questionnaire used for the structured interviews can be found in Appendix 3. 
• Life history interviews 
Life history interviews can uncover events with multiple causation and complex 
interactions, providing rich contextual and historical data on how “the ordering of a 
sequence of events” can result in certain outcomes (Davis, 2009:154), such as 
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participation into SSC programmes. The method has been used to collect data that tends 
to remain invisible to quantitative methods, such as life trajectories, economic 
empowerment and poverty dynamics (Davis, 2009; Sender, Oya and Cramer, 2006; 
Locke and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2011; Oya, 2007). In this study, the aim was to identify key 
common patterns, i.e. significant periods in the life of an individual as well as triggering 
events, as suggested by Fitzhugh, Butts and Pixley (2015), in the trajectories towards 
land ownership status, which could inform issues of targeting and eligibility (i.e. RQ2).  
Life history data were provided by the same farmers who participated in the structured 
interviews. Nevertheless, the two interviews were conducted separately in two rounds of 
sixty to ninety minutes each, with a time gap between the two rounds of several days or 
even weeks. As with the structured interviews with farmers, life histories were 
conducted in Twi, with direct interpreting. The process broadly followed guidelines by 
Wengraf and Chamberlayne (2006). Farmers were given a brief introduction on the 
purpose of the interview and were then asked to tell their life story, focusing on the 
experiences and events which were important in their trajectories as cocoa farmers. 
Some short guidelines were given (e.g. you can start wherever you like, please take your 
time, we will listen first without interrupting, we will take some notes in case we have 
further questions for after you have finished). This was followed by a short 
demonstration based on the researchers’ lives (e.g. "my name is Dafni, I was born in 
France where my parents were working, but when I was two years old I moved with my 
mother to Greece. My mother was a teacher and she was away during the day, so I spent 
a lot of time with my grandmother…”). After that participants were left to speak about 
their lives without further interruptions or guidance. This allowed focusing on the 
aspects of their lives that they deemed important, and deciding themselves how much to 
elaborate on each aspect. Once the life account was completed, some probing questions 
were asked in order to fill in gaps and to clarify unclear points. These questions focused 
on better understanding how farmers first got involved with cocoa farming; how they 
first obtained access to land to farm cocoa (whether as owners or as farm operators); 
how they accumulated the human, social and economic capital needed to obtain land 
entitlements and finally upgrade to ownership status; what were their expansion 
strategies once the land ownership status was acquired; and finally, what were their 
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plans for the future in regards to cocoa farming. The overall aim was to identify at 
which point of their farming trajectories and how farmers becomes eligible to 
participate in a SSC programme. The protocol used for conducting life histories can be 
found in Appendix 4.  
• Focus groups  
Focus groups were used as a strategy to generate data through the interaction between 
research participants (Kitzinger, 1995). Three focus groups were conducted, each with 
approximately eight participants: one with male land owners, one with male 
sharecroppers (landless or in process of acquiring land through abunu contracts) and 
one with female farmers regardless of land ownership status. Participants were mainly 
sampled from the groups of farmers that participated in the structured and life history 
interviews.  This is because the familiarity built with the informants during the 15
interviewing phase could facilitate and enhance data disclosure during the focus groups. 
Conducting the focus groups with the same farmers also allowed further triangulation 
on the farmers socio-economic status in relation to their participation in certification 
programmes. The focus groups were conducted in Twi with direct interpretation. Data 
from the focus groups were used to gain deeper insights of the role of cocoa the 
farmers’ livelihoods and farmers’ perceptions of a “good life”. Links were then drawn to 
cocoa farming and the role of certification. Specifically,  issues of eligibility to enrol in 
certification programmes (i.e. which farmers are perceived as eligible?) as well as 
distributional dynamics (i.e. which farmers are perceived to benefit more or less  from 
certification) were raised and discussed. Findings were used to inform RQ2 and RQ3.   
• Secondary data: survey, archives, SSC programme documents. 
This research draws on several secondary data sources. First, survey data collected by 
the first round (2002) of the Ghana Cocoa Farmers Survey (GCFS) (Zeitlin, 2018) were 
used to inform the quantitative analysis of the thesis. The GCFS, a collaborative 
research project between the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the 
 Farmers who had not participated in the two rounds of interviews but showed interest in 15
participating in the focus groups were allowed to take part in the process. 
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University of Oxford and the COCOBOD, is a panel data survey which collected a 
series of socio-economic data at the farmer level over five rounds of data collection 
(2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010) in three regions of Ghana: Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and 
Western (see Figure 4 for a map of Ghana’s cocoa growing and administrative regions). 
The original sample (497 farmers) was drawn as a random selection of households 
which identified cocoa farming as an income source in the Ghana Living Standards 
Survey (GLSS) 4 of 1998/99 (Teal, Zeitlin and Maamah, 2006; CSAE and COCOBOD, 
2006). Farmers come from 25 villages from the GLSS sample which were selected with 
probability proportional to the size of the cocoa-farming population in each village 
(ibid).  
Second, secondary data on cocoa purchases volumes from 2010 to 2015, broken down 
by region and LBC, were kindly provided by the Cocoa Health and Extension Division 
(CHED) of COCOBOD. Additionally data on the presence of certification programmes 
were compiled combining several secondary sources. A list of certification programmes 
operating in Ghana was kindly provided by the Platform Coordination Unit (PCU) of 
COCOBOD. This was complemented by information retrieved from UTZ on UTZ 
certified cocoa producers (UTZ, 2018d) and Agro-Eco Ghana (Agro Eco, no date). 
Although it is not possible to ensure that the compiled dataset covers every single 
certification programme currently operating in Ghana, it should provide a fair 
representation of where the focus of certification and commercial activity is currently 
encountered. Unfortunately, due to the commercial sensitivity of the information, it was 
not possible to acquire data on the number of farmers involved in each programme or 
the volumes of certified cocoa produced. Finally, information from the membership lists 
of the two SSC programmes operating in the case study community were used to 
explore how farmers become eligible to participate in SSC programmes (RQ2). 
4.5.2.Data management and analysis methods 
Interviews with cocoa, certification and aid industry professionals and farmers, as well 
as focus groups were recorded with the permission of the interviewees while written 
notes were also taken. Following Braun and Clarke (2006), the recordings of all 
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interviews and focus groups were transcribed into written form and merged with 
fieldwork notes which provided contextual information on the process of data 
collection.  Structured and life history interviews were combined into one document, 16
creating a ‘farmer profile’ for each respondent. Overall, the transcription process 
allowed a further familiarisation with the data and the generation of an initial list of 
possible codes and themes. To protect the identity of all the research participants, both 
industry informants and farmers, real names have been anonymised and replaced by 
pseudonyms (see Appendix 2 for a list of interviewed industry informants and Appendix 
5 for a list of interviewed farmers).  
In terms of data analysis, the first step was to become “intimately familiar” with each 
subunit case, by producing detailed, within-case descriptions that were central to the 
generation of the first insights (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). This was followed by cross-case 
comparisons that sought to identify emerging pattens in terms of selection processes. 
Following Eisenhardt (1989), data were analysed by data source, separating qualitative 
from quantitative data. Qualitative and quantitative analyses were sequenced in different 
ways to inform one another (see section 4.3). Then, emerging patterns were compared to 
examine whether findings corroborated or diverged. Converging evidence from multiple 
sources was highlighted to strengthen the findings, while in the case of conflicting 
evidence, possible explanations from other data sources were sought to explain the 
phenomenon. As a general rule, collected data were interpreted within the broader 
political and cultural context of the interview and not as an unmediated expression of 
the respondent's opinion, as suggested by Houtkoop-Steenstra (2000). In particular, the 
following data analysis methods were used.  
• Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis (TA) is a widely-used qualitative analytic method used for 
“identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke, 
 Life history transcripts were provided by the interpreter who assisted the interviews, however, 16
I undertook the task of listening the recordings and adding missed details and clarifications in 
the transcripts.
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2006:6).  In this research it was used to report “experiences, meaning and the reality of 17
participants” (ibid: 9). In particular it was used to analyse data from semi-structured, 
structured and life history interviews, as well as focus groups in order to identify 
patterns in terms of industry stakeholders perceptions on programme placement 
determinants, farmers’ trajectories towards eligibility to participate in SSC programmes, 
and external and self-selection processes (i.e. to inform all three research sub-
questions).  
Transcripts were then introduced into Nvivo and the full texts were coded following a 
‘theory-driven’ process during which the data was approached and coded with the 
predetermined  research questions in mind. In order to address the eligibility question, 
for instance, data were coded with the intention to identify significant points in the lives 
of farmers that allowed them to upgrade from sharecropping to land ownership. 
Regarding selection processes, data were approached with the intention to identify key 
events and experiences that lead to membership status, or on the contrary, that resulted 
in the farmer abstaining from joining the certified group. In parallel, data extracts that 
could inform the broader research context were also coded during this phase, emulating 
a ‘data-driven’ process. In general, during this still explorative phase, data was coded 
for as “many potential themes/patterns as possible” to capture all the themes that could 
prove of interest later (Braun and Clarke, 2006:19). Once all the transcripts were coded, 
codes were reviewed and grouped under potential themes, by comparing and contrasting 
different codes and combining them under broader themes. Themes were then reviewed 
and further merged, or broken down in order to create a set of clearly distinct themes, 
before proceeding with the writing of the analysis. 
• Content analysis  
Content analysis (CA) is an analytical tool that takes a systematic approach to the 
coding and categorising of large amount of textual information in order “to ascertain the 
trends and patterns of words used, their frequency, their relationships and the structures, 
 According to Braun and Clarke (2006:10), a theme captures something important about the 17
data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning within the data set. 
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contexts and discourses of communication” (Grbich, 2012:190). The method is 
recommended for making sense of large amounts of textual data, such as open-ended 
interviews (Weber, 1990). In this research it was used to analyse the semi-structured 
interviews conducted with industry stakeholders and to qualitatively explore 
determinants of programme placement (i.e. RQ1), as perceived by the informants. In 
particular, the analysis aimed to address the following questions:  
A. What are the placement determinants of certified cocoa mentioned?  
B. How often are they mentioned?  
C. What is the relation, if any, between the placement determinants mentioned and the 
actors’ role on SSC (i.e.funding, implementing, facilitating, etc.)? 
The analysis provided numerical data on the frequencies by which placement related 
codes appear in the transcripts. The results served as a basis to incorporate thematically 
analysed data and to place the findings into the broader context of cocoa SSC 
programmes (Grbich, 2012). The overall rationale for using content analysis was to 
further elaborate on the initial findings of the thematic analysis by visualising the 
frequency of the identified codes, and themes in connection to the specific function of 
the actors that referred to each placement determinant. The method typically consists in 
dividing the text into “meaning units” which are labelled with codes and grouped into 
categories and then the quantification of these codes (Graneheim and Lundman, 
2004:106; Kracker and Wang, 2002). Quantification involves counting and tabulating 
the codes under the same theme (or sub-theme) in order to “summarise what is known 
about the data” and then interpret the emerging pattern (Morgan 1993:115). In this case, 
the ‘meaning unit’ consisted of interview text about how cocoa certification programme 
placement is determined in the Ghanaian context. The informants- cocoa, aid and 
certification industry actors- were exposed to the aims of the research and then asked 
(once) about how decisions related to programme placement were taken (see Appendix 
6 for a detailed list of informants). The transcripts of their answers (n=19) were used to 
inform the content analysis. The coding process focused on identifying main themes 
(i.e. what placement determinant the informant talked about) and sub-themes (i.e. how 
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was this placement determinant talked about). Given the lack of pre-existing knowledge 
or theories on the issue, codes were derived from the data through an open coding 
process that allowed for new codes, sub-themes and themes to emerge throughout the 
process (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). While coding, the aim was to maintain a low level of 
interpretation and be as faithful as possible to the original expressions of the informants, 
as recommended by Vaismoradi, Turunen and Bondas (2013). Nevertheless, the process 
of creating categories and grouping bits of data under the same category inevitably 
involves interpretation,  and therefore also the risk of misinterpretation (Dey, 1993).To 
minimise this risk, the “original context” from which the data came was taken into 
consideration (ibid:138). This is why the ‘meaning unit’ should be a single phrase or a 
larger passage of the interview text that could be coded as a single placement 
determinant, but not isolated words. Using the Nvivo codes, the bits of text about 
participants’ views and experiences on how programme placement occurs were brought 
together into one excel sheet. The extracted text was then revised and the codes were re-
organised and re-labelled accordingly, merging or breaking down into new ones, as 
necessary. This was a complex process, as categories could be interlinked and 
overlapping. If more than one placement determinant was identified in the same phrase 
or passage, then the passage was coded multiple times under the corresponding codes of 
placement determinant. The various codes were then “compared based on differences 
and similarities” and grouped into ten sub-categories and four categories, as suggested 
by Graneheim and Lundman (2004: 108). An example illustrating this process is 
provided in the Appendix 7. Overall, care was taken to exclude form the analysis text 
which was generated as a reply to a clarifying question in order to avoid inflating the 
frequency of a theme by counting repetitive answers. 
• Correlation and probit regression analysis  
Descriptive statistics (DS) were used to quantitatively explore possible correlations 
between cocoa volumes and programme placement (i.e. to inform RQ1), as well as to 
describe the data resulting from the GCFS data set. Furthermore, t-tests were used to 
investigate placement and selection determinants (i.e. RQ1 & RQ3). The results were 
not only used to show possible correlations, but also to inform the probit regression 
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models on placement and selection determinants. Probit models are widely used to 
study data with binomial distributions (Liao, 1994). In this case they were used to study 
SSC programme placement (taking the values 0 for programme absence and 1 for 
programme presence) and SSC programme membership (taking the values 0 for a non-
member farmer and 1 for a member). This was possible using data from the first round 
of the GCFS which contained a binary variable on the presence of the Fairtrade 
cooperative / LBC Kuapa Kokoo in the villages were the survey took place, and a 
second one on whether the respondent was a member or not of the cooperative (CSAE 
& DFID, 2002).  Given that in the early 2000s Kuapa Kokoo was the only cooperative/18
LBC producing and sourcing certified cocoa in Ghana, the commercial activity of 
Kuapa Kokoo in a certain area (or the absence of it) can be used as proxy of 
certification presence or absence, since no other SSC programme was operating at that 
time. These two variables allowed conducting a new analysis of the data collected in 
2002 using probit models to quantitatively explore factors that can significantly 
determine the placement of Kuapa Kokoo, as well as farmers’ membership in the 
cooperative (i.e. participant selection). Unfortunately, relevant data were only collected 
for the first year of the survey, which prevented conducting a panel data analysis.  
To sum up, Table 4 summarises the methods used to collect and analyse data, and 
details the number of responses when applicable. It also indicates how collected data 
was analysed and which research questions were informed by the analysis.  
 The first round of the survey was conducted in 2002 by Marcela Vigneri (Zeitlin, 2018).18
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Table 4: Summary of data collection and analysis methods 
4.6.Challenges, limitations and ethical considerations 
4.6.1.Challenges and limitations  
The research encountered the following challenges and limitations during data 
collection and analysis. First, obtaining secondary data from actors involved in the 
implementation of SSC programmes proved to be practically impossible. Particularly 
when commercial actors were involved in the funding and implementation of the 
programme, such as cocoa traders or LBCs, information that could reveal the specific 
scale of the certification programme (i.e. number of participant farmers, hectares of 
certified land, volumes of certified cocoa produced, exact location of programmes, etc.), 
was considered to be commercially sensitive. Informants, whether commercial or aid 
actors, were reluctant to disclose such data, fearing that disclosure could hurt their 
market competitiveness or that of their partners. As a result the collection of data related 
to the presence of cocoa SSC programmes in the Ghanaian context was limited to 
information provided by the Project Co-ordination Unit (PCU) of COCOBOD, which at 
Data collection 
method
Data source N of 
respondents  
Data analysis method Research question 
addressed 
TA CA DS Probit RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 
Semi-structured 
and un-
structured 
interviews 
Cocoa-chocolate,  
certification and 
aid industry 
professionals
43
X X X
Structured 
interviews 
Cocoa farmers 32
X X X
Life histories Cocoa farmers 32 X X X
Focus groups Cocoa farmers 24(8x3) X X X
Secondary 
survey data 
Ghana Cocoa 
Farmers Survey
492 X X X X
Cocoa 
production  and 
certification 
records
Cocobod; 
Standard Setting 
Bodies; NGOs 
n/a
X X
TA= Thematic Analysis, CA= Content Analysis, DS= Descriptive Statistics, Probit=Probit regression 
model
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the time of data collection was still compiling relevant data and therefore it is unclear to 
which extent the list is complete.Although  publicly available information from 
certification bodies and NGOs was also used to complement data provided by PCU, it is 
not possible to ensure that the dataset on the presence of SSC programmes compiled by 
this research covers every single programme currently operating in Ghana. Collected 
data should , however, provide an indication of where the focus of certification activity 
is currently encountered.  
Second, data collection could have benefited from additional information on each 
informant as well as a larger sample size. This research aimed at achieving 
“informational redundancy or theoretical saturation” (Sandelowski, 1995:179), 
however, it is acknowledged that time and resource constraints discussed in section 4.2 
may have prevented exhaustive data saturation. During fieldwork it was observed that 
the quality of the collected data significantly increased during the life history interview. 
This may be related to the specific character of life histories which encourages 
participants to “open up” (Francis, 1992:93, cited by Oya, 2007). Another possible 
explanation is that fact life histories were conducted during the second encounter with 
the farmers and therefore in a context of increased familiarity and trust between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. For example, it was common for farmers to report more farms 
and to disclose more details on how they came to possess or manage these farms (i.e. 
exact amounts paid to enter abunu contracts) during the life history interviews than they 
had done during the first, structured interview. The second round therefore, not only 
served to collect new data, but also to triangulate, and possibly correct data provided 
during the first round. It is therefore likely that a third round of data collection would 
have improved the accuracy and richness of the collected data, by allowing to gather 
complementary information, fill in gaps in the life stories and further clarify conflicting 
accounts. 
The fact that data collected during the first, structured interview with farmers often 
proved to be inaccurate introduces doubts also on the validity of the GCFS survey data 
used by this research (and in fact, of any survey data collected in a similar context). The 
level of trust in the GCFS survey data is further undermined by the lack of publicly 
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available information on the details of the survey rollout process. For instance, it is 
unknown how many enumerators participated in the survey or how these were selected, 
trained or supervised. Information about the exact or relative location of the villages and 
farms (e.g. their distance from main roads and markets, or from nature reserves ) is also 
missing, preventing judgements about the geographical coverage of the survey (i.e. the 
extent to which more remote communities and farms were covered). Besides the 
potential geographical bias that this implies, the lack of such information also 
constrained the secondary analysis. In the case of programme placement, for instance, 
the specification of the probit model could have benefited by the inclusion of variables 
related to the location of the village in relation to surrounding infrastructure (roads, 
schools, hospitals, main towns and markets). Such variables were suggested to be 
significant by the content analysis, however, due to the lack of relevant variables in 
GCFS dataset, it was not possible to test and corroborate these qualitative findings using 
quantitative methods. Moreover, the motivation for including a variable on Kuapa 
Kokoo membership only in the first round is also unclear (i.e. why ask specifically 
about membership to Kuapa Kokoo and not other cooperatives or POs? Why was this 
question dropped in the subsequent rounds?). The above observations indicate that any 
findings based on the GCFS data should be interpreted with caution and ideally in 
combination with other sources of data. For this reason, the GCFS dataset was used as a 
complementary source of information, but not as a stand-alone answer to the questions 
raised by this thesis. Nonetheless, the dataset provided indicative statistics which 
allowed identifying potentially important themes. Qualitative observations were then 
systematised around those themes, as suggested by Jick (1979). The GCFS dataset also 
served to validate (or contradict and therefore raise further questions ) qualitative 
findings, as suggested by Adato (2007). 
Finally, although selecting research participants purposively, often using snowballing 
techniques, ensured that enough variation was included in the sample (Ritchie, Lewis 
and Elam, 2013), the possible presence of selection bias undermines the external 
validity of the findings (van Meter, 19990; Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Although the use 
of quantitative methods aimed at counter balancing this limitation and adding breadth 
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through generalisability (Palinkas et al., 2015:534), it should be acknowledged, that 
qualitative findings based on purposeful sampling are vulnerable to selection bias.  
4.6.2.Ethical issues  
A rigorous protocol, approved by the UEA International Development Research Ethics 
Committee, has been followed throughout the research. All research participants were 
informed about the research objectives and use of data collected prior to any data 
disclosure and informed consent was sought from all the research informants. Care was 
taken to minimise the risk of informants perceiving participation in the research as an 
"obligation" to satisfy their land owners (in case of sharecroppers or tenant farmers), 
local leaders, and buyers, or managers (in the case of industry stakeholders). To do so, 
at the beginning of each encounter with each research participant the objectives of the 
research were clearly stated and it was reiterated that no other private interests were 
related to this independent research project. Particularly during interviews with industry 
professionals it was clearly stated that the study was not an impact evaluation of SSC 
initiatives (i.e. of their work), that could have intimidating effects, but an exploration of 
how farmers select into certification. At the community level, time was invested in 
building relations of familiarity and trust with the local population and thoroughly 
explaining the purpose of the researcher’s presence in the community. Informal chats 
prior to the interviews, as well as small ‘gifts’ were used to build personal relationships 
with the informants. A refreshment or a snack was offered during interviews, while any 
photos taken of the participants (always with their consent) were printed and given to 
them as a small “thank you” for their participation in the research. It is important to note 
that farmers also often offered small gifts in appreciation, such as fruits and plantain 
from their farms, or occasionally lunch. No direct money payments were involved 
during fieldwork, with the exception of one preliminary visit , where refreshments were 
provided to the whole group.  Finally, care was taken to ensure privacy during 19
interviews and safeguard confidentiality. No disclosed information was shared in any 
way with other farmers and/or actors of the cocoa and certification industry. Data that 
 Payments and incentives in exchange of data disclosure were directly requested by one group 19
of farmers during a preliminary, pilot visit in a community. Refreshment were provided in that 
occasion, but the community was dropped from the research, partly due to this experience.    
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could reveal the identity of the informants were anonymised, including names of 
persons, companies and specific research locations. Approval by the local authorities 
and farmers’ organisations was sought before undertaking fieldwork at the community 
level.  
4.7.Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodological approach of this research. It began by 
outlining how the idea of exploring selection processes into SSC programmes first 
emerged and how the research was shaped by my personal and professional 
experiences. It became clear that becoming a mother while conducting this research had 
a significant impact both on re-adjusting the research focus as well as on the methods 
that I could use. Having to do fieldwork with a young child meant choosing data 
collection methods that could optimise my limited time on the field, such as life history 
interviews. The chapter then provided a justification for using a mixed methods design 
and discussed how  primary qualitative data were combined with secondary quantitative 
data. The choice of approaching the research as a single case study with embedded sub-
units was also discussed, outlining how the broader case (i.e. the Ghanaian cocoa 
sector) and the embedded sub-units (i.e. the three different SSC programmes covered by 
this research) were chosen. This chapter also reviewed how the research location was 
chosen and how data was collected, managed and analysed, providing a brief theoretical 
rationale for the choices made. Emphasis was placed on describing how these methods 
were implemented in order to provide the reader with the methodological background of 
the analytical chapters that follow. The discussion of the chapter then focused on the 
methodological challenges encountered and the research limitations. Issues related to 
data saturation, use of secondary data, sampling and external validity were highlighted. 
Finally, the chapter reviewed the ethical considerations related to the study, in terms of 
data disclosure, participant protection and research incentives. The next three chapters 
present the empirical analytical work of this study, with the following chapter exploring 
patterns of SSC programme placement and thus addressing RQ1. 
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5. Exploring programme placement  
5.1.Introduction 
Programme placement can be seen as a broader form of external selection of 
participants, where programme providers (i.e funding, implementing and facilitating 
actors) select the areas to implement a programme and therefore also the population 
from which participants will emerge. Self-selection also applies here, as communities or 
organised groups of potential participants may pro-actively engage with programme 
providers to have programmes implemented in their districts and villages (White, 2009). 
This chapter aims to unpack the placement process of cocoa SSC programmes in the 
Ghanaian context in order to gain a deeper understanding of which producers have 
access to certified groups of farmers and therefore can potentially participate in, and 
benefit from, certified markets. In doing so, it addresses the first sub-question of the 
thesis (RQ1):  
How is the placement of cocoa SSC programmes determined?  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents a descriptive overview of the 
findings from the qualitative and quantitative analyses. Section 5.3 integrates key 
qualitative and qualitative findings, focusing on points of convergence as well as 
disagreement between the two types of data. Finally, section 5.4 concludes.  
5.2.Overview of main qualitative and quantitative 
findings  
5.2.1.Main qualitative findings  
Given the lack of pre-existing knowledge or theories on the placement of SSC 
programmes (see section 3.3.3.), the content analysis of interviews with cocoa, aid and 
certification industry informants served as a starting point for unpacking placement 
processes. The aim of the analysis was to identify, describe and classify key placement 
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determinants as perceived by the actors involved in the design and implementation of 
cocoa SSC certification programmes in the Ghanaian context (see section 4.6 for a 
detailed account of the analysis process). The analysis generated two measurements: (1) 
the number of informants reporting on a sub-theme and theme; and (2) the number of 
mentions of that sub-theme and theme.  The results are summarised in Table 5 (see p.20
87) . 
It can be observed that the themes reported by most informants and most frequently are 
the availability of cocoa volumes, reported twenty-eight times by twelve informants 
(row 3, Table 5); the sourcing capacity of the buyer of certified cocoa, reported thirty 
times by ten informants (row 6, Table 5) and the business operationality of the 
programme, reported thirty-one times by ten informants (row 10, Table 5). These 
themes are clearly business-oriented and apply mainly to the cases of LBC-led SSC 
programmes with selling conditionality.  They consist of the following sub-themes. 21
First, the ‘availability of cocoa volumes’ includes the cocoa production capacity of a 
specific location but also the concentration of cocoa volumes across neighbouring areas. 
Second, the ‘sourcing capacity’ of the LBC involved in the programme refers to the 
ability of the LBC to buy the required volumes from a certain area, but also the use of 
certification as a tool for attracting more farmers and hence increasing and/or protecting 
its market share. Third, the ‘business operationality’ includes sub-themes on the role of 
partnerships and networks between LBCs and NGOs in determining placement; the 
choice of strategic areas in terms of programme future expansion; and the operational 
costs involved in the production and sourcing of the certified beans. Farmer-centered 
themes were reported by less informants and less frequently. For instance the funder’s 
and/or implementer’s mission or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) aims were 
reported ten times by four informants (rows 11, Table 5), while the farmers’ ability to 
attract certification (i.e.farmers’ interest in the programme and willingness to adopt and 
 The mean of mentions is estimated as follows: mean= number of mentions/number of 20
participants mentioning. 
 The reader is reminded that selling conditionality refers to programmes where participants are 21
requested to sell their certified production to a specific PC/LBC associated with the SSC 
programme (see section 2.5)
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comply with the standards) were reported seven times by six informants (rows 12, Table 
5). 
Table 5: Results of content analysis 
Placement determinants Informants 
(n=19)
Mentions 
Themes Sub-themes Codes included N % N Mean 
(1)
Availability of 
cocoa volumes 
Cocoa 
production 
capacity 
Local cocoa production 
capacity ; soil fertility; 
age of trees
8 42.1 20 2.5
(2)
Concentration 
of cocoa 
volumes 
Concentration of farms; 
farm size 
5 26.32 8 1.6
(3) Availability of cocoa volumes total 12 63.16 28 2.33
(4)
Sourcing 
capacity
Capacity to 
source 
volumes 
LBC capacity to source 
volumes and to match 
volumes to demand; 
farmers’ commercial 
loyalty; side-selling & 
smuggling
10 52.63 25 2.5
(5)
Market 
competition 
Improve market share; 
competition between 
LBCs
3 15.79 5 1.67
(6) Sourcing capacity total 10 52.63 30 3
(7)
Business 
operationality 
Partnerships 
& networks 
LBC & NGO existent 
networks and  
partnerships
6 31.58 9 1.5
(8)
Strategic areas Strategic areas for 
businesses and 
expansion
3 15.79 4 1.33
(9)
Operational 
costs 
Operational costs; 
Vicinity and 
accessibility
8 42.10 18 2.25
(10) Business operationality total 10 52.63 31 3.1
(11)
Mission/ Corporate Social 
Responsibility aims 
Mission; environmental 
criteria; community 
needs; CSR and NGO 
objectives
4 21.05 10 2.5
(12)
Farmers’ ability to attract 
certification 
Farmers’ compliance 
with standards  & 
interest in certification 
6 31.58 7 1.17
Source: Author’s creation based on primary data 
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Some initial conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, at least according to 
the perception of the actors informing this analysis, cocoa SSC programmes are placed 
mainly using business-oriented criteria. Farmer- centred or community development 
criteria, although taken into consideration, appear to play a secondary role in 
influencing placement decisions. Second, the cocoa production capacity of a certain 
location, mentioned twenty times by eight different informants, appears to be an 
important determinant (row 1, Table 5). Nevertheless, even more important is the 
capacity of the LBCs involved in SSC programmes to overcome the market competition 
and source the certified cocoa, mentioned twenty-five times by ten informants (row 4, 
Table 5). In fact, combined with the operational costs of programme implementation 
and cocoa sourcing, which was mentioned eighteen times by eight informants (row 9, 
Table 5), it becomes clear that the capacity of the LBC to physically obtain the certified 
beans while maintaining operational costs low weighs more in placement decisions than 
the volumes of cocoa beans that a certain area can produce.  
Drawing on the ANT approach outlined in section 3.2.2, it is worth exploring how 
placement determinants are perceived by different actors in relation to their role in SSC 
programmes (illustrated in Figure 5) and hence their own interests (Mosse, 2005; Scott-
Smith, 2013). Table 6 presents the results of the content analysis disaggregated by 
actors who are (mainly) implementing SSC programmes at the local level, in this case 
LBCs, NGOs and the COCOBOD,  and stakeholders who are not involved in the 22
implementation, such as funders (i.e. cocoa processors and traders, chocolate 
manufacturers) and certifying organisations. 
 The reader is reminded that in some case COCOBOD provides extension services to SSC 22
programmes. 
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Table 6: Results of content analysis by actor category  
It can be observed that sub-themes related to the availability of cocoa volumes were 
mentioned by all the actors, both implementers and non-implementers (row 1, Table 6). 
Nevertheless,  professionals more directly involved in implementing SSC programmes 
clearly commented more often on issues related to ‘business operationality’. For 
instance three out of four informants working for LBCs made a total of seven mentions, 
and four out of six informants working for NGOs commented on the same point fifteen 
times (row 3, Table 6). This possibly reflects the interest of implementing actors in 
placing programmes in a way that economises efforts and money, while funding and 
certifying actors were clearly less concerned about this aspect of programme placement. 
Professionals working for LBCs and NGOs also commented more on farmer-driven 
placement factors (six mentions in total), than professionals from funding and standard 
setting actors (one mention in total - see row 5, Table 6). This may suggest 
implementers’ interest in minimising risks of non-compliance, mainly farmers side-
selling the certified cocoa which can also cause financial losses to their organisations. 
Actor category 
Implementing actors Funding and certifying 
actors 
LBCs NGOs COCOBOD Cocoa & 
chocolate 
companies 
Standard 
setters and 
auditors
Placement 
determinants 
I (n=4) M I (n=6) M I (n=2) M I (n=3) M I (n=4) M 
(1)
Availability of 
cocoa 
volumes
1 2 4 12 1 1 2 6 4 7
(2) Sourcing capacity 3 7 3 10 0 0 2 7 2 6
(3) Business operationality 3 7 4 15 1 2 2 4 1 3
(4) Mission/ CSR aims 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 7
(5)
Farmers’ 
ability to 
attract 
certification 
2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 1
I= Informants ; M=Mentions 
Source: Author’s creation based on primary data 
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On the other hand, social or environmental factors that would justify implementing a 
SSC programme in a certain location, such as child labour or deforestation, were 
reported to a greater extent by funding and certifying actors (eight mentions by three 
informants), than by implementing actors (two mentions by one informant, see row 4, 
Table 6). This can be linked to the interests of the first in improving their corporate 
image and protecting/increasing their market share through investments in SSC 
programmes.   
5.2.2.Main quantitative findings 
The findings of the content analysis presented above were used to empirically inform 
the quantitative analysis of placement determinants. In combination with the availability 
of explanatory variables provided by the GCFS data set,  a probit model was specified 23
to explore the existence of systematic differences in farmer observable socio-economic 
characteristics between areas with and without access to certification. The presence of 
the Fairtrade cooperative Kuapa Kokoo was used as a proxy of access to certification 
because at the time of data collection Kuapa Kokoo was the only cooperative/LBC 
producing and sourcing certified cocoa in Ghana (see section 2.5). Following the key 
certification placement determinants summarised in Table 5, the model considers 
variables related to the availability of cocoa volumes (production volumes, farm size) 
and LBCs’ sourcing capacity (number of buyers used by the farmer and of other LBCs 
operating in the farmer’s village).  Drawing on the SRL framework, it also considers 24
livelihood assets that can influence farmers’ ability to attract SSC programmes. For 
instance, the years of farmers’ residency in the farming village and their education level 
can reflect farmers’ social and human capital and hence the ability of local communities 
to actively seek SSC services. On the other hand, household size, labour practices, 
investments in cocoa farming and other sources of wealth (e.g livestock, non-cocoa 
income) are livelihood assets that can influence farmers’ capacity to comply with the 
standards. Finally, it considers variables that could be linked to the mission/CSR 
objectives of programme funding and implementing actors, such as women’s 
 See section 4.5.1. for more details on the GCFS dataset 23
 The variable related to the number of LBCs in village excludes Kuapa Kokoo. 24
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participation, and child labour. Unfortunately, no variables that could inform aspects of 
the business operationality were provided by the GCFS dataset. For example, there were 
no variables related to the accessibility of the respondent’s farm (e.g. road 
infrastructure, distance form markets or urban centres, etc.). A description of the 
variables used to model farmers’ access to Kuapa Kokoo is provided in Appendix 8. The 
probit model used to estimate the probability that a farmer has access to Kuapa Kokoo 
is specified as follows: 
Table 7 presents the cross-tabulations of farmers with and without access to Kuapa 
Kokoo across the three regions covered by the GCFS dataset. The percentage of farmers 
with access is higher in the Ashanti region (78% of the sample), followed by the 
Western region where the same percentage is 57%.  On the contrary, Kuapa Kooko 25
appears to have less presence in the Brong Ahafor region, where only 38% of the 
farmers had the possibility to sell to the Fairtrade certified LBC. 
Table 7: Cross-tabulation of farmer categories by region  
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are provided in Table 8.  
Non-access Access Total 
Region N % N % N %
Ashanti 26 22.03 92 77.97 118 23.98%
Brong Ahafo 69 62.16 42 37.84 111 22.56%
Western 113 42.97 150 57.03 263 53.46%
Total 208 42.28 284 57.72 492 100
Source: Author’s creation
 The reader is reminded that a map of the cocoa producing areas in Ghana can be found in 25
section 2.3.  
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𝑃𝑟(𝐾𝑢𝑎𝑝𝑎 𝐾𝑜𝑘𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 1)
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 cocoa sold (kg) +  𝛽2 cocoa plot (ha) + 𝛽3 years in village  +  𝛽4 buyers (n)  
+  𝛽5 LBCs in village (n) +  𝛽6 child labour (days) +  𝛽7  savings (1 = yes)  
+ 𝛽8  gender (1 = male) + 𝛽9  years of schooling + 𝛽10  household size 
+ 𝛽11 adult labour contribution (days) + 𝛽12  caretaker (1 = yes)
+ 𝛽13  non cocoa income (1 = yes) + 𝛽14 livestock (n)  +  ui 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables, full sample. 
It can be observed that that the average farmer produces 1,275 MT of cocoa per year on 
a six ha farm, has been residing in the farming community for about thirty-nine years 
and has a primary school education level (see rows 1, 2, 5, & 7, Table 8). Households 
have about seven members and 83% of the sample is male-headed (see row 8 & 13, 
Table 8). In terms of labour use, the average farmer makes use of (adult) household 
labour eighty-three days per year, while 27% of the sample makes use of sharecropping 
labour (see rows 9 & 10, Table 8).  Farmers have reported relying much less on child 26
labour, the elimination of which is a central topic in certification standards such as 
Fairtrade. The average use of child labour (children aged 5-14) reported is of eight days 
Full sample
Row Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
(1) Cocoa sold (kg) 439 1275.5 1458.2 5 11875
(2) Area of cocoa plot (ha) 492 6.252 5.888 0.135 40.06
(3) No of buyers 492 1.4532 0.7105 1 6
(4) No of LBCs in village * 492 3.189 1.437 1 6
(5) Years in village 489 38.714 19.791 1 98
(6) Savings (Yes:1) 491 0.4603 0.4989 0 1
(7) Years of schooling 490 6.563 4.691 0 16
(8) Household size 492 6.829 2.667 1 14
(9) Adult household labour (days) 480 83.50 111.36 0 786
(10) Caretaker (Yes:1) 489 0.2719 0.4454 0 1
(11) Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 466 0.8541 0.3534 0 1
(12) No of Livestock (sheep & goats) 492 4.6910 9.5536 0 80
(13) Household head Sex (Male:1) 491 0.831 0.375 0 1
(14) Child labour (days) 491 8.277 28.177 0 320
* Includes Kuapa Kokoo 
Source: Author’s creation
 For a discussion on  sharecropping arrangement see section 2.4. 26
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per year with a standard deviation, however, of twenty-eight days (row 14, Table 8). 
Regarding selling strategies, farmers have on average access to more than three LBCs 
operating in their village, and sell their cocoa to more than one LBC per season (see 
rows 4 & 3, Table 8). 46% of farmers have reported saving for cocoa farming 
investments (row 6, Table 8), while 85% have other sources of income besides cocoa 
(row 11, Table 8). Ownership of livestock (sheep and goats) is common, but limited to 4 
- 5 animals (row 12, Table 8). Table 8 also indicates that there are some data missing for 
some of the explanatory variables (e.g. cocoa sold, adult household labour, non-cocoa 
income). The effect of missing data in quantitative analysis can be serious, particularly 
if the omission of data is not random but systematic (Dong and Peng, 2013). 
Nevertheless, after investigating the presence of systematic patterns of missing data, it 
was concluded that missing data are random and therefore pose no validity risk to the 
analysis. A description of the investigation of missing values is provided in Appendix 9. 
The breakdown of descriptive statistics by region (see Appendix 10) reveals important 
regional differences that could significantly influence certification programme 
placement. Overall, cocoa farming appears to be more intensified in the Western region 
where farmers have on average  larger farms by one to two hectares which produce 
about 500kg more cocoa per season than in the other two regions. Additionally, they 
appear to save more for farming investments, while relying less on livestock and non-
cocoa income sources. This apparent cocoa farming intensification probably also 
explains why in the Western region there is a higher presence of LBCs per village (3.6 
versus 2.7 in the other two regions) and also a higher diversification of the selling 
channel, as farmers sell on average to more LBCs (1.5 versus 1.3 in the other two 
regions). In terms of socio-economic characteristics, farmers in the Western region 
appear to have on average smaller household size and more years of schooling than in 
the other two regions. Finally, labour-wise, farmers in the Brong Ahafo region present 
higher use of adult and child household labour, while the Ashanti region presents the 
higher percentage of sharecropping labour. 
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The analysis now turns to the exploration of placement determinants. Table 9 compares 
the mean characteristics of farmers with and without access to Kuapa Kokoo in the full 
sample, while Appendices 11, 12 and 13 provide the same information by region.  27
Table 9: Mean characteristics by access status to Kuapa Kokoo, full sample. 
Non-access Access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev t-test
(1) Cocoa sold (kg) 439 1168.6 1357.35 1349.79 1522.5 -2.101**
(2) Area of cocoa plot (ha) 492 5.651 5.554 6.692 6.093 -2.975***
(3) N of buyers 492 1.327 0.564 1.55 0.789 -3.144***
(4) N of LBCs in village* 492 2.3413 1.1180 2.8098 1.3235 -3.982***
(5) Years in village 489 36.03 19.25 40.68 19.98 -2.428**
(6) Savings (Yes:1) 491 0.4711 0.500 0.4523 0.498 0.1716
(7) Years of schooling 490 5.412 4.877 7.398 4.374 -4.622***
(8) Household size 492 6.375 2.758 7.162 2.55 -3.292***
(9) Adult household labour 
(days)
480 79.338 123.039 86.49 102.286 -1.658*
(10) Caretaker (Yes:1) 489 0.2163 0.413 0.313 0.464 5.66**
(11) Non-cocoa income (Yes:1) 466 0.8325 0.374 0.871 0.336 1.342
(12) N of Livestock (sheep & 
goats) 
492 5.3846 8.7756 4.1831 10.0705 3.29***
(13) Household head Sex 
(Male:1)
491 0.82 0.384 0.838 0.369 0.2398
(14) Child labour (days) 491 9.1545 24.95 7.64 30.34 1.97**
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo 
Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, test statistic is z-score.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s creation
 The normality of continuous variables is tested with the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 27
(Appendix 14). The hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected for all the variables and thus 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test, which does not assume normal distribution, is used 
to test for statistically significant differences in the mean values of continuous variables 
between farmers with and without access to Kuapa Kokoo. For categorical variables, the 
Pearson chi2 test is used to test for the statistical significance of the relationship between 
membership status and categorical variables.
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The following statistically significant differences are observed (column 6, Table 9). 
Farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo have on average larger farms by one ha, and 
produce 181 kg of cocoa more  (rows 1 & 2, Table 9). Additioanlly, Kuapa Kokoo 
appears to operate in villages where farmers have more selling options and also 
diversify their selling channels more (rows 3 & 4, Table 9). Regarding characteristics 
that can influence farmers’ ability to attract certification, results suggest that Kuapa 
Kokoo operates in areas where farmers have on average longer farming residencies by 
4.65 years, two years more of schooling and households larger by 0.8 units (see rows 5, 
7 & 8). Farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo also reported 10 % more use of 
sharecropping labour (see row 10). When examining statistically significant differences 
by regions, it can be observed that Kuapa Kokoo appears to have entered areas with 
greater cocoa output per farmer, an average surplus of 361 kg in the Ashanti region and 
96kg in the Western region (see Appendices 11-13, row 1). Farmers with access to 
Kuapa Kokoo in the Western region also have farms which are on average 1.9 ha larger 
(row 2, Appendix 13). Differences in cocoa volumes between access and non-access 
famers are not statistically significant in the Brong Ahafo region, where Kuapa Kokoo 
is present in areas with households which are larger by 1,7 units, farmers have on 
average four years more of schooling, and make 12% more use of sharecropping labour 
(see rows 7, 8 & 9, Appendix 12). Nevertheless, t-tests have limited information value 
in terms of unpacking placement issues, hence the probit analysis estimating the 
probability that a farmer has access to Kuapa Kokoo that follows.  
Table 10 presents the coefficients, average marginal effects (AME) and robust standard 
errors in parenthesis of the variables found to be statistically significant.   28
 AME are preferred here to the commonly used marginal effects at the mean (MEM), as they 28
are considered “more appropriate for providing a realistic interpretation of estimation results”, 
while MEM might refer to “either non-existent or inherently nonsensical observations”, as in 
the case of dummy regressors (Bartus, 2005: 310). For continuous variables, the AME indicates 
by which percentage an unit change in a continuous variable changes the probability of the 
dependent variable becoming one , i.e. Kuapa Kokoo operating in a farmer’s village. The same 
applies for dummy variables, the difference being that the change in the explanatory variable is 
from zero to one.
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Table 10: Probit estimations (access to Kuapa Kokoo)  
Dependent variable:  Farmer has access to  Kuapa Kokoo (1=yes)
Full Sample (1) Ashanti (2) Brong Ahafo (3) Western (4)
Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME
(1) N of 
buyers 
0.159 0.0546 0.860* 0.177** 0.167 0.0382 0.143 0.0470
(0.0998) (0.0340) (0.473) (0.0886) (0.228) (0.0515) (0.126) (0.0412)
(2) N of 
LBCs*
0.199 
***
0.069 
***
0.247* 0.0509* 0.431* 0.0985** 0.374 
***
0.123 
***
(0.0624) (0.0207) (0.137) (0.0289) (0.223) (0.0495) (0.094) (0.0273)
(3) Years in 
village
0.00636
*
0.00219
*
0.0153   
*
0.00315
*
0.0061 0.00140 -0.0099
*
-0.0032
*
(0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0087) (0.0016) (0.008) (0.00191) (0.006) (0.0018)
(4) Years of 
schooling
0.052. 
***
0.018 
***
0.0129 0.00265 0.126 
***
0.0287 
***
0.0343 0.0113
(0.0156) (0.0052) (0.0397) (0.0081) (0.038) (0.00718) (0.024) (0.0077)
(5) Househol
d size
0.0653 
**
0.0225 
**
-0.0469 -0.0097 0.214 
***
0.0489 
***
0.0730 0.0240
(0.0299) (0.0101) (0.0671) (0.0139) (0.069) (0.0151) (0.047) (0.0154)
(6) Adult hh 
labour 
(days)
-0.0006 -0.00021 0.005     
*
0.00104
*
-0.001 -7.95e-05 -0.0018
*
-0.0006
*
(0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0028) (0.0006) (0.002) (0.00037) (0.001) (0.0003)
(7) Caretaker 
(Yes:1)
0.281 0.0960* -0.342 -0.0722 -0.143 -0.0321 0.448* 0.144*
(0.171) (0.0573) (0.385) (0.0810) (0.464) (0.103) (0.237) (0.073)
(8) N of 
Livestock
-0.0152* -0.0052 
**
-0.0255 -0.0053 -0.041
**
-0.0095 
**
-0.0036 -0.0012
(0.0078) (0.0026) (0.0203) (0.0040) (0.018) (0.00377) (0.01) (0.0032)
(9) Hh Sex 
(Male:1)
-0.0130 -0.00447 -0.992* -0.162* 1.007* 0.226** -0.332 -0.116
(0.189) (0.0648) (0.585) (0.0702) (0.516) (0.102) (0.280) (0.085)
(10) Constant -1.64 
***
0.330 -4.742 
***
-1.288 
**
(0.364) (1.137) (1.085) (0.502)
Obs. 396 396 92 92 87 87 217 217
Pseudo R² 0.1086 0.2528 0.3876 40.04
Wald chi² 56.39 27.17 42.31 40.04
Prob>chi² 0.0000 0.0183 0.0001 0.0003
% 
correctly 
predicted 
65.66% 83.70% 81.6% 70.05%
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for Probit Coeff. Standard errors in 
parentheses for Predicted. prob. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
	 	
 97
Column 1 reports the results for the full sample, while columns 2, 3 and 4 report the 
results on the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western region accordingly. The following 
control variables were used but found to be statistically insignificant both across and 
within regions: cocoa sold, area of cocoa plot, savings, non-non-cocoa income and child 
labour. In order to avoid distractions from the statistically significant outcomes  the 
results for these variables are provided in Appendix 15.  
The model for the full sample correctly predicts 65.66% of the observations. While 
variables related to cocoa volumes have statistically insignificant coefficient values (see 
Appendix 15), the number of LBCs, other than Kuapa Kokoo, operating in the village 
appears to be statistically significant (Table 10, column 1). This means that for an 
additional LBC operating in one village, the probability of Kuapa Kokoo also operating 
in the area increases by 19.9% (see row 2, column 1, Table 10). In the Ashanti region 
alone this probability is enhanced also by the number of buyers used by a farmer within 
one season, as an additional buyer increases the probability of Kuapa Kokoo buying 
cocoa in the village by 17.7 % (row 1, column 2, Table 10). 
In terms of variables that can influence farmers’ ability to attract SSC programmes, 
farmers’ years of residency in the farming village, years of schooling, household size 
and the use of sharecropping labour appear to positively increase the probability of 
Kuapa Kokoo operating in the area. In particular, an additional year of farmer’s 
residency increases the probability of Kuapa Kokoo being commercially present in the 
village by 0.22% across regions and 0.31% in the Ashanti region alone, while it 
decreases the same probability by 0.32% in the Western region (row 3, column 1, 2 and 
4, Table 10). An additional year of schooling increases the probability of Kuapa Kokoo 
operating in the farmer’s village by 1.80 % across regions and by 2.87 % in Brong 
Ahafo alone (row 4, column 1 and 3, Table 10). Similarly, an additional household 
member increases the same probability by 2.25% across regions and by 4.9% in Brong 
Ahafo alone (row 4, column 1 & 3, Table 10). Interestingly, the presence of male-
headed households decreases the probability of Kuapa Kokoo operating in the farmer’s 
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village in the Ashanti region by 16.2 percentage points (row 9, column 2, Table 10).  29
The opposite, however, occurs in Brong Ahafo where the presence of male-headed 
households increases the same probability by 22.6 percentage points (row 9, column 3, 
Table 10). Finally, if the variable ‘sharecropper’ changes from zero to one, the 
probability for Kuapa Kokoo operating in the village rises by 9.6 percentage points 
across regions and by 14.4 percentage points in the Western region alone (row 7, 
column 1 &4, Table 10). In terms of adult household labour, an additional day increases 
the probability for Kuapa Kokoo operating in the village by 0.1%, while in the Western 
region it decreases the same probability by 0.06% (row 6, column 2 and 4, Table 10). 
On the other hand, an additional animal owned by the farmer decreases the probability 
of Kuapa Kokoo operating in the village by 0.522% across regions and by 0.947 % in 
Brong Ahafo (row 8, column 1 and 3, Table 10).  
Overall, however, it is worth noting that despite being statistically significant, the 
marginal effects for most of the above variables are considerably low, the higher 
marginal effects being those regarding the number of LBCs and the use of 
sharecropping labour across regions, and that of household head sex for the Ashanti and 
Brong Ahafor regions.These quantitative findings, with all their converging and 
contradicting points, are further discussed along with the results from the qualitative 
analysis in the following section.  
5.3.Integrated synthesis of key qualitative and 
qualitative findings 
This section integrates quantitative and qualitative findings around the five key 
determinants of programme placement that were identified by the content analysis and 
have guided the multivariate analysis: (1) availability of cocoa volumes; (2) sourcing 
capacity; (3) business operationality; (4) farmers’ ability to attract SSC programmes; 
 It is noted that  in the case of dummy variables, AME are expressed in percentage points (pp), 29
which is the unit for the arithmetic difference of two percentages,  instead of percentages (%) 
which indicate ratios.
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and (5) mission/CSR objectives of the programme funding and implementing 
organisations. 
5.3.1.Availability of cocoa volumes 
The availability of cocoa volumes, both in terms of cocoa production capacity and 
concentration of cocoa volumes in a certain area is the third most mentioned of the key 
themes identified by the content analysis (see column 3, Table 6). We would expect, 
therefore, the GCFS data to point towards a strong relationship between the production 
of cocoa volumes and the presence of Kuapa Kokoo. Nevertheless, this is not being 
fully confirmed. While statistically significant differences are found in terms of cocoa 
volumes sold and farm size between farmers with and without access to the Fairtrade 
certified Kuapa Kokoo (see row 1 & 2, Table 10), the two variables are not significant 
in the probit model, neither across nor within regions (see row 1 & 2,  Appendix 15).  
Another way to quantitatively explore the link between availability of cocoa volumes 
and certification presence is by testing the correlation between average cocoa volumes 
purchased by COCOBOD between 2010 and 2015 by district and the data on the 
presence of certification programmes (see Appendix 16 for a list of certification 
programmes per cocoa district and per certification scheme). Given that the average 
cocoa purchases and the number of certification programmes are not normally 
distributed the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is used to test for correlation, as 
suggested by Hauke and Kossowski (2011).  Results (Table 11) suggest a statistically 30
significant, though weak, uphill correlation (r=0.32) between the presence of 
certification programmes and average cocoa purchases, which is illustrated in the scatter 
plot in Figure 9.  
 See Appendix 17 for the results of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test30
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Table 11: Correlation coefficients: cocoa purchases & SSC programmes  
Figure 9: Cocoa purchases and number of SSC programmes per district   
A closer look at the insights from the content analysis suggests that the availability of 
cocoa volumes is the starting point for making placement decisions. The following 
quote highlights this point:  
“So maybe to answer that question, there is what we call ‘hotspots’. For us to operate 
here, and say not there, it’s based on the capacity, the production capacity of here over 
there within all the cocoa producing regions…So the underlying factor is that it depends 
on the productivity, on the production capacity of a particular district in a region. And 
this is usually or mostly determined by the LBCs, because that's where they get more of 
their cocoa from. And the reason why possibly or strategically they may want to focus 
Average Cocobod cocoa 
purchases by district 
(2010-2015, MT)
Number of SSC 
programmes by  
district 
Average Cocobod cocoa purchases 
by district (2010-2015, MT)
1.0000 -
N of SSC programmes by district 0.3237 1.0000
P value (0.0071)***
Observations 68
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Source: Author’s creation based on secondary data
in this particular region or in this district also depends on the expected tonnage from the 
final off-taker. If you are challenged by a client or a final off-taker to produce, let’s say 
20.000 MT of cocoa, strategically you would’t want to go where you cannot get that 
output. So all these factors determine where to focus your attention in terms of 
certification” (Alfred, NGO programme manager).  
The extract underlines the importance of the cocoa production capacity of a specific 
area or district. Coming from the perspective of an implementing actor, it indicates that 
there are well known ‘hotspot’ areas of great cocoa production activity, which are 
preferred in terms of SSC programme placement. The extract also suggests that large 
contracts for certified cocoa are likely to result in SCC programmes being implemented 
in areas with greater production capacity, whereas smaller buyers with minor 
requirements may be able to source certified cocoa from areas with lesser cocoa 
production capacity. Further, it highlights that the the SSC placement process is often 
driven by the pressure that an LBC faces to deliver specific quantities of certified cocoa 
to its clients. This is because LBCs see SSC programmes as financial investments, as 
Rondinelli (1983) suggests (see section 3.2.1). Through this conceptual lens, 
programmes are placed in ways which minimise losses and maximise returns. Under 
this logic, they aim at producing the exact tonnages of certified beans for which they 
have a secured market (i.e. a client), no more and no less. Implementing a SSC 
programme in locations where they cannot source the requested volumes, would mean 
facing supply shortages and therefore the need to expand the investment to source 
certified cocoa from other areas or risk failing to supply their clients. On the other hand, 
creating an over-supply of certified beans can also be problematic, as a portion of the 
cocoa produced as certified would have to be sold as conventional, (i.e.without the 
certification premium), unless the LBC is able to find another buyer interested in 
certified cocoa. As a result, the LBC risks either running into losses by buying cocoa as 
certified and selling it as conventional, or damaging its commercial relationship with its 
supplying farmers by failing to pay the expected premium. 
High cocoa production volumes are linked to soil fertility or the age of the cocoa farms. 
Therefore, recently established farms on forest land, as it is the case in the Northern part 
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of the Western region are more productive than older farms in the Eastern region that 
have been producing for decades without being renovated (Ruf, 2011). Similarly the 
Volta region, apart from very low production levels, would need heavy investments in 
removing old trees and replanting new ones and therefore,“no one wants to invest in 
certified cocoa there” (Edward, certification consultant). While data provided by 
COCOBOD confirm the fact that the Western region (both North and South) produces 
far more cocoa than the other regions (see Table 2), data on the presence of certification 
programmes does not corroborate that this is where SSC programmes are concentrated. 
As Figure 10 illustrates, the Ashanti region presents a higher concentration of 
certification programmes (n=39) from either the North (n=20) or South (n=21) of the 
Western region, whereas it produces 80 to 100 thousand MT less. On the other hand, the 
Eastern region presents a similar amount of certification programmes (n=19) as both 
parts of the Western region, while producing less than a third of what both parts of the 
Western region produce. 
Figure 10: Cocoa purchases (2010-2015) and SSC programmes per region. 
The concentration of volumes was also reported to play an important role in programme 
placement by cocoa industry informants, as the following quote indicates: 
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“If in this community there is no one [doing certification], it means that probably the 
number of farmers that you have here is small. Small production on small small farms. 
When the [harvesting] season comes you will get 500 MT. But [in another community] 
you have the potential to purchase 4000. So if all the big farmers sell 4000 here, why 
invest here to only get 500? So we will consider the volumes we get at the end of the 
season, the relationships, the whole market place.” (Richard, cocoa trading 
sustainability manager). 
The above extract suggests that when SSC programmes are conceptualised as financial 
investments for policy implementation (Rondinelli, 1983), then providers are likely to 
target areas with larger farms that can supply higher cocoa volumes, since this would 
allow maximising returns while minimising costs. This logic contradicts the discourse 
of standard setting bodies like Fairtrade which claim supporting small-holder farmers. It 
also marks a distinction in the approach between SSC programmes driven by 
implementing actors, particularly LBCs, as business efficiency is prioritised over 
fulfilling development aims. Further, as noted above, it suggests that the cocoa volumes 
that a company can obtain from a specific area are also tied to the commercial 
relationships of the company and the broader market competition environment in that 
area, a point which links to the sourcing capacity of the LBC discussed in the next 
section.  
5.3.2.Sourcing capacity 
The sourcing capacity of the commercial partner of the SSC programme, i.e. of the 
LBC, is the second most mentioned placement determinant from the content analysis 
(see Table 5, column 6). The fact that it was widely mentioned by implementing but 
also funding and certifying actors (see Table 6) confirms that cocoa volumes alone are 
not enough to determined placement decisions, as hinted in section 5.3.1. The theme 
captures informants’ comments on the already existing sourcing capacity of LBCs in a 
certain area, i.e. their ability to physically obtain the certified beans. However, it also 
captures how certification related incentives, such as premium and farming inputs, are 
used by LBCs to attract more farmers to their supplying base, or more cocoa from the 
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already supplying farmers and hence improve (or restore) their sourcing capacity. This 
practice confirms that different actors, in this case LBCs, engage with interventions in 
ways that advance their own interests, in this case placing SSC programmes in ways 
which protect and improve their market share, as suggested by ANT (see section 3.2.2).  
The already existing capacity of the LBC to source cocoa from a certain area was often 
framed in terms of farmers’ ‘loyalty’ or ‘commitment’, with LBCs “running certification 
services” where “they have their own farmers”, (William, cocoa manufacturing 
sustainability manager ). These terms were widely used also by implementing and 
certifying actors to refer to farmers who do not side-sell their beans to other buyers but 
are reliable and consistent suppliers of the LBC running the SSC programme. The 
following quote suggests that the level of farmers’ commercial commitment is often as 
important as the availability and the concentration of cocoa volumes when taking 
placement decisions:  
“Beyond the volumes, the buyers will also look at loyalty. They may have more than 
two or three communities they are working, but the decision to introduce certification in 
a community may be based on the loyalty of the community. The focus is that [the 
farmers] have been providing us a lot, they have been consistent over years, so that's a 
good group for us to introduce the standards.” (Henry, NGO programme manager).  
The extract reveals the perception of implementing actors that a ‘good’ group of farmers 
to run a SSC programme is one that not only provides significant cocoa volumes, but is 
also ‘loyal’ i.e. consistent in its supply. The value placed in commercial loyalty is 
clearly linked to the concept of SSC programmes as financial investments, as 
implementing actors seek to involve groups of farmers that have demonstrated 
commercial reliability in order to minimise losses and maximise returns. Otherwise, 
they risk training in sustainability standards farmers who are likely to side-sell the 
certified beans or fail to comply with the standards in other ways, resulting in financial 
losses.  
In that respect, PCs have a key role to play, as they are the ones who (externally) select 
programme participants from the pool of their supplying farmers. They do so by 
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assessing “who is a serious member of the group” (Henry, NGO programme manager), 
implying the farmers who are reliable and constant suppliers and who will not side-sell 
their cocoa to other PCs/LBCs once certified. This strategy simplifies the work of the 
PCs during the initial phase of a SSC programme, as PCs just have to select their “loyal 
farmers and send them up for training” (Daniel, NGO programme manager). While 
farmers’ production capacity was mentioned as an important external selection 
determinant by SSC implementing actors, in practice PCs were reported to prioritise 
commercial loyalty and the overall personal relationship established with the farmer: 
“There may be a farmer that produces only two bags. Very loyal, but unproductive. But 
just because he is loyal, the PC will just keep him in [the SSC programme].Many things 
are based on relationships.” (Richard, cocoa trading sustainability manager) 
The analysis of the GCFS dataset tried to captured the loyalty dimension by including a 
variable on the number of LBCs used by one farmer within the same season. 
Descriptive statistics at the full sample suggest that farmers in general tend to sell their 
cocoa to more than one LBC (Table 8, row 3), indicating that a minimum degree of 
diversification of the selling channel is widespread across farmers and regions 
regardless of certification status. When examining whether this influences SSC 
placement, farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo were found to diversify slightly more 
their selling channel, the difference being statistically significant (Table 9, row 3). These 
results are not confirmed by the probit model at the full sample. Nevertheless, the 
variable is significant for the Ashanti region alone (Table 10, row 1), suggesting that at 
least in this region, Kuapa Kokoo is more likely to be present in villages where farmers 
sell to more buyers within one season.  
Such results appear to contradict the “loyalty” principle, but converge with the scenario 
that SSC programmes are used by LBCs as tools for outplaying the competition and 
improving their market share. The following quote is characteristic of this thinking:   
“But you have a lot of certification programmes and [the placement] decision is mainly 
because of [LBC A],  because we are partners with [LBC A]. And [LBC A] will say in 31
 The name of the LBCs has been anonymised to protect the identity of the informant 31
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this area I used to have a market share of, let's say, 5000 MT. [LBC B] came in, [LBC 
C] came in, and because of that all my farmers have moved away from me and I am 
now losing 5000 MT. So in order to get back my market share, I say ok, I can introduce 
a certification programme there so that my farmers will come back and sell the beans to 
me. So the farmers there, knowing that now we care about them, we support them, now 
they will come back to [LBC A]. There is a lot of competition.” (Richard, cocoa trading 
sustainability manager). 
The extract asserts that placement decisions taken by LBCs are (also) driven by the 
competition they face at the local level. This is directly linked to the way the internal 
Ghanaian cocoa market is structured. As discussed in section 2.3, COCOBOD 
capitalises LBCs at the beginning of the season to buy cocoa from farmers on its behalf 
at state-fixed prices. This means that LBCs, and by consequence PCs, practically have 
no margin to compete on a price basis. In this setting, certification related incentives, 
such as training, premium payments or other inputs in kind (i.e. cutlasses, boots, 
discounted fertilisers, etc.), represent a unique opportunity to attract more farmers. 
Some PCs have a well established supplying base of farmers based on personal relations 
and credit supply which is unlikely to be affected by such incentives.  Others, however, 32
may be able to use a ‘certification boost’ to maintain, recover or increase their local 
market share. This is because, as the above extract suggests, by providing certification 
related inputs to farmers, LBCs are able to show to farmers “care” and “support”, 
elements that differentiate them in the local market and allow them to recover supplying 
farmers they have lost to competitors or further expand their existing supplying base. In 
other words, SSC programmes are used to enhance farmers’ ‘loyalty’ and LBCs place 
them strategically where they need to recover, maintain or increase their market share. 
The use of certification as a competition tool, however, can result in SSC programmes 
targeting the same farmers, while other areas may have no certification coverage at all. 
This is because the introduction of a SSC programme may trigger the implementation of 
more programmes in the same area by other LBCs fearing market losses. Quantitative 
findings from the probit model, which used the number of LBCs operating per village as 
 Farmer-PC relations are further discussed in chapter 7. 32
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a proxy of market competition, shows that Kuapa Kokoo is more likely to be present in 
villages with a higher concentration of LBCs. Results are consistent both at the full 
sample and regional levels (Table 10, row 2). COCOBOD data also show an uphill, 
though moderate, statistically significant correlation (r=0.47) between the number of 
certification programmes operating in a cocoa district and the number of LBCs (see 
Table 12 & Figure 11). 
Table 12: Correlation coefficients: LBCs & SSC programmes  
 
Figure 11: Number of LBCs and number of SSC programmes per district    
The positive correlation between the presence of LBCs and that of SSC programmes 
can of course be driven by high cocoa volumes, as discussed in section 5.3.1., but also 
by other factors, such as accessibility, area-specific costs of cocoa sourcing, vicinity to 
N of LBCs operating by 
cocoa district 
N of SSC programmes by 
cocoa district 
N of LBCs operating by cocoa 
district 
1.0000 -
N of cSSC programmes by cocoa 
district 
0.4737 1.0000
P value (0.0000)***
Observations 68
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Source: Author’s creation based on secondary data
other areas of interest, etc. These issues are discussed below, under the theme of 
business operationality. 
5.3.3.Business operationality 
Business operationality is the most frequently reported placement determinant from the 
content analysis and captures informants’ comments on how (mainly) implementing 
actors consider their pre-existing partnerships and networks, as well as the operational 
costs when taking placement decisions (see Table 7, row 3). As commented in section 
5.2.2 unfortunately the probit model was not able to include variables that could capture 
this dimension of programme placement, and therefore this section relies only on the 
content analysis. Qualitative data suggests that SSC programme placement is influenced 
by pre-existing partnerships and networks of the implementing actors (LBCs and 
NGOs) which can facilitate setting up a programme. The following extract makes this 
point:  
“The LBCs were already buying cocoa, they were working with farmers in various 
other groups, [at the] community or individual level, around a PC, somebody who buys. 
It’s like the point for the companies to enter into the community. And so based on this 
structure, when certification was introduced we followed the system that was put on the 
ground by the LBCs. The LBCs are interested in the beans, so we followed the 
beans.” (Henry, NGO programme manager).  
The extract highlights that LBCs were operating in different cocoa growing areas long 
before demand for certified cocoa picked up at the beginning of the 2010s (see section 
1.1). Their operational areas were structured already, with LBCs having a stronger 
presence in some areas than others. Therefore, it made operational (and economic) 
sense, to use these already established structures and introduce SSC programmes in 
areas which were already familiar to the LBCs who were going to purchase the certified 
beans. In this process the PCs, as local trading actors proved to be crucial in the 
selection of areas to introduce SSC programmes, since they provided the key point of 
interaction between the LBC and the community. The extract also suggests that what 
drove LBCs to enter certain areas in the first place, prior to certification, was the 
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possibility of sourcing considerable amounts of cocoa. SSC programmes were then 
introduced, by LBCs or NGOs, in areas pre-selected by the LBCs based on that 
commercial criteria. According to the same informant, NGOs implementing SSC 
programmes also sought synergies with previous development projects to make 
placement decisions. The difference is that in these cases placement is linked to the 
institutional mission of the NGO (or that of its donors), e.g. protection of forest 
reserves, and not in commercial criteria. For instance, it made operational sense to enter 
areas where due to previous NGO work, farmers were already organised into groups, 
easily accessible and better prepared to engage with certification related activities. 
The second point relates to the operational costs of programme implementation, which 
is the third most reported sub-theme from the content analysis (see Table 5, row 9). 
Running a SSC programme is expensive per se, as implementing actors, whether NGOs 
or LBCs, “need to put in place all the structures and systems and human resources, to 
produce cocoa according to the certification standards” (Alfred, NGO programme 
manager). As a result, they seek to avoid extra costs and look for low-cost areas in terms 
of cocoa sourcing and programme implementation, such as easily accessible 
communities, ideally concentrated in the same areas and in close distance to their 
operational base. Concentration of implementing areas is important, since it facilitates 
the provision of extension services as well as programme monitoring by the same team 
of extension professionals without having to cover long distances between communities, 
both LBC and NGO professionals have highlighted. It also facilitates low-cost 
expansion scenarios and allows responding swiftly to possible increases in demand, as it 
is faster and cheaper to include more farmers in the same area than to set up a new 
programme in a new area (Ibrahim, LBC sustainability manager). This further explains 
why areas with small, scattered farms, like the Volta region, are being avoided in terms 
of SSC programme placement. Moreover, accessibility from the operational centre of 
the implementing actor was also reported as another key factor. The following quote 
explaining how an LBC took SSC placement decisions illustrates this logic:  
“The Ashanti and Brong Ahafo is close [to the LBC headquarters], so it meant that the 
monitoring of the programmes would be easier […] than going to the Western region. In 
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the Western region, the terrain is hard, the road networks and so on. It was better to do 
[certification] where we thought the factors that could militate against the success 
would be less” (Collins, LBC sustainability manager ).  
The quote suggests that accessibility may prove more important than volumes. In this 
case, despite the important bulk of cocoa volumes in the Western region, the LBC 
decided to implement its SSC programme in areas closer to its operational base in 
Kumasi, in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions. Accessibility was also valued in terms 
of ‘public relations’ or marketing, i.e. “to quickly show the people around where you are 
working”, as one certification actor commented (Joel, standard setting body programme 
manager). A difference in placement approaches of different actors therefore is 
observed. LBCs make gains from the commission on the cocoa tonnages they purchase, 
and therefore their approach to SSC programmes in general, and to placement in 
particular, is narrowly determined by their commercial interests. Aid and certification 
actors, on the other hand, are driven by their mission which broadly involves improving 
the working and living conditions of farmers. Therefore they have interest in 
capitalising on the impact of SSC programmes by selling evidence to donors, 
programme funders, or market actors and finally consumers. This explains the 
importance of having “show case” projects that can be easily accessed by visitors for 
marketing or fundraising purposes. Such differences between commercial and non 
commercial actors are further illustrated in the discussion that follows on the mission 
and CSR objectives of an organisation as placement determinant.  
5.3.4.Mission/ Corporate Social Responsibility objectives  
Business-oriented placement determinants dominate the findings of the content analysis, 
however, farmer-centred criteria related to the particular mission or CSR objectives of 
the funding and certifying actors were also reported (see Table 6, row 4). The following 
quote makes this point: 
“Certification goes where the problem is, for example child labour is in the Western 
region. There may be a buyer that wants to buy from there to contribute in child labour 
improvements and then sell it as CSR. Or climate change in the Eastern region, soil 
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fertility issues, mining, etc. So it depends in which area a buyer wants to contribute 
to.” (Victor, programme manager at a multi-stakeholder industry institution). 
The informant suggests that for the funding actors who purchase the certified beans,SSC 
programmes are seen as CSR investments that can be “sold”. Cocoa and chocolate 
companies aim to capitalise on these investments by using them to differentiate 
themselves towards consumers and improve or protect their reputation against concerns 
regarding the social or environmental impact of their activities. Their approach to 
placement therefore diverges from that of implementing actors, which are more 
narrowly concerned with minimising their sourcing risks and implementation costs 
when it comes to SSC placement. Instead, funding actors are interested in placing SSC 
programmes in locations that advance their CSR agenda, regardless of the 
implementation costs. 
These may be remote, hard to reach areas, "where many people ordinarily would not 
even go”, as one certification professional commented (Joel, standard setting body 
programme manager).According to Joel, SSC may be used to make a broader 
programme economically sustainable on its own. This applies to programmes driven by 
actors with broader aims, (e.g. environmental protection) which use SSC as a means to 
make markets fund their activities through premium payments. For instance, if a 
programme has secured funding for three years, a SSC component may be introduced in 
an attempt to keep programme activities running once the initial funding is over. In 
these cases, SSC placement is clearly determined by the goals of the broader 
programme. For instance, a programme concerned with natural resource management, 
will be located around a hub of natural resources, which can be forest reserves or water 
bodies, and target the neighbouring communities.  
The above observations imply that funding or certifying actors make placement 
decisions in ways which advances their own mission or CSR goals regardless of the 
related implementation costs. As a result when such actors are involved in placement 
decisions, SSC programmes are more likely to target less accessible or less productive 
areas than programmes placed following business-oriented criteria as is the case of 
LBC-driven certification. Either way, a clear link emerges between the actors’ interests 
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and they way they engage with SSC programmes, in this case influencing programme 
placement decisions.  
The quantitative analysis was able to include only two variables that could be linked to 
the mission/ CSR objectives of funders and implementing organisations (i.e child labour 
and sex of household head) and therefore its contribution to this theme is limited. 
Results from the t-test analysis suggest that the Fairtrade cooperative Kuapa Kokoo 
entered areas with slightly, but statistically significantly, lower child labour (Table 9, 
row 14), although this is not supported by the probit model (see Appenix 15, row 12). 
On the other hand, interviews with Kuapa Kokoo professionals affirm that the 
cooperative/LBC selected areas “where strategically you would get business […] where 
we have cocoa and where we have farmers” (Jacob, LBC programme manager). 
Combined findings suggest that Kuapa Kokoo, as a SSC implementing LBC, expanded 
using business-oriented placement determinants. It is therefore likely that it entered 
more accessible and possibly better integrated areas, where a combination of a higher 
presence of COCOBOD extension services and schooling facilities could have 
contributed to lower use of child labour. The scenario that lower child labour is the 
result of spill-overs of the Kuapa Kokoo Fairtrade related activities is rather unlikely, 
given the limited impact that Kuapa Kokoo has had so far on cocoa farmers (e.g. Nelson 
et al., 2013; Laven, 2010; Deppeler, 2014). Further, results from the probit model 
suggest that the presence of female headed household significantly increases the 
likelihood of Kuapa Kokoo operating in a village in the Ashanti region, while the same 
likelihood significantly decreases in Brong Ahafo. Qualitative findings cannot explain 
this contradiction, which should be further investigated. A possible explanation would 
be that female-headed households in the Ashanti region, for some reason that could be 
related to the presence of previous development programmes or simply particular area-
specific socio-economic characteristics, were better organised and had a greater 
capacity to attract and set up Kuapa Kokoo societies in their villages. This assumption is 
linked to the farmers’ ability to attract certification, the last of the five theme identified 
by the content analysis, which is discussed in the next section.   
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5.3.5.Farmers’ ability to attract certification   
The last placement determinant identified by the content analysis refers to farmers’ 
ability to attract SSC programmes, framed as farmers’ interest in certified markets, but 
also their willingness and ability to comply with the standards. Farmers’ predisposition 
to adopt the standards is reported by both implementing and certifying actors as a 
necessary pre-condition for implementing a SCC programme in a specific area (Table 6, 
row 5). This is linked to SSC implementing and certifying actors seeking farmers who 
see cocoa farming as ‘business’ and not as ‘a tradition’ or ‘a way of life’. The following 
comment is characteristic of this view:  
“Certification schemes are not there for the distressed farmer, the one who is at the 
bottom of the his activities and does not have any idea how to come out of that 
environment. This is not the target of certification bodies. When you look across UTZ, 
Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, these are not the farmers they are looking for. 
Certification is there for farmers who understand the business of farming, but they are 
struggling to do that business.” (Edward, certification consultant) 
The extract clearly indicates that SSC programmes are meant, at least in theory, to target 
farmers who have a professional attitude towards farming. This possibly means 
excluding those who are not able to see cocoa farming as a commercial activity that 
should be intensified through investments, but rather as a part of a ‘subsistence’ 
agriculture, despite being involved in cash crop production.  These tend to be farmers 33
who are more deprived of resources and different types of capital. Overall, the statement 
hints to a process of positive external selection into SSC programmes, where the 
farmers that are already better positioned to be integrated in the export market are 
preferred over those trapped in the loop of rural poverty. 
Moreover, implementing actors highlighted the importance of farmers’ ability to comply 
with standards when taking placement decisions. In the case of Kuapa Kokoo, for 
 ‘Subsistence agriculture is used here to denote farmers “who can be found on a continuum 33
between subsistence production and concentration on crop production for the market” (Morton, 
2007:19680).
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instance, one staffer described how they selected in which communities to introduce 
UTZ certification based on the levels of farmer compliance with the Fairtrade standards 
that they have been implementing for a long time: 
“You know, we have done Fairtrade audits for more than twenty years. So we know 
areas where there is a high risk and areas where there is a low risk of non-compliance. 
And if you compare the [UTZ] standards with those of Fairtrade, the difference is just 
something small.So, if in certain areas farmers are passing the Fairtrade audits easily, 
then it was more prudent to go for UTZ certification on these areas than going to the 
high risk.” (Jacob, LBC programme manager). 
The extract suggests that farmers’ previous good performance with SSC increases the 
likelihood of a new SSC programme being placed in the same area. In this case, 
farmers’ demonstrated ability to comply with certain standards was perceived by the 
LBC as a key ‘risk minimising’ factor that determined placement. This implies that an 
implementing actor might prefer to double-certify farmers that have been already 
performing well under certification, instead of setting up a SSC programme in a new 
area, involving farmers that would need to be introduced to the standards from zero. 
This also suggests that implementing actors operating with business logics are more 
likely to create concentration of SSC programmes in certain areas, while systematically 
excluding others, not only on the basis of “optimal” areas in terms of high cocoa 
volume and low operational costs, but also on farmers’ human capital, i.e. their ability 
to comply with the standards.  
The quantitative analysis considered variables that can be linked to this ability, such as 
years of residence in the village which reflect cocoa farming experience, schooling 
level, labour access, ability to save and invest in cocoa farming and income 
diversification (i.e. livestock and other sources of income). Results from both the t-test 
and the probit analysis confirm that farmers’ ability to adopt and comply with the 
standards positively influences SSC placement. In the case of Kuapa Kokoo, findings 
suggest that the Fairtrade LBC is more likely to be operating in areas where farmers are 
longer residents and have more years of schooling and therefore in theory a greater 
ability to actively demand SSC programmes and engage with the standards (Table 9, 
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row 3 &4). In terms of access to labour, farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo also have 
larger households, i.e. a larger pool of household labour force to draw from (Table 9, 
row 5). According to the probit model, farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo also tend to 
make greater use of sharecropping labour (Table, 10, row 7). Overall, the probit analysis 
suggests that Kuapa Kokoo entered areas where farmers had better access to both family 
and sharecropping labour and therefore had greater ability to adopt the often more 
labour-intensive Fairtrade standards. Finally, Kuapa Kokoo is more likely to have 
entered areas where farmers have less livestock, suggesting less income diversification 
and greater cocoa farming intensification (Table 10, row 8). Assuming that SSC 
programmes represent a labour-led, agricultural intensification livelihood strategy (see 
section 3.3.3), findings suggest that Kuapa Kokoo entered areas where farmers were 
already better positioned to pursue certification as a cocoa farming strategy. 
Nevertheless, by implicitly targeting areas where farmers have greater ability to comply 
with the standards it is likely that farmers less able to do so were automatically excluded 
from the Fairtrade market, undermining therefore claims of support to the weakest or 
poorest producers (Cramer et al., 2017). 
5.4.Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to unpack the placement processes of SSC programmes 
in order to understand which geographical areas, and by consequence which farmers, 
are more likely to be targeted by SCC actors and why. The chapter started by presenting 
key qualitative findings from the content analysis of interviews with cocoa, aid and 
certification industry professionals. Five themes were identified as possible placement 
determinants: (1) availability of cocoa volumes; (2) sourcing capacity; (3) business 
operationality; (4) mission/CSR objectives of the programme funding and implementing 
actors and (5) farmers’ ability to attract SSC programmes. The analysis suggests that 
implementing actors appear to prioritise more business-oriented criteria in their 
placement decisions (i.e. themes 1 to 3), while funding and certifying actors tend to 
operate more guided by farmer-centred criteria (i.e. themes 4 & 5). Findings from the 
qualitative analysis, as well as proxies for livelihoods capitals were used to structure the 
quantitative analysis presented in the following section. The discussion focused on the 
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variables that were found to be statistically significant either across or within regions: 
the number of buyers used by one farmer; the number of LBCs operating in the farmer’s 
village; the farmer’s years of residence and years of schooling; the household size and 
the household head sex; use of household and sharecropping labour; and ownership of 
livestock. It was noted that the marginal effects of most of these variables were 
considerably low, with the exception of number of LBCs and the use of sharecropping 
labour across regions, and that of household head sex for the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo 
regions. The chapter then moved to the integration of qualitative and quantitative 
findings and examined where results converged or diverged. It was discussed that the 
sourcing capacity of the LBC in combination with the operational costs may be more 
important in shaping placement decisions than the cocoa production capacity of a 
certain area alone, at least when implementing actors are concerned. Funding and 
certifying actors, on the other hand, appear to consider placement criteria which are 
closer linked to their institutional mission or CSR goals. In both cases, it became clear 
that placement decisions are shaped by the interests of the actors involved in the 
programme. 
Overall, integrated findings suggested that business-oriented placement logics followed 
by implementing actors, mainly LBCs, tend to prioritise areas with larger farms that can 
supply higher concentration of volumes, as well as areas where farmers are better 
positioned to adopt and comply with the standards. This contradicts the discourse of 
certifying actors like Fairtrade which claim supporting the poorest producers (e.g. 
Cramer et al., 2017). Most importantly, however, such placement logics can result to the 
excessive concentration of SCC programmes in few certification ‘hotspots’’. This 
tendency risks the emergence of over and under-certified areas, systematically including 
farmers from optimal areas while excluding the rest. Funding and certifying actors, on 
the other hand, tend to see SSC programmes as a way of advancing their institutional 
mission or CSR agenda. Placement decisions taken for these reasons result in SSC 
programmes being placed in areas of particular social or environmental concern, which 
may include less accessible or less productive farming communities, otherwise avoided 
by implementing actors. With this pattern of positive selection emerging, the next 
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chapter turns to the eligibility criteria of SSC programmes and examines which farmers 
are in practice able to join such initiatives. 
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6. Unpacking eligibility  
6.1.Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined placement processes in SSC programmes, focusing 
on how the interest of different actors determine which areas are targeted. This chapter 
is concerned with eligibility, i.e. which farmers are able to join SSC programmes, 
regardless of whether they actually join or not. Cocoa SSC tend to lack explicit 
guidelines on which farmers can (or cannot) join a certified group, leaving farm 
operators, such as tenant and sharecropper farmers, in a grey zone of eligibility 
ambiguity (see section 1.3). The aim of this chapter is to examine how explicit or 
implicit eligibility criteria apply in the case of cocoa SSC programmes in Ghana and to 
explore the resulting implications for the reach and impact of such programmes. By 
doing so, it addresses the second sub-question of the thesis (RQ2):  
How do farmers become eligible for participation in cocoa certification programmes?  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 is a preliminary section which briefly 
presents the life histories of three selected farmers who make repeated appearances in 
the analysis provided in the following sections. Section 6.3 explores eligibility in 
practice, drawing on interviews with industry professionals as well as membership lists 
of certified groups. It then examines farmers’ perception on eligibility criteria at the 
community level. Combined findings from industry and farmer level data suggest that 
land ownership and entitlements, although officially not a precondition for membership, 
are often essential for joining a certified group. Based on this main finding, the section 
6.4 examines farmers’ trajectories to land ownership and entitlements in order to 
understand how and when farmers become eligible to join cocoa SSC programmes. 
Drawing on the SRL framework (see section 3.3.3), it particularly focuses on the role of 
human, social and economic capital in acquiring natural capital (i.e. land ownership 
and/or entitlements) and hence eligibility to participate in SSC programmes. Section 6.5 
discusses the main implications of the findings, while the section 6.6 concludes.  
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6.2.Life histories of selected farmers  
This is a preliminary section to the analytical sections that follow. Its aim is to briefly 
provide some key background information on three selected cases who appear 
recurrently in the analysis presented in this chapter (but also partly in chapter 7), and 
therefore deserve a more comprehensive introduction than those making shorter 
appearances. The three cases illustrate the life histories of three farmers with different 
ownership relations to the land they farm: a sharecropper (Abdulai), a sharecropper who 
was involved in an abunu contract and therefore was also a tenant (Moses) and a land 
owner (Solomon). A table providing an overview of the key characteristics of all the 
interviewee farmers can be found in Appendix 5. 
6.2.1.Abdulai (sharecropper) 
Abdulai is a 29 years old sharecropper from the Upper East region of Ghana. He lost his 
parents at a very young age and grew up with his grandmother who could not afford to 
send him to school. Instead, he spent his childhood farming food crops on his 
grandmother’s land until the age of 15. By that time, one of his uncle who was a cocoa 
sharecropper in Côte d’Ivoire suggested to take him to work with him. Abdulai agreed, 
however, once there he was given as a houseboy/ farm labourer to a woman who was a 
tenant farmer in a big compound with other farmers. During the four years he spent 
there, he never received any renumeration, besides a place to stay and eat. Nevertheless, 
there was a yearly contract for him, the amount being paid directly to his uncle, who 
would come once a year to collect the money. Although he was free to go, Abdulai saw 
the experience as an opportunity to learn how to farm cocoa and stayed until he realised 
he could survive on his own. At the age of 19 he decided to return to his hometown. For 
the trip he used some savings he had from working as a ‘by day’ labourer, as well as 
50-60 Ghanaian Cedis (GHS) the lady he worked for gave him before leaving.  After a 34
couple of months in his hometown, Abdulai returned to Côte d’Ivoire, but this time he 
went alone to try his luck in a city. He settled down in a place where he found other 
immigrants from his hometown and started as an ambulant seller of ice cream, Tampico 
 the equivalent of 8 to 9.5 GBP  today.34
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juice and yoghurt. When the political situation in Cote d’Ivoire got tense around 2010 
he felt unsafe and decided to return. He then joined some friends who were growing 
onions outside Accra. At some point he visited his brother who was farming in the 
research community and there he met Moses. Coming from the same hometown, the 
two men quickly became friends. Moses was already working as a sharecropper and he 
told Abdulai that he could get him a sharecropping farm. Abdulai  stayed with Moses, 
however, instead of getting a sharecropping farm for himself, he ended up helping 
Moses with his own abusa farm and working as a labourer. Abdulai went back and forth 
between Accra and the community thrice, keeping on with the onion farming, while also 
searching for sharecropping opportunities. In one of his trips to the community, Abdulai 
met his wife and got married. Together they joined some relatives who were 
sharecropping maize. Two years after his marriage, Moses called him with news about 
an abusa opportunity in the area and Abdulai went for it. He eventually got the 
sharecropping job and established there with his wife at the age of 27. Abdulai had a son 
by the time of the interview and his wife was pregnant with their second child. He was 
planning to get a second wife, because his wife was travelling too often to their 
hometown, leaving him alone with all the farm work. He also wanted to save money to 
build a house in his hometown and return to farm on his father’s land. In terms of 
certification participation, Abdulai was not member of any SSC programme. The owner 
of his sharecropping farm, however, was a member of the Cocoa Life group, which 
means that the farm was Fairtrade certified. Abdulai attended the training of the Cocoa 
Life group which was open to the whole community, but did not receive any share of 
the premium paid to the farm owner.  
6.2.2.Moses (sharecropper and tenant farmer) 
Moses, 37 years old, is a sharecropper in the process of becoming land owner through 
an abunu contract. Originally from the Upper East region of Ghana, he has been 
farming cocoa in the research community for more than a decade. As most northern 
sharecroppers, Moses skipped school and spent his childhood farming with his parents. 
When he was around 17 years old, he joined his brother in law who was sharecropping 
cocoa near the research community and work with him for three years, learning how to 
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farm cocoa and working as a labourer on a daily basis for other cocoa farmers. Moses 
never got paid for his work, but the day he left he received from his brother in law 
building material, clothing and shoes, as well as a small amount of money. After a short 
stay in his hometown, Moses returned because his brother in law had managed to secure 
him a sharecropping farm. Nevertheless, after the first harvest, the farm owner 
requested the land back to give it to his son. When he lost the farm, Moses went back to 
his hometown to farm food crops with his father. However, this was not lucrative, so he 
decided to try once more his luck in the cocoa lands. This time he joined some relatives 
who were sharecropping in the Western region. While there he helped his relatives and 
worked on other people’s farms on a ‘by day’ or contract basis (i.e. taking the whole 
farm on a contract to weed and clear). After a year he went back to his hometown, 
although the income generating opportunities there were scarce.  
Around this time, his brother in law found him another sharecropping farm and Moses 
was keen to take it. He was 25 years old by then and soon after obtaining the 
sharecropping farm, Moses went back to his hometown to get married. He spent there 
several months looking for a wife until he found Loretta. After the marriage rites, he 
returned with his wife to his sharecropping farm. Four years later, he decided to marry a 
second wife, Aisha, to deal with the increase farm and house workload. Shortly after his 
second marriage, Moses was able to acquire a second sharecropping farm. Nevertheless, 
transition to polygamy was not without problems. Loretta, not accepting the junior wife, 
took her children and returned to their hometown, while Moses kept on sharecropping 
with his junior wife. After a couple of years Moses was able to enter an abunu contract 
and this is what convinced Loretta to return to work with her husband on the abunu 
land. This is because contributing with her labour to the establishment of the farm 
would ensure her children’s inheritance rights on the land. At the time of data collection, 
Moses was negotiating the acquisition of a third sharecropping farm. This time it was a 
farm with an Akura in a considerable distance from the research community and his 
other farms. Moses was planning to send Aisha, his junior wife to work there. Despite 
being still in his thirties, Moses was already planning to return to his hometown once 
the abunu contract was completed and shared. In terms of certification participation, 
Moses used his abunu farm to register with the Touton-PBC programme (where he 
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appeared as a tenant farmer) and he sporadically attended the training of the Cocoa Life 
group, without, however, being a member.  
6.2.3.Solomon (farm owner) 
Solomon is a 60-year-old Ashanti farm owner. His father was a goldsmith who invested 
in cocoa farming on a large scale. Solomon's father owned five large farms scattered 
across the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions. According to Solomon, the farms were 
large enough for each one to need about six sharecroppers. His father had seven wives 
located in different farms who would supervise the sharecroppers for him when he was 
not around. Solomon grew up with his mother, his father’s third wife, who was running 
a textile shop in a small town in the Ashanti region, set up with her husband’s capital. 
Solomon visited one of his father’s farms in the area as a child mainly during school 
holidays and weekends. When Solomon finished Junior High School (JHS) at the age of 
17, he was encouraged by his teachers to continue studying. Nevertheless, his father 
refused to further finance his studies and instead offered him 10 hectares of virgin forest 
land to grow cocoa, next to where he was farming himself at that time. Solomon refused 
initially because he wanted to continue studying. To encourage him, his father promised 
him that the farm was going to be his personal property, not to be shared with any of his 
siblings. Lacking previous cocoa faming experience, Solomon was supported by his 
father who trained him and provided labourers to help him clear the land and plant 
cocoa. Once alone in the Akura, Solomon needed a partner to help him, so he got 
married. This marriage did not result in any child bearing so the marriage was soon 
dissolved and Solomon this time brought two wives simultaneously at the Akura to live 
and work with him. Once his farm was established and the cocoa production 
“stabilised”, Solomon divided his land into three farms, he kept one for himself and 
gave the other two to sharecroppers. Throughout the years he has been investing in his 
hometown by building different houses and shops. At the time of the interview he was 
already taking vey specific steps in order to relocate to his hometown and leave the farm 
entirely to sharecroppers. In terms of certification participation, Solomon was a member 
of the board of the Cocoa Life group. 
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The stories of the three farmers (and those of their wives) provided in this preliminary 
section illustrate the challenges farmers with different human, social and economic 
capitals encounter in the process of becoming cocoa farmers, as well as the different 
strategies they develop. For Abdulai and Moses, for instance, it was necessary to first 
acquire cocoa farming experience and invest in the right social connections in order to 
be able to farm cocoa. Solomon, on the other hand, clearly relied on his family 
resources in order to gain the farming experience he needed to farm cocoa. Although 
each of the three cases is in many aspects unique (e.g. Abdulai’s cocoa farming 
experience in Cote d’Ivoire, Moses’ exceptional ability to manage an increasing number 
of farming hectares using his wives’ labour force, or Solomon’s trajectory as the son of 
a particularly wealthy farmer), there are also a number of similarities with the 
trajectories of other farmers. For example, being sent from a young age to relatives (or 
even to strangers) to help with daily household and farming chores without direct 
remuneration, just like Abdulai and Moses, was a widespread practice across 
interviewed farmers. Another common pattern among farm owners like Solomon, or 
farm tenants like Moses, was their intention to return to their hometown, leaving their 
farms in the care of sharecroppers. These patterns and their implications in relation to 
SSC programmes are further discussed in the sections that follow.  
6.3.Eligibility: perceptions and practice  
This section discusses how eligibility is perceived by both industry professionals and 
farmers and then reviews the membership lists of the two SSC programmes operating in 
the research community to explore how eligibility applies in practice.  
6.3.1.Perceptions of eligibility 
Implementing and certifying actors often see a farmer's active involvement in cocoa 
farming as the only requirement for SSC eligibility. Therefore, whoever “works on the 
farm, makes himself available for training, and builds the capacity to comply with the 
standards” may join (Edward, certification consultant), regardless of whether this is a 
farm owner or operator (i.e. a sharecropper farming in abusa terms or a tenant farmer 
	 	
 124
who is renting the land without sharing the crop).  Nevertheless, it was also underlined 35
that certification should not disturb the relations between farm owner and operator 
(Gideon, LBC manager). Instead, they should aim first at enrolling the farm owner to 
avoid “any dispute which would involve families and generations” (Edward, 
certification consultant). This is despite acknowledging that dealing directly with the 
farm operator can be more effective in terms of adoption of standards, since they are 
“the ones doing all the work on the farm” (Richard, cocoa trading sustainability 
manager). Another reason for prioritising the owner over the operator is that the latter 
tends to “fade off with the time” (Elizabeth, COCOBOD extentionist), as they may 
move from one farm to another in search for better revenues (see section 6.4.2), or lose 
the farm like in the case of the first abusa contract of Moses (see section 6.2.2.).  
From the above, it can be concluded that implementing and certifying actors consider 
farm operators as eligible to participate in SSC programmes, however, they prefer 
targeting farm owners to avoid possible disputes and minimise dealing with the more 
volatile and less reliable sharecroppers. On the other hand, they have interest in 
enrolling the farm operator when the owner is not available (e.g. in the cases of 
‘absentee’ farm owners) but only if permission from the owner is granted (Emily, 
standard setting body programme manager).  This attitude towards operators implicitly 36
makes them eligible only (or mainly) in cases of ‘absentee’ farm owners, who cannot 
attend the training events and meetings themselves since they do not reside in the 
community (Elizabeth, COCOBOD extentionist). 
Farmers’ perception of their own eligibility to join SSC programmes points to the same 
direction. Although some farmers argued that sharecroppers are eligible to join SSC 
programmes since they are the owners of one-third of the crop, others noted that the 
certified groups are for “cocoa farmers and not for sharecroppers, unless the 
sharecropper is allowed to stand in for the farmer” (Kofi, farm owner). Permission to do 
so involves holding the farm passbook in order to officially register with the SSC 
 Farming under abunu contracts is often considered as a form of tenancy, see section 2.4. for 35
more. 
 The term ‘absentee’ farmer refers to farm owners who no longer reside in the community and 36
their farms are farmed by sharecroppers, see section 2.4. for more. 
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programme.  This is more likely to occur in the cases of ‘absentee’ farmers who tend to 37
regard their sharecroppers more like tenants than labourers (Robertson, 1987). 
Sharecroppers who are not officially members of the group but only represent the land 
owner, are unlikely to receive any SSC incentives. The following passage illustrates this 
point:  
"The bonus is not for the caretakers, it's for the farm owners.  The caretakers are doing 38
the donkey's work. The meetings are non-ending, you go there for long hours, 
sometimes they call early in the morning, you don't get the farm work done and after 
that, you don't get any bonus. Sometimes you even have to take the bonus from the PC 
and take it to [the owners]. Even transportation money they will not give you. It's the 
farm owners who are members of the cooperative and not the caretakers.” (Moses, 
sharecropper and tenant farmer)  
Moses’s comment confirms that non-registered sharecroppers tend to be excluded from 
SSC related incentives, despite being expected to assume the obligations of a certified 
farm (i.e. attending meetings and training). Moreover, the fact that the financial 
incentives are restricted to farm owners (also in the case of ‘absentee’ farmers) has a 
demotivating effect which prevents sharecroppers from further engaging with the 
programmes, unless they are recognised as members of the groups with full rights. This 
is why clarifying eligibility issues for this section of the producing actors becomes 
crucial.  
Another issue related to the perception of eligibility and the ability to benefit from 
certification is that of training in GAP, an element of SSC programmes which was 
highly valued by certified farmers in the community. In the case of the Cocoa Life 
programme, training is open also to non-members, however, farmers who perceive 
themselves as non-eligible are not always aware of these options. This appears to apply 
particularly to sharecroppers who are new on the job, and/or are based in isolated 
 A farm passbook is a registry book where the quantities of cocoa sold to a PC are noted and is 37
often used as a proof of who is operating the farm. In order to register with a SSC programme, a 
farmer needs to present the passbook of the farm he/she owns or operates.
 Moses uses the term ‘caretaker’ to refer to sharecroppers and ‘cooperative’ to refer to the 38
Fair-trade certified Cocoa Life group.  
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Akuras,  scattered at considerable distance around the community, with no easy access 39
to meetings and information. In other words it applies to farmers with limited social 
capital. Abdulai and Mustapha, for instance, are two sharecroppers based in large 
Akuras over an hour’s walk from the community. Despite taking care of certified farms, 
neither of them was a member of the corresponding certified group. While Abdulai 
attended certification trainings sporadically, Mustapha did not attend at all and only 
relied on the landowner for instructions on how to farm certified cocoa. None of them 
received any part of the certification premium, as this was paid directly to the 
landowners who did not share it with their sharecroppers.  
Moreover, wives working on their husbands’ abusa farms or even those holding abusa 
contracts themselves were even less aware of their eligibility status and the possibilities 
to benefit from SSC programmes. Josephine, for example, farms with her husband two 
sharecropping farms, which are both Fairtrade certified. Neverthelesss, she has not 
received any certification related incentives. When she tried to join the Cocoa Life 
group, she was told by the board of the group that membership was only for landowners 
and that “the wives of sharecroppers could not be part of the group”. Josephine later 
was told that she could join the group even as a sharecropper but by then the entrance 
fee to become a member was much higher and she could not afford to pay it. Despite 
the lack of clear rules regarding eligibility, Josephine was (initially) perceived as non-
eligible by the  rest of certified farmers and that prevented her from joining the SSC 
programme. Emelia, on the other hand, farms a sharecropping farm on her own and has 
also inherited an incomplete abunu farm from her late husband, which converts her into 
a sharecropper - ‘tenant’ farmer. While other tenant farmers with abunu farms were able 
to join both certified groups, as it will be discussed in the next section, Emelia perceived 
herself as non-eligible and therefore abstained from both certified groups operating in 
the community. Both cases indicate that in the absence of clear participation rules for 
farm operators, eligibility perceptions of one self or of others shape in practice who is 
able to join SSC programmes and who is not. 
 The reader is reminded that Akuras are settlements in the middle of large, commonly isolated,  39
cocoa farms.
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6.3.2.Eligibility in practice 
Membership lists of the two certified groups (Cocoa Life and Touton-PBC) operating in 
the case study community reveal that land ownership and entitlements are essential in 
practice, even if not formally required, for joining a SSC programme.  Although farm 40
operators (i.e. sharecroppers and tenant farmers) appear in both membership lists, the 
following points need to be raised. First, farmers registered as farm operators are clearly 
the minority. Combined numbers from the two groups suggest that sharecroppers 
constitute 13% of the total certified farmers in the community, while tenant farmers 
(appearing only in the Touton-PBC membership list) amount to 10% (Figure 12).  41
Figure 12. Certified farmers in  the community per land ownership status   
When examined by certified group of farmers, it is observed that the Touton-PBC group 
has only 3 members registered as sharecroppers and 12 registered as tenant farmers out 
of a total of 56 farmers, while the Fairtrade-Cocoa Life group, which does not apply the 
 The reader is reminded that there are two SSC programmes operating in the case study 40
community: the “open doors” Fairtrade certified  Cocoa Life programme, in which participation 
is not conditional on the selling channel, and the “closed doors” UTZ certified Touton-PBC 
programme, in which participation is conditional to selling to PBC, the commercial partner of 
the programme (for contextual information on the case study community see section 4.4).
 As discussed in section 2.4. there is no no clear distinction between the terms of sharecropper 41
and tenant farmer. According to Robertson (1987) it can be assumed that the first one has a 
shorter and less secure relation with the land, while the second one reflects a longer and better 
established relation to the farm and it could also indicate the presence of an abunu contract.    
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10%
category of tenant farmer, has 13 out of a total of 67 members registered as 
sharecroppers (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Land ownership status of farmers by certified group  
Second, the registration of farm operators in the “closed doors” Touton-PBC 
programme does not necessarily reflect active membership. This is because membership 
applies automatically to all farmers selling to the PC in charge of the SSC programme, 
in this case the PC of PBC. As a result, tenant and sharecropping farmers, who lack the 
power to decide to whom the cocoa should be sold, as discussed in section 2.4, may find 
themselves registered with the programme even though they never intended to, just 
because the farm owner requests the cocoa to be sold to the certified PC.  
The case of Lisa, illustrates how this can occur. Lisa is supervising a sharecropper on 
behalf of her aunt who is not living in the community. Although she appears in the 
Touton-PBC membership list as a tenant, she does not consider herself to be a member 
of the group. The fact that her aunt wants the cocoa sold to PBC has converted Lisa 
automatically into a member of the certified group, despite the fact that she never 
intended to join. In fact, although she appears as a group member, Lisa does not attend 
any training or meetings, while the UTZ premium is paid directly by the PC to her aunt. 
Neither Lisa, nor the sharecropper producing the certified beans receive any premium or 
other certification related benefit. This research has identified two more cases of 
“ghost” members like Lisa, who although officially certified, neither engaged in 
certification related training and meetings, nor received any certification related benefits 
(premium or inputs). It is hard to estimate from the collected data how extended this 
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phenomena is. However, judging from the abundance of farms managed by 
sharecroppers and supervised by thirds on behalf of ‘absentee’ farmers in the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector, it is likely that the case of Lisa is farm from exceptional. 
Third, data collected from six certified farmers registered as tenants or sharecroppers 
reveal that five of them were actually land owners, or land owners to be, due to their 
involvement in abunu contracts. As discussed in section 2.4., under an abunu contract a 
tenant farm is employed to develop a farm in exchange of permanent farming rights on 
half of the developed farm once the work is finished. As a result, even while the farm is 
being developed, farmers with abunu contracts can be considered as (future) owners of 
one-half of the farm. Therefore, entering an abunu contract in practice equals acquiring 
land entitlements. From Table 13 it can be observed that only one of  the six interviewed 
farmers registered as farm operators, Alhasan, is a sharecropper without an abunu 
contract, i.e. without the perspective of acquiring land entitlements in the future. 
Table 13: Interviewed farmers registered as farm operators 
All the rest are or were involved in abunu agreements, which means that either they 
have already shared the land and now have rights over half of it (Kwame), or they are in 
process of completing their contracts and therefore they will obtain farming rights of 
their share of land at some point in the future (Moses, Lisa). Two farmers had even 
completed their contracts (i.e. the trees were already bearing fruits) and they were just 
Farmer Touton-PBC Cocoa Life Labour status Land ownership status 
Moses Tenant Sharecropper  Abunu contract in process
Lisa Tenant Landowner 
Overseer/ 
sharecropper  for 
family land 
Abunu contract in process 
Obed Sharecropper Sharecropper Sharecropper  Abunu contract completed / Land not yet shared 
Kwame Sharecropper Sharecropper  Landowner (abunu contract - completed & land shared)
Anita Sharecropper  Working on abunu farms 
Abunu contract completed / 
Land not yet shared 
Alhassan Sharecropper  Sharecropper  No abunu contract
Source: Author’s creation based on primary data primary and secondary data.
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waiting for the land to be officially shared (Obed; Anita). Although these farmers were 
also abusa sharecroppers for other farms (with the exception of Anita, who despite 
being registered as a sharecropper was only working on her abunu land), they all used 
their abunu and not their sharecropping farm to join the SSC programme. This indicates 
that despite being registered as sharecroppers, they have joined the certified group using 
their current or future land entitlements.  
Fourth, and closely linked to the above point, cases of sharecroppers joining a certified 
group using their sharecropping farm are exceptional. This research has identified only 
one such case, that of Alhassan, who lacks land entitlements and would not have been 
able to join a certified group otherwise (see Table 12). Nevertheless, Alhassan’s farm 
owner, who is still a resident in the community, allowed him to keep the passbook for 
the farm he is operating and use it to join the Cocoa Life group. As a result, Alhasan not 
only is able to attend Cocoa Life meetings and training events, but he also receives the 
certification premium for his share of cocoa, unlike other non-registered sharecroppers 
of certified farms. Commenting on the uniqueness of his case, Alhassan highlighted the 
importance of "working" the relationship with the landowner. In this case, landowner 
and sharecropper had a clearly good relationship, based on mutual respect and trust 
which involved exchanges of favours and gifts. Following Robertson’s (1987) 
classification, it can be argued that the land owner regarded Alhassan as a tenant rather 
than a labourer, able to entirely manage the farm on his own, without supervision (see 
section 2.4). In fact, although Alhassan’s farm owner was present in the community, 
Alhassan had the freedom and responsibilities of a sharecropper of an ‘absentee’ farm 
owner. The personal characteristics of the farm owner also appear to play a role. 
Alhassan’s landowner is an important leader at the community level and also an active 
member of the board of the Cocoa Life group. Although not the chief, he is in practice 
considered as a figure which provides ethical and organisational guidance in the 
community, being one of the elders and in charge of the communal work group. These 
characteristics are likely to have influenced his decision to facilitate Alhassan official 
access to the Cocoa Life group. It is probably not a coincidence that he was also the 
only landowner among the interviewed farmers to have allowed his wife to hold a 
passbook for the share of land she was cultivating, a fact which allowed her to register 
	 	
 131
with the certified group and receive direct benefits, while other wives working on their 
husband’s land did not had this opportunity. 
To recap, a combined analysis of interviews with implementing, certifying and 
producing actors and membership lists of the two certified groups operating in the case 
study community suggest that farmers registered as sharecroppers or tenants not only 
are the minority, but also tend to be in reality farmers who have, or are about to obtain, 
land entitlements through abunu contracts. On the contrary, cases of sharecroppers with 
no land entitlements able to join certified groups appear to be scarce and subject to the 
farm owner personal characteristics and the sharecropper-landowner relationship. 
Additionally, the research has identified the paradox of “ghost farmers”, where 
registered farmers are not engaged in certification related activities (and often not even 
in cocoa farming activities), while farm operators involved in the production of certified 
cocoa are excluded from SSC incentives. It is unclear whether this exclusion is a result 
of official eligibility criteria or farmer’s own perception of who is eligible to join a SSC 
programme. In any case, these findings suggest that land ownership and entitlements are 
essential for joining certification programmes and are shaping in practice the cut-off 
point between the farmers who are able to join certification programmes and those who 
are not. Building on this finding, the next section explores how farmers come to obtain 
land entitlements and finally own land, and how this relates to their eligibility status. 
6.4.Life trajectories, land entitlements and eligibility 
This section investigates how farmers’ life trajectories, land entitlements (i.e. land 
ownership and/or recognised rights of current or future farming rights through abunu 
contracts) and SSC eligibility relate. It draws on a thematic analysis of semi-structured 
and life history interviews with fifteen farmers who are farm operators for other farmers 
and fifteen farmers who have always farmed cocoa on owned or family land. To avoid 
confusions, the farm operators’ group is labelled “Group A”, while the land owning 
group is labeled “Group B”. Emphasis is placed on the trajectories of Group A, as these 
are the farmers who due to lack of land entitlements tend to be excluded from SSC 
programmes. Their trajectories are then briefly compared with those of Group B, whose 
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land entitlements make them directly eligible to join certified groups. The analysis 
identifies common patterns in the life trajectories of the research participants as cocoa 
farmers, focusing particularly on how key livelihoods capitals (human, social and 
economic) shape the farmers’ strategies towards acquiring land entitlements (and 
therefore also SSC eligibility). The first sub-section offers an overview of the findings 
and discusses key socio-economic differences between farmers in groups A and B 
(section 6.4.1). The following sub-sections focus on particular life trajectory patterns 
related to the accumulation of human, social and economic capitals that allow farmers 
to obtain land entitlements, and therefore also become eligible to join SSC 
programmes .  
6.4.1.Overview of patterns in farmers’ life trajectories  
This section provides an overview of the sample in terms of key characteristics and 
introduces the patterns that have been identified in the trajectories of the two groups. 
Figure 14 illustrates the composition of the two groups by land entitlements and 
certification status.  
Figure 14: Land entitlements and certification status by farmer group. 
Among the fifteen farmers of group A, only eight have land entitlements, while in group 
B, farmers with land entitlements amount to fourteen. Only seven of the farmers in 
group A are members of a certified group, six of which have land entitlements, 
confirming the link between land entitlements and SSC eligibility. In group B, the 
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certified farmers are thirteen. Of the two non-certified farmers, one has land 
entitlements but did not wish to join any group, i.e. he self-selected himself out of 
certification, while the second one, a female farmer working on her husband’s family 
land, reported that the lack of land entitlements prevented her from joining a SSC 
programme. Across the two groups there is only one farmer that is a member of a 
certified group without any land entitlements and that is Alhassan, whose case has been 
discussed in section 6.3.2. Figure 15 illustrates how farmers with land entitlements in 
both groups acquired their first farm. 
Figure 15: Pathways to land entitlements by farmer group.  
Land entitlements in group A result entirely from abunu contracts, while the first farm in 
group B is acquired mainly through inheritance and gifts, permission to land on family 
land,  but also abunu contracts. Other ways of obtaining subsequent farms include 42
direct purchase and, in the case of PCs, press contracts.  43
The trajectories of the two groups are relatively similar, however some differences can 
be observed. The key difference is that, while farmers in group B are able to access land 
for farming cocoa easier and earlier, group A farmers need to invest much more time 
and effort in order to obtain land entitlements, which tend to occur mainly through 
abunu contracts. This also means that it is harder for them to become eligible to join a 
 Permission to farm on family land can be ambiguous in terms of land ownership, however, it 42
is usually understood that  if a farmer clears and plants the land, then he/she obtains permanent 
farming rights in the land. 
 Press contracts are agreements during which a landowner in need of credit gives his/ her farm 43
on “press”, to somebody else to farm for a limited amount of seasons in exchange of cash 
money. If by the end of the agreed period the land owner is not able to repay its debt, then the 
farm becomes property of the person who gave out the credit, which is usually a PC.
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SSC programme, and when they do so it occurs much later in their lives. Figure 16 
illustrates the life trajectory patterns of the two groups, highlighting the differences in 
italics. These are further discussed in the following sections.  
Figure 16: Life trajectory patters and SSC eligibility 
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In order to obtain land entitlements, which will also provide them with SSC eligibility 
status, farmers in group A need to accumulate the necessary human, social and 
economic capitals which will enable them to acquire land on abunu terms, the main 
pathway to land ownership available to them. Primary data suggest that abunu contracts 
are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to obtain, reflecting the increasing 
scarcity of land suitable for cocoa farming, as reported by Boni (2005) (see section 2.4). 
It is indicative that farmers who have recently acquired abunu contracts were required to 
pay an initial amount to the land owner varying between 700 GHS and 3000 GHS 
(depending on the size of the land),  whereas the former generation of cocoa farmers is 44
reported to have entered abunu contracts without paying this entrance fee. 
As the land market is becoming more competitive, potential tenants need effective 
networking to identify abunu opportunities (i.e. social capital), demonstrable cocoa 
farming experience and skills to convince the owners to trust them with their farms (i.e. 
human capital), plus readily available money to pay the entrance fee of the agreement 
(i.e. economic capital). As a result, Group A farmers are unlikely to obtain their first 
abunu contract before their mid-thirties, as Figure 17 illustrates.  
Figure 17: FarmerAge and first land entitlements by farmer group.  
 The equivalent of 100 to 500 GBP 44
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The above does not apply to farmers in group B who obtain land entitlements mainly in 
their twenties through direct transfers of land (i.e. inheritance, gifts, permission to farm 
on family and), or using their human, social and economic capitals to acquire land, 
through direct purchase or abunu arrangements. Cases of group B farmers who obtained 
their first land entitlements in their mid and late 40s also exist, however, they are less 
common. These tend to be farmers who were settled in urban centres and engaged in 
cocoa farming at a later stage in life when family land became available. 
Both groups are composed by migrant farmers of first, second or even third generation, 
who settled in the research community to farm cocoa. In group A, eleven out of fifteen 
farmers are from the northern regions of the country, or from Burkina Faso (i.e. Kusasi, 
Gruma, Frafra and Grussi), while two belong to the Ewe ethnic group and have 
migrated from Togo. Only one is an Ashanti, the ethnic  group who is considered to be 
predominant in the area. Finally, there is only one case of a Bono farmer, the ethnic 
group who is indigenous of the Brong Ahafo region. Farmers in Group B, on the other 
hand are either Ashantis (n=9) either Fantis (n=6) with hometowns in the Ashanti and 
Central region. Figure 18 presents the ethnic group composition of the two groups. 
Figure 18: Ethnic group by farmer group  
This demographic distribution suggests that farmers who tend to lack land entitlements 
and therefore SSC eligibility status, are the ones who migrate from poorer areas with 
greater deficiencies in terms of public services and infrastructure, like the northern 
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regions of Ghana (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2017) . Possibly linked to being raised in 
poorer areas, farmers in group A have no, or limited, formal schooling and have spent 
their childhood helping with household and farming work. This was commonly 
attributed to lack of funds to pay for school expenses, lack of schools in the area, or 
child work, i.e. caring for younger siblings or farming. The loss of a parent was also 
reported as a reason for not attending school, as it signified a loss in income plus an 
increased need of family labour. This contrasts heavily with farmers in Group B who in 
their majority have completed secondary education (JHS), even though they were not 
able to further their education due to lack of funds, or parents prioritising farming over 
higher education, as the case of Solomon indicates (see section 6.2.3). Teenager 
pregnancy was also a reason for dropping out of school and turning to cocoa farming in 
this group. A few cases of farmers who have not attended school at all, or were not able 
to finish primary education were also identified among Group B farmers. These were 
usually cases of farmers growing up in isolated Akuras without any school in the 
proximity, or being sent to relatives as a house and farm help at an early age. Figure 19 
presents the schooling level of the two groups. 
Figure 19: Schooling level by farmer group  
Interestingly, what both groups of cocoa farmers have in common is their aspiration to 
move out of cocoa farming in the future. This is reflected by attempts to escape cocoa 
farming at the beginning and towards the end of their life trajectories. Farmers in group 
A attempt to do so by trying their luck with non-farming activities, usually in their early 
twenties. This can take the form of an apprenticeship that would allow them later to 
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generate non-farm income, or engaging directly with non-farming activities (e.g. petty 
trading, construction and mining jobs).These attempts are usually short-lived and 
farmers tend to return back to (cocoa) farming as a main livelihood activity within 
approximately five years. The case of Abdulai who tried his luck as an ambulant ice-
cream seller in Cote d’Ivoire before returning to farming and finally settling down as a 
cocoa sharecropper is a typical example (see section 6.2.1). This pattern also appears 
among farmers in group B, however, it is less pronounced. This may be because farmers 
in this group have access to land to farm cocoa, and therefore do not need to look for 
other economic alternatives. Paradoxically, it is farmers in group B, who already have 
access to land, who are better positioned to find better alternatives to cocoa farming, 
due to their higher schooling levels but also better access to financial and social capital 
to fund apprenticeships and set up trading activities. As a result, many end up 
combining both, cocoa farming (often with the help of sharecroppers) and non-farming 
activities.  
Most importantly, however, the aspiration to escape cocoa farming, or farming in 
general, also extends to the farmers’ future plans. Farmers who already had land 
entitlements overwhelmingly stated that they were planning to return to their 
hometowns once their farms were stabilised and could be left to the care of 
sharecroppers. This does not apply only to wealthier and middle-age land owners, such 
as Solomon, but also to younger sharecroppers who have just started working on their 
abunu contracts, like Moses. The following quote is characteristic of this thinking:  
“When all the [abunu] work is done I will leave a sharecropper in my place and go back 
to the North. I can even get my money by mobile banking, I do not even need to come 
back if I do not want to. I will come to supervise the sharecropper once in a while”. 
(Moses, sharecropper with land entitlements) 
This creates a paradox, whereby land entitlements is the first step of disengagement of 
the farmer with cocoa farming and towards becoming an ‘absentee’ farmer. Strategies 
towards this direction include accumulating more cocoa farms and then hiring 
sharecroppers to take care of them; investing in non- cocoa farming activities, such as 
transportation or trading; building houses and investing in income generating activities 
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in the farmer’s hometown in order to prepare the ground for the return. In terms of SSC 
eligibility status, this suggests that the main eligibility criteria, i.e. land ownership or 
land entitlements, is likely to target farmers who are already preparing to exit the cocoa 
farming sector. Although this exit process can take several years, even decades, it is 
worth reflecting on the implications this has for the effectiveness of SSC programmes in 
terms of changing farming practices on the ground. This is because farmers who are 
being targeted or perceived as eligible to participate tend to see themselves as future 
“absentee” farmers whose farms will sooner or later be taken care of by, typically non-
eligible, sharecroppers. The discussion now turns to the role of key livelihood capitals 
in acquiring land entitlements and therefore SSC eligibility. 
6.4.2.Human capital 
Before accessing or acquiring land to farm cocoa, farmers need to demonstrate that they 
have the skills, knowledge and ability to manage a cocoa farm independently, i.e. they 
need the adequate human capital. Farming experience, particularly in cocoa, is key in 
this aspect. Farmers from both groups were involved in farming from an early age, as 
children and teenagers, first taking care of food crops and later of cash crops, cocoa 
included. Nevertheless, experiences vary according to their origins and family 
backgrounds, with some clear patterns emerging for each group. 
Farmers in group A, who in their majority grew up in poorer rural areas in the North or 
East of Ghana (or in Burkina Faso or Togo) without attending school, commonly helped 
their parents with farming tasks on a daily basis. They gradually extended their level of 
responsibility, taking care of food crops for family consumption (e.g. maize, sorghum, 
millet, groundnuts, beans, rice), but also commercial crops, such as groundnuts and 
onions. Some of the farmers in this category were also involved in handling livestock, 
such as goats and sheep or cattle. For farmers in group A who had access to family land, 
it was common to start farming food crops on their own around the age of fifteen. This 
allowed them to “upgrade” in their responsibilities and autonomy as farmers. The 
produce from these farms was still considered to be family income. However, 
interviewees commonly stated that they could seek permission to use it for their 
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personal needs or even, later on as young adults, to pay the bride price of their first 
wedding.  
These farmers, who grew up without any cocoa farming experience, typically had to 
spend a period of their life as young adults to learn how to farm cocoa, working in 
cocoa farms of relatives or friends. Data from life histories indicate that this cocoa 
farming ‘internship’ period can vary between two and eight years. No payment is 
usually involved, besides basic provisions such as food and housing, and occasionally 
personal items. It is common, however, at the end of this ‘internship’period, for the farm 
owner to provide a small amount of money, ranging between 50 and 150 GHC,  and a 45
relatively valuable ‘graduation' gift (i.e. a bicycle, construction material, clothing and 
shoes, etc.) that would help the ‘intern’ make a new start. ‘Interns’ tend to also work as 
day-labourers during this period, to cover for their personal needs and possibly save 
some money for later. Among farmers from group A there are also those who were sent 
to relatives in cocoa growing areas from a very young age to help with house and 
farming tasks . These got involved in cocoa farming as soon as they were able to do 
basic farm work. As in the case of ‘internships’, this work was not remunerated, but was 
regarded by the ‘host’ farmer as a contribution to the household economy in exchange 
of food and housing, and by the young ‘guest’ as an opportunity to build human capital 
and graduate as an independent farmer.  
Overall, findings from the life history analysis suggest that teenagers and/or young 
adults lacking human and natural capital to start farming on their own are willing to do 
unpaid work for some years in order to obtain the necessary skills and experience that 
would allow them to transit to abusa, and later on to abunu, contracts.The stories of 
Abdulai an Moses confirm that. Nevertheless, in the particular case of Abdulai, the 
‘internship’ was arranged without the informed consent of the intern, and in terms that 
border labour exploitation: 
“I never got to know the negotiations my uncle had with the Madame. I never received a 
penny for my work on that farm, my uncle kept all the money he collected on my 
 The equivalent of 8 to 24 GBP. 45
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behalf. I don’t even know how much she was paying for, I only got where to stay and 
eat.” (Abdulai, 29 years old, sharecropper)  
Abdulai’s case clearly fits the emerging pattern of ‘unpaid internship with graduation 
gift’ described above. However, by saying that he ‘only got where to stay and eat’ 
Abdulai contradicts himself, as throughout this experience he was clearly conscious that 
this, otherwise exploitative, situation was also an opportunity to acquire the skills and 
experience he needed to “survive on his own”. In other words, Abdulai’s ‘internship’ 
was also advancing his own interests, by enabling him to built the human capital that 
would enable him to pursue cocoa farming as a livelihood strategy (Mosse, 2005; 
Scoones, 1998), and which eventually allowed him some years later to become a 
sharecropper (and will possibly help him  obtain land entitlements in the future). 
Most farmers in Group B acquired some cocoa farming experience as children, since 
their parents were already involved in cocoa farming. However, the level of wealth of 
the parents differs significantly, and while some farmers had to skip school and become 
heavily involved into farm and house work, others experienced cocoa farming as an 
entertaining activity in the margins of school. Solomon, for instance, the son of a large 
cocoa farmer describes his experience with cocoa farming as a child as follows:  
“As a wealthy farmer’s son, I only went to there during the weekends to get food crops 
for the house. I really didn’t go there to weed or prune cocoa trees”. (Solomon, farm 
owner) 
Solomon’s comment points to the fact that wealthier farmers experienced cocoa farming 
as a fun off-school activity which did not involve any seriously heavy work such as 
weeding or pruning. This means that despite having more years of schooling, Solomon 
lacked real skills and experience with cocoa farming until he obtained his own land. In 
other words, he lacked the specific human capital to farm cocoa. To overcome this 
shortage, he drew on his social and economic capitals: he relied heavily on his father to 
learn how to farm cocoa but also on his father's economic capacity to hire day labourers 
to establish the farm. Additionally, once the production was stabilised, Solomon 
‘outsourced’ the management of two-thirds of his land to sharecroppers. It can be 
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observed therefore that Solomon did not need the same human capital as Abdulai in 
order to pursue the same livelihood strategy, i.e. to farm cocoa. Instead, having the 
possibility to use other livelihood resources, mainly his economic and natural capital he 
was able to access sharecropping labour and overcome any shortages in terms of 
practical farming skills. This was also noted in group B farmers who grew up in urban 
centres and lacked farming experience and skills, but made use of their social and 
capitals, as well as family land to transit to cocoa farming. Such differences illustrate 
the heterogeneity among cocoa producing actors, and how their different needs shape 
different interests, from accepting unpaid (and even exploitative) labour conditions to 
outsourcing farm work to sharecroppers.   
6.4.3.Social capital 
Social capital, understood as “investment in social relations with expected returns” (Lin, 
1999: 30), is key in acquiring land entitlements for farmers in group A. This is because 
farmers in search of either abusa or abunu opportunities can benefit enormously from an 
active network of people already involved in cocoa farming who can inform of 
emerging opportunities, and mediate to the farm owners in their favour to finalise the 
agreement. This is the case of Abdulai, who clearly relied on his friend Moses (and 
Moses’ social network) to get his first sharecropping farm. In the process, however, he 
had to spend several long periods helping Moses with his sharecropping farm without 
remuneration, while weeding other people's farms as a day labourer in parallel.   
Marriage is another form of investment in social capital that can facilitate the 
acquisition of abusa or abunu contracts. This is because it provides the “social 
credentials” that land owners need in order to be convinced that a farmer, with his 
wife’s labour contribution, can  manage successfully their farm. Collected life histories 
of male sharecroppers suggest that securing the first abusa contract and marriage are 
two events that often occur very close one to the other, at least for those who engaged 
with cocoa farming at a young age. There is no clear pattern on which event precedes 
the other. It is the case, however, that soon after getting married (or finding a partner), a 
landless male farmer is able to secure his first sharecropping farm, while when a single 
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male farmer  obtains his first abusa contract the tendency is to get married soon after. 
Moses’s comments illustrate how marriage is linked to such contracts:  
"When you become a sharecropper you need a wife to help you. If you go to the farm 
and you are drying cocoa, somebody must be at home to attend the cocoa. If it rains, 
you spoil the cocoa beans. You also need someone at home to be turning it in the sun. 
There must be somebody around cooking for you, maintaining the house. You need a 
wife. And even the farm owners, if you don't have a wife, they will not give you [the 
farm]. It's one of the characteristics farm owners look out for” (Moses, sharecropper 
with land entitlements).  
Moses explicitly and consciously links his decision to get married with his 
sharecropping status. Female labour within the institution of marriage is regarded as an 
indispensable element of the successful management of a sharecropping farm. Besides 
being a source of labour, marriage is also valued for its capacity to positively influence 
land owners in their decision to trust a sharecropper with their farm. In this case, Moses 
commented that the land owner of his abusa farm directly advised him to get married 
because he thought that otherwise he would not be able to manage his farm properly. In 
other words, Moses status as a married man convinced his land owner to trust him with 
his farm. Therefore, in this context marriage becomes a social capital investment that 
allows the transition from labouring to sharecropping.   
6.4.4.Economic capital 
Besides human and social capital, farmers also need economic capital in order to obtain 
land entitlements. Group B farmers tend to have the economic capital available to 
purchase land directly, or to hire the labour force needed to establish and maintain cocoa 
farms, as Solomon’s case illustrates. On the contrary, group A farmers who tend to lack 
readily available financial resources, as well as the human and social capital, to obtain 
land entitlements, rely mainly on their (and their wives’) labour force to upgrade and 
expand in order accumulate the economic capital needed to enter abunu contracts.  
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Upgrading refers to moving to larger, better maintained and overall more productive 
farms, that can provide better income with less effort. An example is provided by 
Mustapha, one of Solomon’s sharecroppers. Driven by his interest to accumulate 
economic capital, Mustapha did not hesitated  to change three sharecropping farms 
within a year, each time moving to a bigger and better maintained farm. Upgrade may 
also refer to a sharecropper being able to enter an abunu contract that will eventually 
provide land entitlements. Expanding, on the other hand, refers to increasing the number 
of hectares a farmer is managing as a farm operator, both in abusa and abunu terms. 
Female family labour is again key in both upgrading and expanding processes. Moses 
comments on his decision to marry Aisha, his second wife, illustrate this point:  
“With two wives, when one isn't around to manage the house, the other one would be. 
For me cooking is a very difficult task. But with two wives, if one has to travel the other 
can cook and take care of the children” (Moses, sharecropper with land entitlements). 
Moses’ quote highlights the importance of female labour particularly for northern 
migrant farmers who often undertake long trips back and forth to their hometowns and 
which result in the couple being separated for weeks or even months. Given the 
importance of female labour underlined above, having an extra wife to avoid labour 
shortages both at home and at the farm becomes crucial, particularly when the 
household is faced with increased workload. In the case of Moses, his marriage to Aisha 
allowed him to secure the extra labour he needed to both expand (by acquiring two 
more sharecropping farms) and upgrade (by acquiring his first abunu contract). 
Interestingly, Moses was working on the abunu farm, which was going to result in land 
ownership, with Loretta, his first wife, while he planned to send Aisha to his third 
sharecropping farm, an Akura isolated from his others farms. His choice reflects the 
power relationships between wives within the household. While Loretta was ensuring 
with her labour that her children were going to inherit their father’s abunu farm in the 
future, Aisha and her children were facing the option of having to work and live in an 
isolated place where no school or other services were available. Aisha did not want to to 
go, however, Moses was very clear about his decision: 
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“The work is for all of us, the money is for all of us. If I say the younger should go, she 
will go. If I say the older should go, she will go. Ideally the younger one should be the 
one to go. She would be the one to stay there”. (Moses, sharecropper with land 
entitlements) 
The above quote suggests that Moses not only made use of his wive’s labour force to 
transit from sharecropping to land ownership, but also unilaterally took decisions on 
how this labour should be distributed. In this particular case, Aisha had clearly no power 
to decide, or even influence her husband's decision, about where she should work and 
live with her children. It is also unclear whether she would be able to access and 
manage the income resulting from her work as a sharecropper. Considering that Aisha 
was set to sharecrop a Fairtrade certified farm whose owner was a board member of the 
Cocoa Life group, it is also highly questionable that Aisha would be able to benefit from 
either SSC premium or training. These observations further highlight the importance of 
grasping the heterogeneity that exists not only within the productive actors (i.e. farm 
owner versus farm operator) but even within households (i.e. first wife versus second 
wife). This heterogeneity results in different interests and livelihoods strategies, 
including positions vis-a-vis SSC programmes. In this case it becomes clear that women 
farming along with their sharecropping husbands, are even more invisible to 
implementing and certifying actors both in terms of eligibility to participate and ability 
to receive benefits from their contribution in the production of certified cocoa. 
6.5.Implications of findings  
The main implication of the findings of this chapter is that by failing to incorporate 
farmers with no land entitlements in cocoa SSC programmes a policy gap is created, 
whereby an important section of the farmers involved in the production of certified 
cocoa are not being officially considered both in terms of standards  implementation and 
distribution of  benefits. First, farmers with no land entitlements producing certified 
cocoa, such as sharecroppers and their wives, are unlikely to follow the training on GAP 
or to receive any SSC related incentive. Although one of the two SSC programmes 
operating in the community was open to training non-registered farmers, the analysis 
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has shown that in practice farmers considered as non-eligible, particularly those with 
limited social capital, are unlikely to engage with SSC related activities. Second, 
sharecroppers (and their wives) working in certified farms appear to be systematically 
excluded form any material of financial incentive resulting from certified production 
(i.e. premium, agricultural inputs, etc), which tend to  accrue to the farm owners, even 
when those are no longer farming. Implementing and certifying actors are aware of this 
policy gap but they seem reluctant to interfere in the landowner-sharecropper 
relationship and dictate how benefits should be distributed. Nevertheless, if funding, 
certifying and implementing actors truly aspire to bring change through SSC 
programmes in the cocoa farming practices, then they will have to effectively train and 
incentivise those who are actually producing the certified crop in order to see their goals 
materialised. 
Moreover, linking eligibility to participate in SSC programmes to land entitlements 
means that the majority of younger farmers, who tend to lack land entitlements, are 
likely to be automatically excluded from SSC programmes. This heavily contrasts with 
increasing concerns of the cocoa industry that the cocoa farming population is ageing 
and therefore not able to adopt the farming innovations needed to modernise and 
intensify cocoa production (i.e Fick, 2015; Löwe, 2017). The fact that both cocoa farms 
and the farming population of Ghana are “ageing” is projected as one of the sector’s 
main problems and several interventions are currently implemented in order to 
“revitalise” the sector by incentivising young people to get involved in cocoa farming 
(e.g. the “Youth Forward Initiate” funded by the MasterCard foundation).  A policy 46
paradox therefore emerges: while the SSC funding actors want to engage younger 
people in cocoa farming, SSC implementing and certifying actors target mainly farmers 
with land entitlements who are inevitable older (see Figure 16 for an illustration of the 
age that farmers are first able to obtain land entitlements). The analysis of farmers’ 
trajectories shows that land entitlements come at a later stage in a farmer’s life as they 
are commonly linked to skills, experience, capital, social connections and ability to 
mobilise labour, things that young people tend to lack. In fact, young people with land 
 For more see http://www.mastercardfdn.org/the-mastercard-foundation-launches-innovative-46
us74-million-youth-employment-initiative-in-ghana-and-uganda/
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entitlements, or the human, social and economic capital to obtain land would probably 
also be able to find better income generating opportunities than cocoa farming. If the 
funding actors (i.e. cocoa and chocolate companies) want to engage young people with 
skills and resources in order to “revitalise” and “modernise” cocoa production , they 
would need to make sure profits from cocoa production are also higher. Beyond 
increasing production yields, this probably means paying more to attract skilful talent 
with resources to invest into the cocoa sector. If however, the aim is to engage the 
young people that are already involved in cocoa farming as labourers and sharecroppers 
(and their even more invisible wives), SSC programmes should recognise their presence 
and contribution and include them both in terms of training activities and distribution of 
benefits. 
6.6.Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the second sub-question of the thesis and examined which 
farmers are eligible to participate in SSC programmes and how they reach this 
eligibility point. The chapter began by outlining the life histories of three selected 
farmers who make recurrent appearances in the analysis: a sharecropper, a sharecropper 
who is also a tenant farmer and therefore has land entitlements and a farm owner. It then 
provided a discussion of how implementing, certifying and producing actors perceive 
who is eligible to enrol in SSC programmes and who is not. It became clear that farm 
operators are generally perceived as non-eligible, unless they are ‘standing in’ for farm 
owners that do not reside in the community and therefore cannot engage with the 
programme activities. This conclusion was followed by an analysis of the membership 
lists of the two certified groups operating in the research community. The discussion 
pointed to the fact that farm operators not only are the minority among the certified 
farmers, but also their official numbers are inflated by the presence of “ghost” members 
who are not actively participating in the programme, as well as that of farm owners to 
be through abunu contracts registered as farm operators. Combining these results it was 
concluded that farmers are rarely able to join SSC programmes without land 
entitlements and therefore they are a fundamental element of membership in SSC 
programmes.  
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Building on this key finding, the following section provided an overview of the patterns 
identified in the trajectories of farm owners and farm operators and discussed in greater 
detail how farmers’ human, social and economic capitals can lead to land entitlements 
and hence SSC eligibility status. It was highlighted that farm operators tend to 
undertake long unpaid cocoa ‘internships’ in order to built the human capital they need 
to farm on their own. They are also keen on investing in their social networks providing 
free labour in exchange of information and mediation related abusa and abunu 
opportunities. Finally, they attempt to accumulate economic capital by expanding their 
farming hectares and upgrading to larger and more productive abusa farms. In these 
processes marriage is key in securing extra family labour but also in providing land 
owners with the assurance of successful farm management. Farm owners, on the other 
hand, do not need to go through the 'internship' phase as they tend to either have direct 
access to land, or possess the human, social and economic capitals necessary to acquire 
land. As a result they obtain land entitlements and SSC eligibility status much earlier in 
their lives. The last section of the chapter looked at the the implications of these 
findings. It was highlighted that a policy gap emerges whereby farmers who produce 
certified cocoa but lack land entitlements, such as sharecroppers and their wives, are not 
being officially considered both in terms of training in standards and distribution of 
incentives. Linking eligibility to land entitlements also excludes the majority of young 
farmers who, although already involved in cocoa farming, tend to lack land 
entitlements. This represents another policy paradox, whereby while cocoa and 
chocolate industry actors appear preoccupied by the ageing population of cocoa 
farmers, the SSC programmes they are funding tend to overlook and exclude this exact 
same section of the producing population as non-eligible. With these reflections in mind 
the next chapter turns to participant selection and explores how already eligible farmers 
finally select in or out of SSC programmes.  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7. Unpacking participant selection   
7.1.Introduction 
This thesis has so far explored how SSC actors’ interests and livelihood capitals shape 
programme placement (chapter 5), and eligibility processes (chapter 6). Both chapters 
discussed how SSC funding, implementing and certifying actors select participant 
farmers by targeting particular geographical areas and farmers’ communities and 
through implicit participation eligibility criteria.    This chapter is concerned with 
participant selection, i.e. which farmers actually join SSC and focuses particularly on 
the processes by which farmers self-select themselves into SSC interventions. In doing 
so, it addresses the third sub-question of the research (RQ3):  
How do farmers select in or out of  cocoa SSC programmes?   
The analysis in this chapter is sequenced as follows. First, section 7.2 presents an 
overview of the findings from the quantitative analysis. While in chapter 5 the probit 
model was informed by the qualitative analysis due to the lack of programme placement 
theories, here it was possible to model selection based on insights from the literature 
review of participant selection determinants presented in section 1.3. Key quantitative 
findings were then integrated to the qualitative analysis presented in section 7.3, 
following thus the inverse processes of that in chapter 5. Finally, section 7.4 summarises 
the key findings and concludes.  
7.2.Overview of main quantitative findings related to 
selection processes 
The literature review on participant selection determinants (see section 1.3) indicates 
that variables related to natural, economic and human livelihood capitals , such as land 
size, livestock ownership, possession of farming equipments, access to credit, access to 
labour, schooling and agricultural extension, as well as farming experience can be 
influential in shaping participant selection into SSC interventions. Based on these 
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indications and in combination with the availability of explanatory variables provided 
by the GCFS data set,  a probit model was specified to explore factors that can 47
influence the likelihood of a farmer being a member of the Fairtrade certified 
cooperative/LBC Kuapa Kokoo.  The model considers variables related to the natural 48
capital of farmers (land size; land ownership), human capital (e.g. age; education, sex of 
household head), and economic capital (non-cocoa income, livestock, farming 
equipment, savings, use of loans). As a proxy of social capital, the years of residence in 
the village were included in the analysis, assuming that longer residence favours the 
"possession of a durable network" which is linked to social capital (Bourdieu, 1986:21). 
The same variable can also serve as a proxy for farming experience, i.e. for human 
capital. The number of buyers used by the farmer within the same harvest season, serves 
as an indicator of side-selling as well as of farmers’ social capital, as it can reflect the 
affiliations and associations that allow farmers to pursue SSC as a farming strategy 
(Scoones, 1998). Labour related variables, like use of household and sharecropping 
labour are also included,  as they can inform on the use of certification as a labour-led 
agriculture intensification strategy (Carswell, 1997). A description of the variables used 
to model farmers’ Kuapa Kokoo membership is provided in Appendix 18. The probit 
model used to estimate the probability that a farmer is a member of Kuapa Kokoo is 
specified as follows: 
The analysis uses observations from the GCFS data set with access to Kuapa Kokoo, 
i.e. farmers residing in villages where Kuapa Kokoo operated and therefore had the 
possibility to become members of the Fairtrade cooperative/LBC, even if they did not. 
Observations of farmers without access to Kuapa Kokoo and thus no possibility of 
membership, were excluded from the analysis. The full sample of the analysis presented 
below, therefore, refers to the 284 farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo and not to the 
 See section 4.5.1. for more details on the GCFS dataset 47
 For more details on Kuapa Kokoo see section 2.548
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indications and in combination with the availability of explanatory variables provided 
by the GCFS data set,  a probit model was specified to explore factors that can 42
influence the likelihood of a far er being a member of th Fairtrade certified 
cooperative/LBC Kuapa Kokoo.  The model considers variables related to the natural 43
capital of farmers (land size; land ownership), human capital (e.g. age; education, sex of 
household head), and economic capital (non-cocoa income, livestock, farming 
equipment, savings, use of loans). As a proxy of social capital, the years of residence in 
the village were included in the analysis, assuming that longer residence favours the 
"possession of a durable network" which is linked to social capital (Bourdieu, 1986:21). 
The same variable can also serve as a proxy for farming experience, i.e. for human 
capital. The number of buyers used by the farmer within the same harvest season, serves 
as an indicator of side-side-selling as well as of farmers’ social capital, as it can reflect 
the affiliations and associations that allow farmers to pursue SSC as a farming strategy 
(Scoones, 1998). Labour related variables, like the use of household and sharecropping 
labour are also included, as they can inform on the use of certification as a labour-led 
agriculture intensification strategy (Carswell, 1997). A description of the variables used 
to model farmers’ access to Kuapa Kokoo is provided in Appendix 22. The probit model 
used to e timate the probability that a farmer is a member of Kuapa Kokoo is specified 
as follows: 
The analysis uses observations of farmers from the GCFS dataset with access to Kuapa 
Kokoo, i.e. farmers residing in villages where Kuapa Kokoo operated and therefore had 
the possibility to become members of the Fairtrade cooperative/LBC, even if they did 
not. Observations of farmers without access to Kuapa Kokoo and thus no possibility of 
membership were excluded from the analysis. The full sample of the analysis presented 
below, therefore, refers to the 284 farmers with access to Kuapa Kokoo and not to the 
 See section 4.5.1. for more details on the GCFS dataset 42
 For more details on Kuapa Kokoo see section 2.543
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𝑃𝑟(𝐾𝑢𝑎𝑝𝑎 𝐾𝑜𝑘𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 = 1)
= 𝛽଴ +  𝛽ଵ cocoa plot (ha) + 𝛽ଶ % land owned +   𝛽ଷ age  + 𝛽ସ  sex (1 = male) 
+  𝛽ହ years of schooling + 𝛽଺  household labour contribution (days)
+  𝛽଻ caretaker (1 = yes) + 𝛽଼  non cocoa income (1 = yes) + 𝛽ଽ  livestock (n)
+ 𝛽ଵ଴  farming equipment (1 = yes) + 𝛽ଵଵ  savings (1 = yes) + 𝛽ଵଶ  loans(1 = yes )
+ 𝛽ଵଷ  years in village(n) + 𝛽ଵସ  buyers (n) + u ୧ 
entire GCFS data set.  Table 14 presents the cross-tabulations of farmers with access to 49
Kuapa Kokoo according to membership status across the three regions covered by the 
GCFS dataset. 
Table 14: Farmer categories by membership status and region 
It can be observed that the percentage of member farmers is higher in the Ashanti region 
(47.83%), followed by the Western region where the same percentage is 30% (column 
4, Table 13).  On the contrary, Kuapa Kooko appears to have less members in the 50
Brong Ahafo region, where only 19.05% of the farmers who participated in the survey 
were affiliated to the Fairtrade certified LBC.  
Descriptive statistics across and within regions are very similar to those presented in 
Table 9, section 5.2.2, therefore will not be discussed here again. It is only worth 
commenting on the variables that are not covered by the analysis in chapter 5. For 
instance, on average the interviewed farmer has a relatively high land ownership 
percentage (87%), a figure that could be linked to the fact that non-owners, such as 
abusa sharecroppers tend to be under-represented in survey samples, possibly inflating 
the land ownership percentage (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2017). Moreover, the average 
household head is over fifty years old, confirming reports of an ageing cocoa farming 
population (e.g. Fick, 2015; Löwe, 2017). Finally, 12.5% of the farmers own tree felling 
equipment, while 54% have reported making use of loans. Descriptive statistics for the 
Non-Members Members Total 
Region N 
(1)
% 
(2)
N 
(3)
% 
(4)
N 
(5)
% 
(6)
Ashanti 48 52.17 44 47.83 92 32.40
Brong Ahafo 34 80.95 8 19.05 42 14.78
Western 105 70.00 45 30.00 150 52.82
Total 187 65.85 97 34.15 284 100
 The reader is reminded that chapter 5 examines differences between farmers with and without 49
access to Kuapa Kokoo and factors that can influence the presence or absence of the cooperative 
in a certain area. 
 A map of the cocoa producing areas in Ghana can be found in section 2.3 50
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rest of the variables can be found in Appendix 19 for the full sample and in Appendix 20 
by region.  
Turning now to the investigation of selection determinants of farmers into Kuapa 
Kokoo, the analysis first explores statistically significant differences between members 
and non-members of Kuapa Kokoo in the full sample (Table 15), while Appendices 21 
and 22 provide the same information for the Ashanti and Western regions.  The Brong 51
Ahafo region has been omitted from the within region analysis, as the number of 
farmers affiliated to Kuapa Kokoo is very low (n=8) to allow statistical tests. 
Table 15: Mean characteristics by membership status, full sample. 
Non- member Member
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev T-test
(1) Area of cocoa plot (ha) 284 6.795 5.786 6.494 6.67 1.557
(2) Owned land/total land (%) 284 0.87 0.28 0.87 0.27 -0.030
(3) Age 282 50.1 14.5 51.99 15.1 -0.952
(4) Sex (Male:1) 284 0.87 0.335 0.77 0.42 4.462**
(5) Years of schooling (n) 284 7.57 4.28 7.06 4.56 0.891
(6) Household labour (days) 280 91.55 109.78 99.47 114.8 -0.501
(7) Caretaker (Yes:1) 281 0.294 0.457 0.351 0.48 0.943
(8) Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 263 0.89 0.31 0.83 0.38 1.99
(9) Livestock (n) 284 4.14 9.43 4.26 11.25 0.038
(10) Farming equipment (Yes:1) 280 0.092 0.29 0.187 0.39 5.217**
(11) Savings (Yes:1) 283 0.473 0.5 0.412 0.495 0.95
(12) Loans (Yes:1) 282 0.554 0.498 0.51 0.50 0.478
(13) Years in village 282 39.29 20.54 43.375 18.67 -1.768
(14) N of buyers 284 1.417 0.753 1.794 0.80 -4.6***
Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-score. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
 The normality of continuous and discrete variables is tested with the Shapiro-Wilk normality 51
test (Appendix 23). The hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected for all the variables and 
thus the WMW test, which does not assume normal distribution, is used to test for statistically 
significant differences between members and non-members of Kuapa Kokoo. For categorical 
variables, the Pearson’s chi-square test is used to test for the statistical significance of the 
relationship between membership status and categorical variables.
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Across regions, it can be observed that among farmers who are members of Kuapa 
Kokoo there is a higher percentage of female-headed households (23% versus 13% in 
non-members, see row 4, Table 15) and a higher percentage of farmers who own tree 
felling equipment (19% versus 9%, see row 10, Table 15). It is hard to explain these 
statistically significant differences, however, it is observed that both variables could be 
endogenous to Kuapa Kokoo membership. In other words, the observed higher 
percentages may be a direct result of Kuapa Kokoo membership and not a precondition. 
This could be the case if, for instance, Kuapa Kokoo as a Fairtrade certified cooperative 
has actively targeted and engaged more female farmers in an effort to promote gender 
equality and empower female farmers in alignment with Fairtrade’s vision and mission 
(Fairtrade International, 2018b). Further, it is it also possible that Kuapa Kokoo 
facilitated the acquisition of tree felling equipment to its members as part of its 
extension services. Nevertheless, this research was not able to verify these assumptions 
and therefore they are only flagged here as a possible hypotheses that future research 
could test. Finally, Kuapa Kokoo members also appear to diversify more their selling 
channels, as they use more buyers within the same cocoa season (row 14, Table 15).  
Within regions, however, diverging and even contradicting pictures emerge (see 
Appendices 21 and 22). In the Ashanti region Kuapa Kokoo members have been 
residing in the farming village for 10 years less on average than their non-affiliated 
neighbours (row 13, Appendix 21). Additionally, they have significantly smaller cocoa 
plots (-2.4 ha) and make less use of household (-63 days) and sharecropping labour 
(-0.18 percentage points). Kuapa Kokoo members have also reported less savings for 
farm investments than non-member farmers (-0.16 percentage points) (see rows 1,6,7 
&11, Appendix 21). On the contrary, Kuapa Kokoo farmers in the Western region have 
on average longer residencies (+ 9.8years) than non-member farmers (row 13, Appendix 
22). Interestingly there are also more female farmers among affiliated farmers than non-
members. Moreover, Kuapa Kokoo farmers in the Western region make more use of 
household (+44 days) and sharecropping labour (+0.138 percentage points) than their 
non-affiliated neighbours (rows 6 &7, Appendix 22). Despite these intriguing 
differences, a statistically significant higher percentage of member farmers in both 
regions have reported owning a tree felling equipment but also selling to more buyers 
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within the same cocoa season than non-member farmers (rows 10 &14, Appendices 21 
& 22). These t-tests results, however, have limited informational value, particularly 
when sample sizes are small, hence the probit analysis estimating the probability of 
Kuapa Kokoo membership that follows.  
Table 16 presents the coefficients, average marginal effects (AME) and robust standard 
errors in parenthesis for the variables found to be statistically significant.  Column 1 52
reports the results for the full sample, while columns 2 and 3 report results for the sub-
sample for the Ashanti and Western region accordingly. The sub-sample for the Brong 
Ahafo region is once more omitted due to insufficient sample size. The following 
control variables were used but found to be statistically insignificant both across and 
within regions: percentage of owned land, age, use of sharecropping labour, possession 
of  livestock, use of loans and years of residency in the village. In order to avoid 
distractions from the statistically significant outcomes, the results for these variables are 
provided in Appendix 24. 
                                                                                                                                                               
 As in chapter 5, AME are preferred here to the commonly used marginal effects at the mean 52
(MEM), as they are considered “more appropriate for providing a realistic interpretation of 
estimation results”, while MEM might refer to “either non-existent or inherently nonsensical 
observations”, as in the case of dummy regressors (Bartus, 2005: 310). 
	 	
 155
Table 16: Probit model (Kuapa Kokoo membership) 
Dependent variable:  Farmer is affiliated to Kuapa Kokoo (1=yes)
Full Sample Ashanti Western
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME
(1) Cocoa plot (ha) -0.0385** -0.012** -0.167** -0.0450*** 0.0062 0.00158
(0.0196) (0.0061) (0.0663) (0.0170) (0.025) (0.0064)
(2) Sex (Male:1) -0.669*** -0.23*** -0.128 -0.00765 -1.20*** -0.34***
(0.252) (0.0886) (0.390) (0.106) (0.407) (0.108)
(3) Years of 
schooling (n)
0.00584 0.00187 -0.0344 -0.00929 0.093** 0.023**
(0.0220) (0.0071) (0.0377) (0.0100) (0.042) (0.0102)
(4) Hh labour 
(days)
0.000633 0.000203 -0.003** -0.00093** 0.00144 0.00037
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.00041) (0.001) (0.0003)
(5) Non cocoa 
income (Yes:1)
-0.545** -0.187** -0.992 -0.255* -0.550 -0.150
(0.262) (0.0923) (0.609) (0.137) (0.352) (0.996)
(6) Farming 
equipment 
(Yes:1)
0.735*** 0.256*** 1.651* 0.381** 0.693** 0.193**
(0.247) (0.0864) (0.844) (0.137) (0.323) (0.0921)
(7) Savings (Yes:
1)
-0.00898 -0.00288 -0.675* -0.175* -0.062 -0.0159
(0.178) (0.0570) (0.397) (0.0977) (0.285) (0.0728)
(8) N of buyers 0.354*** 0.113*** 0.562* 0.152* 0.59*** 0.15***
(0.120) (0.0366) (0.326) (0.0858) (0.159) (0.0351)
(9) Constant -0.0741 3.037** -1.835**
(0.600) (1.296) (0.889)
(10) Observations 249 249 78 78 137 137
(11) Pseudo R² 0.1026 0.3004 0.2439
(12) Wald chi² 30.77 39.02 32.69
(13) Prob>chi² 0.0060 0.0004 0.0032
(14) % correctly 
predicted 
73.09% 69.23 76.64
(15) Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for Probit Coeff. Standard errors in 
parentheses for Predicted. prob.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The model for the full sample correctly predicts 73.09% of the observations. Results 
show that across regions, an additional hectare decreases the probability of being a 
member of Kuapa Kokoo by 1.2% (row 1, column 2, Table 16). This result seem to be 
driven by the Ashanti sub-sample where the same increase in farm size decreases the 
membership probability by 4.5% (row 1, column 4, Table 16). Another factor that 
significantly affects the membership probability is the sex of the household head, since 
being male decreases the likelihood of membership by 23 percentage points (row 2, 
column 2, Table 16).  This result appears to be driven by the Western region sub-53
sample, where a change from female to male in the sex dummy decreases the 
membership likelihood by 34 percentage points (row 2, column 6, Table 16). Once 
more, this suggests that female headed households for some reason were more likely to 
become certified. Given Fairtrade’s goal to empower female farmers , it is possible the 
implementing actors externally selected female headed households by specifically and 
directly targeting female farmers  and facilitating their certification process, although 
this does not explain why this occurred only in the Western region.This research cannot 
provide a plausible explanation based on the collected data beyond speculations. 
However, it is noted that it is an issue worth investigating using qualitative methods in 
the future. Finally, the presence of non-cocoa income appears to decrease the 
probability of membership by 18.7 percentage points, a result driven by the Ashanti sub-
sample where the same effect is of 25.5 points (row 5, Table 16).  
There are only two variables that consistently affect the membership probability across 
and within regions: the ownership of tree felling equipment and the number of buyers 
used by a farmer within the same cocoa season. The ownership of tree felling equipment 
increases the membership probability by 25.6 percentage points across regions, while 
for the Ashanti and Western regions the same effect is of 38.1 and 19.3 percentage 
points (row 6, Table 16). As noted above, the variable is suspected to be endogenous to 
Kuapa Kokoo membership, although this is not confirmed. Moreover, an additional 
buyer used by the farmer within the same cocoa season also appears to increase the 
likelihood of Kuapa Kokoo membership by 11.3% across regions, and by 15.2% and 
 The reader is reminded that in the case of dummy variables, AME are expressed in percentage 53
points (pp),  which is the unit for the arithmetic difference of two percentages,  instead of 
percentages (%) which indicate ratios. 
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15% within the Ashanti and Western regions respectively (row 8, Table 16). On the 
other hand, there are few variables which can significantly influence the membership 
likelihood only within certain regions. Schooling, for instance, is statistically significant 
only within the Western region, with an additional year of schooling rising the 
membership probability by 2.3% (row 3, column 6, Table 16). On the other hand, an 
additional day of adult household labour decreases the probability of Kuala Kokoo 
membership by 0.093% only within the Ashanti region (row 4, column 4, Table 16). 
Such differences across and within regions, even when the marginal effects are very 
small, point to the importance of considering context heterogeneity and the need to have 
both location and culture specific participant targeting strategies. Qualitative methods 
are fundamental in grasping context heterogeneity and developing tailored strategies, 
hence the importance of the integrated synthesis of quantitative and qualitative findings 
that follows. 
7.3.Integrated synthesis of key quantitative and 
qualitative findings  
This section integrates findings from the quantitative analysis presented in the previous 
section with the two main themes resulting from the thematic analysis of primary 
qualitative data from interviews with farmers and PCs on selection processes: the 
farmer-PC relationship and the farmers ability and/or willingness to adopt the standards.  
7.3.1.The farmer-PC relationship 
The farmer-PC relationship is key in determining selection in programmes with selling 
conditionality,  like the Touton-PBC programme. This is because in these cases PCs 54
tend to automatically enrol in the programme the farmers that are already supplying 
them with cocoa. This means that in programmes with selling conditionality, participant 
selection actually occurs the moment farmers decide to sell their produce to a certain 
PC, a decision which is often taken prior to, and regardless of, the SSC programme. 
 The reader is reminded that selling conditionality refers to programmes where participants are 54
requested to sell their certified production to a specific PC/LBC associated with the programme 
(see also section 2.5).
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There are two factors that appear to determine this relationship: the provision of credit 
and the fairness in the commercial relations.    
7.3.1.1.Provision of credit  
Provision of credit emerged as a key factor in shaping the PC-farmer relationship, and 
by consequence, farmers’ selection in SSC programmes with selling conditionality. 
Access to credit is a crucial aspect of farmers’ financial stability in general (e.g. 
Adebayo and Adeola, 2017) and that applies to Ghanaian cocoa farmers as 
well .According to the GCFS dataset, 54% of the surveyed farmers have made use of 
credit at least once (row 12, Appendix 19). This appears to apply to all farmers 
regardless of certification status as the relevant variable is found to be statistically 
insignificant (see t-tests in Table 15, row 12, and  probit  estimates in Appendix 24, row 
5). All interviewed farmers reported turning to their PCs for credit in exchange of future 
harvest. Additionally, it was frequently reported that credit was the the first, and often 
only, reason for selling cocoa to a certain PC. It was also often stated that farmers 
initiated their commercial relationship with a PC after a loan they received when in 
need of cash. After that, farmers continued selling their cocoa to the same PC, often 
resulting in commercial relationships that spanned one or more decades. The following 
quote is characteristic of how the PCs operate as loan providers: 
“If you take seven bags of cocoa as a loan from a PC, you cannot just give back seven 
bags. You need to double it, say fourteen bags. And then until you finish giving cocoa to 
the PC you borrowed from, you cannot give to another PC. So the PC is not charging 
any interest, he’s just expecting from you that you’re going to bring him more 
cocoa.” (Solomon, farm owner). 
Solomon’s quote indicates that loans provided by PCs are interest-free (at least in the 
area around the research community) and are usually given for the corresponding value 
of one or multiple cocoa bags. The extract also asserts that even though PCs do not have 
direct financial gains from the loans in the form of interests, they do get commercial 
benefits. By providing loans in exchange of future harvest, PCs ‘lock-in’ farmers in 
dealing exclusively with them and hence ensure their future cocoa purchases, and by 
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consequence the commission they earn on purchased cocoa. Additionally, farmers who 
borrow from PCs are expected to provide more bags in return than the equivalent of the 
loan given. According to interviews with PCs, these loans are financed exclusively by 
their private capital, without any financial involvement of the LBCs. This means that 
PCs assume the whole risk of the loans they provide. The related risk, however, tends to 
be relatively low. This is because PCs live in the same community with the farmers, in 
most cases they are neighbours, friends or even relatives, and know the production 
capacity of each farmer. This allows them to better judge the risks involved in every 
loan case. Commercial loyalty and long lasting relations also play a role in keeping the 
default risk low. In fact, interviewed PCs and farmers have all asserted that default rates 
were very low, with most farmers re paying their loans (in cocoa bags) during harvest 
time, while cases of farmers carrying their debt from one season to another were 
extremely rare. 
This credit system results in a win-win situation which advances the interests of both 
farmers and PCs. Given the lack of formal financial institutions that can provide credit 
to farmers (Dzadze et al., 2012) and the prohibitive costs of informal loans provided by 
rural money lenders in the Ghanaian rural context, loans provided by PCs are often the 
only viable source of cash for farmers when in need. It is a sort of pre-payment service 
to cover everyday needs or emergencies, such as school fees, house repairs, medical 
expenses or funeral costs. By providing interest-free credit at any time farmers need it, 
PCs become farmers’ financial safety net, an essential piece in their economic stability 
and a far better alternative to local money lenders charging between 50% and 100% of 
interest on a loan. On the other hand, the provision of loans is one of the few 
mechanisms PCs have to attract farmers, since prices are regulated by the state and 
cannot serve as a basis for market competition (see section 2.3.). PCs know that a 
farmer in need of cash will divert the cocoa to which ever PC is able to provide a loan. 
In fact, farmers tend to diversify their selling channel as a strategy of financial stability. 
The following quote illustrates this point:  
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“Sometimes when you need help, the PC might not be able to help you. So there is a 
need to have more PCs, two or three. Because when you need help, if this one cannot 
help you go to the other person”. (Solomon, farm owner) 
The extract indicates that Solomon, a relatively wealthy farmer and owner of a large 
cocoa farm, is aware of the importance of securing and maintaining multiple credit 
sources. His comment shows that diversifying the selling channel is a crucial strategy 
for enhancing farmers’ ability to deal with financial shocks. This finding is supported by 
the GCFS dataset. As the descriptive statistics show, it is common for farmers, whether 
certified or not, to sell their harvest to more than one buyer (row 14, Appendix 19). 
Further, when examined by certification status, both t-tests and probit analysis suggest 
that certified farmers are even more likely to use several buyers within the same cocoa 
season than non-certified (row 14, Tables 15 and row 8, Table 16). This also suggests 
that the risk of losing market share is real and PCs will usually go the extra mile to 
provide credit to a farmer from their supplying base. This is why PC-farmer 
relationships tend to be solid and long lasting, built on reciprocal trust: farmers trust that 
they can rely on their PC for cash in times of hardship, while PCs trust that farmers will 
not default on their loans.  
The implications for participant selection into SSC programmes are the following. First, 
the predisposition of a PC to provide credit to a certain farmer clearly influences the 
farmer’s decision to supply this PC with cocoa in return. In the case in which the PC 
happens to be the ‘gatekeeper’ of a SSC programme with selling conditionality, then the 
PC’s ability or willingness to provide credit will also shape farmers’ selection into the 
programme. This also applies the other way around, as the lack of predisposition (or 
capacity) of PCs to provide credit will discourage farmers from selling their cocoa to 
them. If such PCs are involved in SSC programmes, this will result in farmers self-
selecting themselves out of the programme. 
The Touton-PBC programme illustrates how farmers can be discouraged from selling to 
a certain PC by the lack of credit provision and therefore also self-select themselves out 
of a SSC programme. In this case, Ebenezer, the PC of PBC at the research community 
was notorious for being extremely strict and selective in his credit provision to farmers. 
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According to farmers’ testimonies, Ebenezer had openly informed the farmers of the 
certified group that he did not intend to give out any loans. This had the effect of 
discouraging farmers who depend on credit from joining the programme: “Anything can 
happen, I want to be able to ask for a loan”, Lisa (tenant farmer) commented on her 
decision to distance herself from PBC and its SSC programme. This resulted in Lisa 
becoming a ‘ghost’ member of the certified group, i.e. although Lisa was officially 
registered as a member of the group because she was selling cocoa from a family farm 
to PBC, she did not engage with the programme activities. Other farmers also noted that 
they were discouraged from selling to PBC, and hence participating in its SSC 
programme, due to the lack of access to credit. For instance, Kojo commented that he 
used to sell his cocoa to PBC because he was on good terms with Ebenezer. 
Nevertheless, he stopped because it was very difficult to get loans from him, and he 
transferred to another PC on whom he could rely for loans when needed. Kojo 
developed a very close relationship with his new PC and he would even allow him 
during the high  season to keep his cocoa money so that he could use it up for loans 
during the low season (i.e. as a sort of saving/credit account), confirming the role of 
PCs as local bankers. Among the ten interviewed farmers who had commercial relations 
with PBC and therefore were affiliated to its SSC programme, only two were able to get 
loans from its PC. Not coincidentally, both were male, senior members of the 
community, with relatively large production volumes and a long lasting relationship 
with Ebenezer.  
The above case highlights how farmers lacking the social and economic capitals that 
would allow them to get loans from the PC of the SSC programme would rather self-
select themselves out of the programme, instead of supplying with cocoa a PC without 
guarantees of access to credit. Further the case of the Touton-PBC programme suggests 
that more credit-dependent farmers, like Lisa or Kojo, are more likely to be left out of 
SSC programmes with selling conditionality than those who can afford dealing with a 
PC who does not provide credit. Overall, it is observed that selection processes are 
bidirectional. While PCs can externally influence participant selection by providing (or 
not) credit, farmers can self- select themselves in or out of SSC programmes based on 
their ability to access credit. This process is driven by both observable (e.g. cocoa 
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production that can serve as collateral to loans) and unobservable (e.g. degree of trust in 
the farmer-PC relationship)  farmer characteristics. 
Second, there is a sharp contrast between the expectations of SSC implementing actors 
regarding farmers’ commercial loyalty discussed in section 5.3.2 and farmers’ need to 
diversify their selling channel in order to increase their sources of credit and hence 
safeguard their financial stability. This means that a tension emerges between the 
interest of implementing and trading actors (mainly LBCs) to prioritise the participation 
of commercially ‘loyal’ farmers in SSC programme with selling conditionality, and 
farmers’ interest to maintain multiple selling channels. For instance, side-selling of 
certified produce is often consider as a non-compliance with the standards that can lead 
to the suspension or even exclusion of the farmer from the programme. In these cases, 
this could lead to more credit-dependent farmers who need to diversify more their 
selling channels being left out of SSC programmes. 
Third, the importance of credit in the PC-farmer relationship also indicates that 
certification related incentives, such as training, price premium, and other material 
inputs (e.g. fertilisers boots,  cutlasses), are not sufficient per se to incentivise the 
participation of farmers if credit provisions are not in place. While farmers obviously 
find such incentives attractive, they will not risk losing their source of credit by 
diverting their produce to the PC of the SSC programme in order to become certified. 
This can lead to situations where farmers register with a SSC programme and follow the 
training, but keep selling their produce to their PC of choice, in order to maintain their 
source of credit, even if this means losing the certification premium. 
7.3.1.2.Fairness in the commercial relationship 
Beyond the provision of credit, farmers also reported valuing fairness in their 
relationship with the PC. This was mainly reflected in the accuracy of the PC’s scale 
when weighting and buying cocoa. Scale manipulations are commonly reported in local 
commodity markets (e.g Milford, 2012). They also appear to be frequent in the 
Ghanaian cocoa market, as PCs, not able to alter the state-fixed cocoa price, manipulate 
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the scale in order to increase their gains. Farmers commented on this practice during 
interviews: 
“The PCs are killing [us] with the scale. Some of them are very cruel. They can adjust 
the scale to the extent that you have to add 10 kgs. Sometimes you know that the weight 
of the cocoa is one bag, but it never reaches the [64 kg in the] scale. […] If they are 55
adding 10 kgs to each bag and you're giving them 10 bags that's a 100 kgs gain. That’s 
not small money”. (Moses, sharecropper with land entitlements) 
Once more, the Touton-PBC programme illustrates how the issue of scale can influence 
farmers’ self-selection in programmes with selling conditionality. In this case, Ebenezer, 
the PC of the programme, despite being known for his lack of predisposition to provide 
loans as discussed in the previous section, was also widely recognised in the community 
for his ‘fair scale’. Interviewed farmers often associated the fact that Ebenezer had the 
‘best scale’ in the area to the fact that he was buying cocoa for PBC, the LBC 
previously owner by the government, as it was common belief that PBC PCs and their 
scales were still being better controlled and monitored than others.  This research has 56
identified three farmers who were selling their produce to Ebenezer, because of his 'fair 
scale’, despite the fact that this commercial choice was leaving them without credit. 
This means that the ‘fairness’ in the commercial relationship with Ebenezer attracted 
some farmers to PBC and as a result also influenced self-selection into its SSC 
programme.  
Nevertheless, more credit-depended farmers could not afford forgoing their credit 
sources in order to sell to PBC, even if that meant a better deal in the scale. One selling 
strategy, once more, was diversification of the selling channel. By selling part of his 
cocoa to PBC and part to another PC, Owusu was trying to maintain his credit source 
while receiving a fair price for at least part of his produce:  
 In the Ghanaian trading system one bag of cocoa equals 64 kg. 55
 The LBC PBC, previously the cocoa buying subsidiary of Cocobod,  was privatised in 1993 56
as part of the market liberalisation reform, nevertheless many farmers still regard the LBC as a 
government-owned company (see section 2.5)
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“PBC is from the government, they do not give loans. But the weighting is better, one 
bag is fair. The other PC, I need him to settle my bills, to pay the school fees.” (Owusu, 
farm owner).  
Another strategy, though probably available only to farmers with large cocoa volumes, 
was for farmers to have their own scale. This was the case of Solomon, whose cocoa 
production exceeded the 80 bags per season. Solomon had his own scale to weigh his 
cocoa and was selling to three different PCs. Each one of them would go to his farm to 
pick up the cocoa from his farm and weigh it on the spot using his scale. This allowed 
Solomon to maintain his credit sources while getting the correct weight (and pay) for 
his cocoa. Nevertheless, most farmers could not afford either of these strategies. 
Particularly farmers with lower production volumes that do not permit selling to 
multiple PCs, and/or more credit-dependent farmers tended to just skip selling to PBC 
and tolerate scale manipulations in order to secure their credit sources. This also meant 
that these same farmers were less likely to participate in the Touton-PBC SSC 
programme, suggesting a positive selection of the already better off farmers, i.e. those 
with larger production volumes, greater financial stability and less dependence on 
credit. Such features point once more to the importance of the economic and social 
capitals of farmers and to the fact that participant selection can be driven by farmer 
characteristics which are both observable (e.g. greater production capacity) and 
unobservable (e.g. ability to use social networks to access credit). 
7.3.2.Ability and/or willingness to adopt the standards  
Farmers’ ability and/or willingness to adopt the standards is another key determinant of 
participant selection into SSC programmes. Particularly in cases of programmes without 
selling conditionality where the PC-farmer relationship is no longer relevant, selection 
into certification appears to be mainly determined by factors that influence farmers’ 
ability and willingness to adopt the standards, namely the ability to bear the costs of 
certified production and farmers’ attitudes towards farming.  
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7.3.2.1.Labour costs of certified production  
Producing cocoa according to sustainability standards may increase the farming 
workload, as farmers are expected to prune and weed their farms on a more regular 
basis, while also taking more systematic care of mistletoe, as discussed in section 1.2. 
This means that if the farmer is not able to draw on extra household labour, farming 
according to standards may lead to an increase in the use of sharecropping or hired 
labour. In any case, increased labour costs of certified production may act as a barrier to 
participation for farmers who cannot afford to invest in extra labour.   
The scenario that certified farmers make greater use of household or sharecropping 
labour is not supported by the GCFS dataset, as the corresponding variables are either 
statistically non- significant, or significant but with low marginal effects (see row 4, 
Table 15 and row 3, Appendix 24). This could be explained by a lack of proper 
enforcement of the standards, something which was often hinted by certification 
consultants who worked with Kuapa Kokoo. If this is the case, it would mean that, 
although certified in theory, Kuapa Kokoo farmers did not really adopt and apply the 
Fairtrade standards, and therefore there was no real need to increase their labour input. 
However, it could also mean that the adoption does not significantly increase farmers’ 
workload after all and therefore it is not a barrier to the adoption of standards.  
Farmer-level data diverge on whether adopting the standards actually leads to an 
increased farm workload and by consequence to an increase in the use of hired or 
household labour. Anita and Nora, for instance, categorically stated that their workload 
is the same after adopting the Fairtrade standards and that they do not need to hire extra 
labour. The only difference from following the standards, they noted, is that their farm 
production has increased. However, it is worth noting that both farmers were working 
on abunu contracts and the part of the trees that were already bearing fruits, where they 
could apply the standards, was relatively small (i.e. below 5 hectares). Lisa, working on 
a one hectare family farm, agreed with this view noting that farming according to the 
standards hasn’t really increased her workload. “These are things we were doing 
already. It’s just that we were not doing it at the right time and in the right way”, she 
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noted. Adopting the standards, therefore, signified for Lisa a re-organisation, but not an 
increase, in the farm workload. Finally, Ama who together with her husband farms 
about 12 hectares, commented that the increase in workload applies mainly in the initial 
phase of the adoption of the standards. Nevertheless, as one keeps maintaining the farm 
according to the standards, the work stabilises at some point and at the end the extra 
workload is not significant:  
“It was more work, initially. So once you think it’s too much and you can’t do it, you 
hire labour. But right now the farm has stabilised and now the cocoa is doing fine. So 
we don’t get to hire a lot of labour like when we were initially applying all the training.” 
(Ama, farm owner's wife). 
Nevertheless, other farmers asserted that certification lead to an increase in the labour 
input, which, however, was being covered by the increase in yields from applying the 
standards. Kwame, the owner of a 2 hectares  farm and a sharecropper for another 9 
hectares, recognised that applying the standards significantly increased his workload 
which lead to an increased used of hired labour. The extra labour cost was covered by 
the increase in productivity: “At first I wouldn’t even get 10 bags from my farm and 
now I’m able to get 25”. Constance, a PC in the case study community with more than 7 
hectares and two sharecroppers taking care of half of her land, also confirmed that since 
adopting the standards she needs to hire extra labour: “The sharecropper alone cannot 
do all the work. You have to hire extra labour, but then it pays off”.  
Such testimonies suggest that particularly for farmers managing more hectares, whether 
as owners or sharecroppers, the increase in the farming workload can be significant. 
This could explain why according to the GCFS dataset, every additional hectare of 
farming appears to decrease the likelihood of a farmers being certified (row 1, Table 
16). This implies that the adoption of standards can be problematic for farmers lacking 
the initial capacity to increase their labour input (whether drawing on household labour, 
or by increasing the use of hired labour), even if the investment pays off at harvest time. 
If this is the case, it proves once more that pre-harvest credit provisions are crucial for 
the adoption of standards and therefore for farmers’ self-selection into SSC 
programmes. Overall, observable characteristics related to farmers’ economic capital 
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(e.g. production volumes and access to credit) and unobservables ones linked to their 
social capital (ability to draw on unpaid labour of friends and relatives, as discussed in 
section 6.3.3.) appear to influence farmers' ability to afford extra labour and thus to 
adopt  the standards. 
7.3.2.2.Farming attitudes 
SSC programme implementing actors tend to prioritise those farmers who are able and 
willing to see cocoa farming as a business, as discussed in section 5.3.5 . This did not 
emerged as a theme in the thematic analysis based on farmers’ insights. Nevertheless, 
there are some observable variables included in the GCFS dataset that can be associated 
to a ‘business’ approach to cocoa farming. Such variables include savings for farm 
investments and the possession of farm equipment, as well as the existence of non-
cocoa income that can be regarded as a strategy of livelihood diversification, which can 
be considered as the opposite strategy of cocoa farming intensification. Results from the 
probit model suggest that such ‘business’ related farmer characteristics are indeed 
positively related to selection into the Fairtrade certified LBC Kuapa Kokoo. The 
possession of farm equipment, for instance, appears to increase the likelihood of a 
farmer being certified across and within regions (row 6, Table 16). The existence of 
non-cocoa income, on the other hand, appears to decreases the same likelihood across 
regions and within the Ashanti region sub-sample (row5, Table 16), suggesting that 
farmers who diversify more their sources of income are less likely to become certified. 
Savings for farming investments is the only variable that does not support this scenario, 
as it appears to have no significant influence on the certification status at the full 
sample, while it is negatively associated with the probability of being certified for the 
Ashanti region sub-sample (row 7, Table 16). Overall, however, the probit results 
appear to support the view expressed by implementing actors that SSC programmes 
have a preference for farmers with a business attitude towards cocoa farming. 
Finally, farmer unobservable characteristics such as trust in SSC implementing actors 
and programme structures, as well as willingness to work closely with others, can also 
influence selection into SSC programmes. The case of Felix, a 62 year old farmer who 
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was managing a family farm, illustrates this point. Felix was one of the few farmers 
with land entitlements identified by this research, who was not associated to any of the 
two certified groups operating in the case study community. He explained his decision 
to self-select himself out of both programmes as a result of his dislike towards attending 
group meetings and having to work closely with others. Patrick, on the other hand, a 33 
year old farmer sharecropping on his relatives’ land, joined the Cocoa Life group with 
his abusa farm. Nevertheless, he soon dropped out, as he believed that the group was 
managed by a number of elite farmers with family links to each other, who were 
benefiting disproportionally from the programme (i.e. unfair distribution of premium 
and privileged use of the services of the Cocoa Life extentionist). This undermined his 
trust in the group and made him self-select out of the certified group. 
7.6.Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to unpack participant selection processes into SSC 
programmes in order to understand which farmers are more likely to participate in, and 
therefore possibly benefit from,  SSC interventions and why. The chapter started by 
providing an overview of the main quantitative findings. The following variables were 
found to be statistically significant in determining membership in the Fairtrade 
cooperative/LBC Kuapa Kokoo: cocoa farming hectares, household labour contribution, 
having a male headed household as well as  having savings and  income from non-cocoa 
sources were all found to decrease the likelihood of being Fairtrade certified across or 
within regions. It was noted, however, that the marginal effects for farming area and 
household labour were particularly small, indicating a limited influence on the 
membership likelihood. On the other hand, years of schooling, possession of farming 
equipment and the number of buyers used by a farmer within the same season were 
found to be statistically significant with a positive influence on the membership 
likelihood. Particularly the last two (i.e. having a tree felling machine and the 
diversification of the selling channel),  were  the only variables which had a consistent 
effect on the membership likelihood with a marginal effect of considerable size across 
and within regions.  
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The discussion then moved to the integration of these results with key qualitative 
findings from the thematic analysis. Results indicate that there are two main venues 
through which participant  selection processes operate. First, the choice of the selling 
channel, which applies only to SSC programmes with selling conditionality. It was 
discussed that loans provided by PCs are highly valued by farmers since they are crucial 
for their financial stability. As a result, the provision of such loans (or the lack of it) 
influences farmers’ choice of PC and therefore their selection in or out of SSC 
programmes with selling conditionality. The provision of loans itself can be determined 
by farmers’ observable and unobservable characteristics linked to their economic and 
social capitals (e.g. production capacity and social networks that can provide alternative 
sources of credit). Second, the ability and willingness of farmers to adopt the standards, 
which is broken down to two main factors: farmers’ ability to afford a possible increase 
in production costs linked to certified production and their attitudes towards farming. In 
terms of production costs, integrated findings suggest that farmers handling more 
farming hectares are more likely to need extra labour in order to comply with the 
standards. Ability to draw on extra labour once more depends on farmers’ economic and 
social capitals and on characteristics that can be both observable and unobservable, such 
as economic resources to hire extra labour, or reliance on relatives and friends to source 
unpaid labour. In terms of attitudes, quantitative data support insights from interviews 
with implementing and certifying actors presented in section 5.3.5. and suggest that 
farmers with observable characteristics that can be linked to a greater cocoa farming 
intensification, such as less non-cocoa income and possession of tree fell equipment, are 
more likely to become certified. Finally, farmers whose trust in the certified group is 
undermined, or who lack willingness to work closely with other farmers, tend to self-
select themselves out of SSC interventions. Figure 20 summarises the participant 
selection determinants identified by this research in terms of observable and 
unobservable characteristics, as well as depending on whether they influence external 
selection, self-selection or both. 
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Figure 20: Participant selection determinants 
The main implications of the above findings can be summarised as follows. First, 
selection processes which are determined by the PC-farmer relationship based on the 
provision of credit are likely to prioritise farmers who are already financially more 
stable and therefore less likely to default on their loans, or are directly less credit-
dependent. This means that farmers with higher social status and/or larger cocoa 
volumes that allow them to provide greater repayment guarantees to the PCs, or to 
diversify more their selling channels and therefore their sources of credit are more likely 
to join SSC programmes with selling conditionality. On the contrary, more credit-
dependent farmers, or those who are less able to diversify their selling channels (due to 
smaller production volumes) are more limited in their selling choices and therefore 
more likely to prioritise access to credit against participation in a SSC programme if 
presented with the dilemma. Additionally,  farmers who are already more business-
oriented, and with a greater ability to make the necessary investments in farming 
equipment and labour input in order to adopt and comply with the standards are more 
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Household head
 sex  
Source: Author’s creation 
likely to be externally selected or to self-select themselves into SSC programmes. 
Findings also suggest that if SSC programmes are to be more inclusive, then the 
provision of accessible, low-cost credit or pre-financing services must be part of their 
programme design. This would allow farmers who are less able to adopt a more 
business oriented and intensified type of cocoa farming, as the one promoted by SSC 
programmes, to overcome financial barriers that could be stopping them from 
participating in certified markets. This chapter has addressed the third research sub-
question. The following chapter reviews the main findings of the three analytical 
chapters and reflects on key methodological and policy issues. Some recommendations 
for future research are also provided. 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1.Study summary  
This thesis sought to contribute to the broader debate on the effectiveness of SSC for 
agricultural production by focusing on the so far under-researched aspect of selection 
processes. Using the Ghanaian cocoa sector as a case study and drawing on primary 
qualitative and secondary survey data, I provide new insights  on how SSC programme 
placement is determined (RQ1), how farmers involved in cocoa production become 
eligible to participate in such programmes (RQ2), and finally how these eligible farmers 
select in or out of certified groups. Selection processes were investigated in three 
different cocoa SSC programmes operating in the Ghanaian context: the Fairtrade 
certified cooperative/LBC Kuapa Kokoo, the previously Faitrade certified and now 
verified Cocoa Life programme,  and the UTZ certified Touton-PBC programme. 57
Combined findings suggest that selection processes are systematic with the already 
better off farmers being more likely to participate and therefore potentially benefit from 
SSC programmes. The thesis also contributes to the impact evaluation literature by 
pointing to the importance of unpacking selection processes in order to understand not 
only whether an intervention works, but also for whom it may or may not work. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the key arguments of each of the chapters, 
focusing on contributions made both to the SSC and impact evaluation scholarship 
(section 8.2.). It then turns to the main implications resulting from the research findings 
(section 8.3.) and concludes with some reflections and recommendations for future 
research (section 8.4). 
 The reader is reminded that since 2015 the Cocoa Life programme is verified and not certified 57
by Fairtrade (see section 2.5. for more)
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8.2.Key arguments and contributions to the existing 
literature 
Chapter 1 presented the research rationale. It was argued that given the rise in cocoa 
SSC programmes amid fears of supply shortages and consumers’ social and 
environmental concerns (Lernoud et al.., 2017; Potts et al. 2014; Vecchio and 
Annunciate, 2015; Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2015 & 2018), gaining a better 
understanding of who can participate in certified markets, and just as importantly who 
cannot, becomes necessary. The chapter then introduced the reader to the broader SSC 
literature and the current debates on their effectiveness, highlighting that the processes 
by which farmers enter SSC initiatives so far have been rather under-researched. Based 
on these reflections on the state of the literature, three sub-questions were specified 
regarding programme placement, eligibility criteria and participant selection processes.  
Chapter 2 introduced the contextual background of the research. It reviewed the power 
relations within the cocoa-chocolate global economy and pointed to the consolidation of 
cocoa  processing and manufacturing companies on the one hand, and the fragmentation 
and debilitation of the cocoa farming base on the other (Kaplinsky, 2004; Fold, 2002; 
Ryan, 2011; Barrientos, 2014). It was argued that the observed increase in the demand 
and production of  ‘sustainably sourced’ certified cocoa should be understood in this 
context. The discussion then introduced the reader to the particular historical and 
institutional context of the Ghanaian cocoa economy and its current operational 
structure. It was underlined how an originally farmer-driven industry has been, and 
partly still is, heavily controlled by the state through COCOBOD (Hill, 1963, Berry, 
1993; Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011 & 2017). Emphasis was placed on the contractual 
agreements ‘abunu’ and ‘abusa’ which were fundamental to the development of the 
sector (Robertson, 1980 & 1987;   Knudsen and Fold, 2011; Takane, 2002) and are key 
in following  the discussion on eligibility and participant selection processes presented 
in chapters 6 and 7. Finally the chapter presented the three SSC programmes 
investigated by this study and summarised key characteristics which can allow the 
reader to engage with the analytical chapters.  
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Chapter 3 and 4 provided the conceptual framework and methodology of the study. 
Chapter 3 began by reviewing the debate on the concepts of intervention, programme 
and project. Drawing on Long’s actor oriented approach (Long and van Der Ploeg, 
1989; Long, 1999; Long, 2001) and ANT (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 1992) this 
thesis characterised SSC interventions as an active and on-going process driven by the 
interests of the different actors involved. The discussion then moved to the concept of 
selection to argue that there is value in considering selection not only as a source of bias 
(Heckman, 1979; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986; Ravallion, 2001) but also as a source 
of learning which can inform for whom a programme may or may not work ( Weiss, 
1997; Pawson and Tilley, 2004). Given the lack of a ‘selection’ theory that could guide 
the analysis, the study used  the SRL framework (Scoones, 1998) as an analytical tool 
and examined the role of different livelihood capitals in shaping farmers’ ability to 
access, enrol and engage with SSC programmes. Chapter 4 started by detailing how the 
idea of exploring selection processes in certification initiatives was born and how 
motherhood shaped both the scope and the methods of the research. Further, it was 
detailed how quantitative and qualitative methods were mixed in order to triangulate, to 
complement findings, to develop analytical models and to explain contradictory 
findings. After detailing the data collection and analysis methods, the chapter finished 
with the methodological challenges encountered and the research limitations. It 
discussed the difficulties in obtaining secondary data from commercial actors, the 
reliability of primary and secondary data as well as issues of selection bias resulting 
from non-random sampling. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 presented the empirical findings resulting from both quantitative 
and qualitative analytical methods. Findings suggest that programme placement is 
driven by business-oriented criteria when placement decisions are shaped by the 
interests of SSC implementing actors which are mainly concerned with minimising 
implementation costs and risks and maximising returns. Such logics result in the 
placement of SSC programmes in areas with greater production capacity and better 
accessibility, where farmers tend to be better prepared to adopt and comply with the 
standards. The main implication is that, contrary to the expressed aims of SSC, more 
remote areas with smaller production volumes, and ‘higher-risk’ farmers in terms of 
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standards adoption and compliance are likely to be avoided. Such findings echo authors 
who have argued that SSC tend to operate in “low hanging fruits” areas with already 
organised farmers who can act as reliable suppliers in terms of volumes and crop 
quality(Fountain and Hutz-Adam, 2015:7; Pongratz-Chander 2007; Kariuki, 2014; 
Beall, 2012). On the other hand, farmer-oriented placement criteria appear to prevail 
when placement decisions are taken by funding and certifying actors who regard SSC 
programmes as vehicles of their institutional mission or CSR strategy. In these cases 
areas that face specific social and/or environmental challenges, such as child labour, 
extreme rural poverty or threats to natural resources may be specifically targeted. 
In terms of eligibility, findings suggest that land entitlements operate as a cut off point 
in qualifying for membership in SSC programmes, as reported also by Sutton (2014), 
Ingram et al. (2014) and Nelson et al. (2013). Non-eligible farmers tend to be the most 
marginalised or disadvantaged farmers, such as migrant sharecroppers from poorer 
areas with less formal education, less established social networks in the cocoa growing 
areas and fewer financial resources. These farmers typically need to go through several 
years of unpaid work and secure extra labour, mainly through marriage, in order to 
access land first as sharecroppers and later as tenants of ‘abunu’ farms. As a result, they 
are not able to reach SSC eligibility status until their mid-thirties or forties. On the 
contrary, farmers who had a more advantaged  start in life and had either direct access to 
land for cocoa farming or were better equipped in terms of human, social and economic 
capital are more likely to be considered as  eligible for SSC membership  earlier in life.  
Finally, findings related to participant selection indicate the importance of both 
observable and unobservable farmer characteristics related to farmers' economic and 
social capitals. The provision of pre-harvest loans and the fairness in farmer-PC 
relations emerged as key participant selection factors, since they determine farmers’ 
choice of PC and therefore their selection in or out of SSC programmes with selling 
conditionality. Ability and willingness to adopt the standards was identified as second 
key factor influencing participant selection. This was broken down into ability to afford 
possible increases in labour requirements, as well as farming attitudes. Findings partly 
support Oya et al. (2017) on the ability to afford increased certification costs as 
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participant selection determinant. Prominent observable determinants highlighted in 
section 1.3 such as land size or education are not supported by this analysis. Results 
point, however, to the importance of less documented unobservable characteristics in 
determining participant selection. The role of personal relations between farmers and 
local buyers has been thoroughly documented in section 7.5.1. Propensity to work 
closely with other farmers and trust in the leadership of the POs may also play a 
significant role in participant selection as the two cases presented in section 7.5.2.2 
illustrate. Although the relevant evidence is limited, these potentially influential 
unobservable selection determinants are being flagged here for further exploration. 
Overall, findings suggest that farmers in remote areas with smaller production volumes, 
lacking land entitlements and facing greater financial uncertainty and credit 
dependence, or with limited capacity to increase their labour input, are likely to be 
systematically excluded from SSC programmes. Such findings converge with studies 
that have previously pointed towards a positive selection of the already better off into 
SSC initiates, while leaving behind the poorer and more marginalised (e.g. Cramer et 
al., 2014 & 2017; Breimer and de Vaal, 2012; Hansen and Trifkovic, 2013; Staricco and 
Ponte, 2015; Carimentrand and Ballet, 2010; Staib, 2012). 
8.3.Policy implications  
The following policy implications arise from the above outlined findings. In terms of 
placement, the use of business oriented criteria may lead to the creation of certification 
“hotspots” and an over-concentration of SSC programmes in areas that are considered 
optimal by SSC implementing actors (see section 5.3.1). This can lead to the multi-
certification of the same farmers, as SSC programmes concentrate in the same ‘optimal’ 
areas, while farmers in less attractive areas in operational terms  may never have access 
to certified markets. This is less likely to occur when SSC programmes follow more 
farmer or community- oriented placement criteria, where the specific socio-economic 
and environmental challenges may in fact attract and not discourage certification 
initiatives. Given the fact that SSC have crossed into the mainstream and are becoming 
increasingly implemented by market actors who take placement decisions following 
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business criteria (Paschall, 2013), scenarios of future over-concentration of certification 
in ‘optimal' areas and systematic exclusion of  areas where farmers are smaller, and less 
prepared to adopt the standards and intensify their production become more likely. This 
scenario points to the risk of  increasing local inequalities among cocoa farmers, where 
the poorer and more marginalised farmers are systematically out of the sector’s 
sustainability initiatives.   
Regarding eligibility criteria, there are two main implications. First, farmers with no 
land entitlements producing certified cocoa, such as sharecroppers and their wives, are 
unlikely to follow the training on certification standards or to receive the certification 
related benefits. Instead these tend to accrue to farm owners, even if these are ‘absentee’ 
farmers, already disengaged to a great extent with the cocoa farming work (see section 
6.4). Moreover, this study has identified ‘ghost farmers’ (see section 6.3.2), who despite 
being registered as members of certified groups, in reality  are not engaged in any way 
with certification related activities. Such findings indicate a mismatch between those 
who actually produce the certified crop (i.e. tenant and sharecropper farmers along with 
their wives), those who are officially registered as certified (i.e. farm overseers) and 
those who finally receive the benefits (at least the financial premium), who tend to be 
the farm-owners, even if no longer actively farming. Concerns arise regarding the ethics 
of such practices (i.e. is it fair or socially sustainable that SSC initiates tend to benefit 
the already better off producers?), but also the effectiveness of SSC programmes (i.e. is 
selecting the farm owners, even if already disengaged with farming advancing the aims 
of SSC programmes?). Finally, SSC efforts to intensify production should also be re-
examined in terms of their social impact. For example, the case of Aisha who was 
required to relocate with her children to a remote settlement with no schooling facilities 
in order to produce certified cocoa clearly indicates that there is a gap between the 
values that consumers associate with certified products and the practice of certified 
production (see section 6.4.4). Overall, it becomes clear that if SSC are to bring real 
change in farming practices, they need to recognise, include and properly incentivise the 
farmers that although involved in certified production have been so far rather 
“invisible” to both implementing and certifying actors, such as sharecroppers and their 
wives.  
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Second, using land ownership or entitlements as the main eligibility criteria is likely to 
target farmers who are already preparing to exit the cocoa farming sector (see section 
6.4.1). Although this exit process can take several years, even decades, it is worth 
reflecting on how effective it is for SSC programmes which aim at changing farming 
attitudes and behaviour to target middle-aged farmers who are already planning to exit 
the sector, leaving their farms in the care of, typically non-eligible, sharecroppers. 
Given the industry concerns that both cocoa farms and the farming population of Ghana 
(and West Africa more broadly) are “ageing” and will not be able to cope with a future 
demand for more and better quality cocoa, SSC funding and implementing actors should 
consider how they could include in their programmes the young people that are already 
involved in cocoa production. Because against the common belief that young people are 
deserting the sector (e.g Fick, 2015; Löwe, 2017; Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2015), 
there is great number of young people currently farming cocoa, but their lack of land 
entitlements rends them invisible to policy makers, aid practitioners, and cocoa industry 
professionals.  
Finally, in terms of participant selection, one of the key lessons emerging is that pre-
harvest credit can be crucial for standards adoption for programmes with and without 
selling conditionality. This is because it can allow farmers who are locked in trading 
relationships with certain PCs on the basis of loan provisions, and/or those less able to 
afford the increased labour costs, to overcome the financial barriers that could be 
stopping them from participating in certified markets. Inclusion of pre-harvest credit 
would also significantly minimise the side-selling of certified produce, a widespread 
practice and one that causes SSC implementing actors, particularly LBCs, a 
considerable headache, as it results in losses of volumes of certified beans. 
8.4.Reflections and recommendations 
This thesis has shown the importance of exploring selection process of participants into 
social and economic programmes. To do so, it has drawn conceptually on ANT but also 
on Scoones’ (1998) SRL framework. The first was particularly helpful for the analysis 
of the programme placement determinants presented in chapter 5, as it has enabled 
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mapping the different actors involved in cocoa SSC programmes and analysing how 
certification can advance their multiple material and political interests. This conceptual 
approach, however, proved difficult to apply when exploring eligibility dynamics and 
participant selection processes at the farmer level (chapters 6 and 7). Instead, Scoone’s 
SRL framework was used to visualise how different livelihood capitals can enhance or 
hinder both participant eligibility and selection. This does not mean that actor 
approaches cannot contribute to a better understanding of these issues. On the contrary, 
they have the potential to illuminate the local political structures and their influence, in 
this case the role of the members of the cooperative board or of other institutions and 
committees operating at the community level. Nevertheless, grasping the dynamics of 
local interests would require a more ethnographic methodological approach, involving 
extensive fieldwork and data collection through observation, as well as informal, 
unstructured interviews to enable farmers opening up to an outsider about sensitive 
issues, such as the use of SSC related resources to the benefit of only few individuals. It 
is characteristic that such dynamics started to become visible towards the end of the 
fieldwork in the research community. At that point, for example, it became possible to 
observe the kinship relations among the members of the Cocoa Life group and how 
these were driving away other farmers from joining the group. At the same time, the 
increasing degree of familiarity between researcher and researched allowed the 
disclosure of comments on the different ways that board members and PCs involved in 
both the Cocoa Life and the Touton-PBC programmes were benefiting from their 
positions, shaping eligibility perceptions and participant selection while advancing their 
own interests. Nevertheless, these last-minute observations were not deemed enough to 
construct the analysis on eligibility and participant selection using the ANT framework.  
The analysis drew instead on the structured and life history interviews conducted with 
the farmers, as well as on focus groups. Although these were not able to reveal the 
dynamics of local interests, they provided important insights on the role of livelihood 
capitals in shaping farmers’ trajectories, as well as selection processes into SSC 
programmes. Life histories in particular proved to be an extremely rich source of data 
which also allowed triangulating and often correcting data collected during the shorter, 
structured interviews, as discussed in section 4.6.1.  
	 	
 180
This difference in the quality of data casts doubts on the reliability of the secondary 
survey data as well. Despite these quality concerns, however, it is concluded that the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative  methods can be particularly useful in 
illuminating the so far under-explored aspect of selection processes into social and 
economic interventions. In this study mixed methods were used to overcome the lack of 
existing theory on selection processes, by creatively sequencing qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis (see section 4.3). Triangulation and complementarity were 
then used to verify convergent findings and to explain contradictory ones.  
In retrospect, this research would have benefited from considering the entire network of 
labour and kinship relations surrounding a cocoa farm. This would mean collecting data 
from all the persons contributing labour to a single farm (i.e. farm owners, tenant 
farmers, sharecroppers, as well as all the wives working along their husbands or on their 
own account). By doing so, I could have gained a deeper understanding of the power 
relations revolving around cocoa production, as well as the dynamics of interests and 
their interplay with cocoa SSC programmes. Moreover, this thesis would also have 
benefited from a round of data collection during harvest time, when labour demand 
reach its peak and one can observe the full spectrum of people working on a single farm 
(e.g. relatives coming from the North, children taking a break from school to help their 
parents, or day labourers being hired to harvest cocoa). This is an extremely busy period 
for farmers and it can result challenging to conduct long interviews such as life 
histories. However, it is a fascinating time for observation and short, unstructured 
interviews as cocoa beans leave the farms, money is pouring in, and the community is 
buzzing with activity. Finally, this study would have benefited from sampling a greater 
number of farmers farming in more remote areas. This would have made the sample 
more representative by better capturing the part of cocoa producing population settled in 
the numerous Akuras around the research community and would have allowed further 
exploring the role of remoteness in the (self) selection of farmers in or out of 
development interventions. 
In terms of recommendation for future research in SSC initiatives, the mounting 
evidence of positive selection processes of producers in combination with the increasing 
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use of SSC in globalised mainstream markets raises serious concerns regarding the 
implications of who can access, participate and really benefit from such initiatives. As 
highlighted above, issues of both ethics and effectiveness come into play and future 
research should pay attention to both. The occurring shift from aid to market driven 
SSC programmes and the plunge of certified products into the mainstream (Lernoud et 
al., 2017; Potts et al., 2014; Paschall, 2013; COSA, 2013) calls for a greater 
consideration of the implications of commercial actors taking over the implementation 
of SSC programmes from aid and other not for profit actors.  
Moreover, this thesis has shown how the particular interests of the actors involved in 
SSC, the national institutional context, and even the personal characteristics of SSC 
programme gatekeepers, such as the propensity of a PC to assume financial risk and 
provide credit to farmers, shape the final outcome of who is in and who is out. Future 
research should therefore carefully consider the contextual factors at play in each 
specific case and consider certification as a “fluid term” rather than a “fixed 
idea” (Paschall, 2013:9). Overcoming the assumption that producers are a 
‘homogenous’ group with the same resources, abilities, and interests becomes crucial in 
this respect. This thesis has shown that farmers involved in cocoa production may differ 
substantially in terms of livelihood capitals and ability to pursue different livelihood 
strategies. These characteristics also determine the degree to which they can access, 
participate and finally benefit from SSC programmes. Such findings resonate with the 
historical dynamics of accumulation of the sector shown by previous studies on Ghana’s 
cocoa sector (e.g. Hill, 1963; Okali, 1983; Berry, 1993; Takane, 2002; Amanor, 2005) 
and discussed in section 2.4. Cocoa production has previously lead to varying degrees 
of land accumulation and wealth creation, with some farmers being able to significantly 
improve their socio-economic status, while others being “systematically excluded” from 
the profits resulting from cocoa commercialisation (Berry, 1993: 157-158). It should not 
be surprising, therefore, that the SSC programmes play into the same dynamics. This 
thesis has shown how certification related benefits tend to accrue to the farmers who 
already possess land and other livelihood capitals, even if not directly involved in cocoa 
farming (like the cases of absentee farmers receiving the certification premium 
indicate). For these reasons, focusing on the ‘invisible’ people contributing in certified 
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production, such as sharecroppers and their wives, should be a priority of future 
research into what certification can or cannot do and for whom. In this respect, the use 
of ANT (in combination with a more ethnographic approach) can be a powerful 
conceptual tool for disentangling the selection but also distributional dynamics of SSC 
programmes and grasping who is able to participate and benefit from certified markets 
and who is not. 
Taking into consideration that farmers are a differentiated and diverse group is 
fundamental also for future research in the Ghanaian cocoa sector in particular. There is 
a large body of literature on Ghana’s cocoa economy, nevertheless, very little work so 
far has focused on sharecroppers despite a widespread and fairly structured and 
established sharecropping system operating in the country for more than a century and 
involving both abunu and abusa arrangements (Okali, 1983; Robertson, 1987; Takane, 
2002). As Kolavalli and Vigneri (2017) note, sharecroppers tend to be under-represented 
in survey data because they do not get interviewed as non-decision makers. 
Nevertheless, a research (and policy) focus on the decision makers, i.e. the land owners, 
conceals the role of a wide range of people who despite lacking land ownership or 
entitlements, contribute heavily in Ghana’s cocoa production. Female and young 
farmers working on family or sharecropping farms are another example of ‘invisible’ 
farmers, both to research and policy, as are the wage workers employed on a daily and 
not permanent basis. Nevertheless, these people exist: they produce cocoa, are part of 
the cocoa growing communities, send cocoa remittances to their homelands for school 
fees and other investments. Omitting them from future studies implies failing to grasp 
an essential piece of the socio-economic and cultural mosaic that forms Ghana’s cocoa 
industry.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1:Selection determinants into SSC programmes (literature 
review) 
Determinant Significant Positive Significant Negative 
Land size/ land holding (ha)/ 
land property/ Crop area/ Crop 
area owned. Crop trees
Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap) 
Milford, 2014 (Mexico, 
Coffee, Fairtrade) 
Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade) 
Fort and Ruben, 2009 (Peru, 
Bananas, Fairtrade) 
Francesconi and Ruben, 2014 
(Tanzania, Coffee, Fairtrade) 
Subverie and Vagneron, 2013 
(Madagascar, Horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Asfaw, Mithöfer, and 
Waibel, 2007 (Kenya, 
horticulture,  
GlobalGap) 
Ruben and Fort, 2012 
(Peru, Coffee, Fairtrade)
Non-crop land owned Minten et al., 2015 
(Ethiopia, Coffee, Various)
Land fertility Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap)
Livestock Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap)
Equipment/ Machinery/ Farm 
asset index 
Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap) 
Mueller and Theuvsen, 2015 
(Guatemala, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Irrigation access Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade)
Farm enterprises Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Off-farm income/ Non-farm 
income
Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Jena et al., 2012 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Fairtrade)
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Credit  access Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade) 
Jena et al., 2012 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Fairtrade)
Radio use / owns a radio Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap) 
Milford, 2014 (Mexico, 
Coffee, Fairtrade)
Age/ Age of household head Ruben and Fort, 2012 (Peru, 
Coffee, Fairtrade) 
Minten et al., 2015 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Various)
Years of Schooling/ Education/ 
Education of household head/ 
literacy 
Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap) 
Jena et al., 2012 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Fairtrade) 
Minten et al., 2015 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Various) 
Subverie and Vagneron, 2013 
(Madagascar, Horticulture, 
GlobalGap) 
Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016 
(Kenya, Coffee,  UTZ & 
Fairtrade) 
Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade) 
Fort and Ruben, 2009 
(Peru, Bananas, Fairtrade)
Extension training Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Experience in crop production/ 
Farming experience  
Jena et al., 2012 (Ethiopia, 
Coffee, Fairtrade) 
Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016 
(Kenya, Coffee,  UTZ & 
Fairtrade) 
Mueller and Theuvsen, 
2015 (Guatemala, 
horticulture, GlobalGap)
Exportation experience Mueller and Theuvsen, 2015 
(Guatemala, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Changes in buyer/ 
intermediaries in the village 
Subverie and Vagneron, 2013 
(Madagascar, Horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Household size Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap)
Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade)
Household members working Milford, 2014 (Mexico, 
Coffee, Fairtrade)
Female household members Asfaw, Mithöfer, and Waibel, 
2007 (Kenya, horticulture,  
GlobalGap)
Determinant Significant Positive Significant Negative 
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Female headed household Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016 
(Kenya, Coffee,  UTZ & 
Fairtrade) 
Children household members Asfaw, Mithöfer, and 
Waibel, 2007 (Kenya, 
horticulture,  
GlobalGap)
Road distance/ Distance to 
nearest paved road 
Milford, 2014 (Mexico, 
Coffee, Fairtrade)
Distance to processment point Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016 
(Kenya, Coffee,  UTZ & 
Fairtrade) 
Distance from city centre/ 
nearest market/ Travel time to 
buyer   
Muriithi, Mburu and Ngigi, 
2011 (Kenya, horticulture, 
GlobalGap) 
Parvathi and Waibel, 2016 
(India, Black Pepper, 
Fairtrade) 
Fort and Ruben, 2009 (Peru, 
Bananas, Fairtrade)
Minten et al., 2015 
(Ethiopia, Coffee, Various) 
Van Rijsbergen et al. 2016 
(Kenya, Coffee,  UTZ & 
Fairtrade) 
Transportation costs Mueller and Theuvsen, 
2015 (Guatemala, 
horticulture, GlobalGap)
Determinant Significant Positive Significant Negative 
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Appendix 2: Interviews with industry informants 
Industry/ institution  Position of interviewee Interviewee Code 
Year of 
interview
N of 
interviews 
NGO A International advisor for 
sustainable agriculture 
Daniel 2016 1
NGO A International advisor for 
sustainable agriculture 
Daniel 2015 1
NGO B Programme Manager Derrick 2016 1
NGO B Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Manager 
Henry 2016 1
NGO B Senior Programme Officer Alfred 2016 1
NGO B Senior Programme Officer Frank 2015 1
NGO B Coordinator Paul 2015 1
National aid agency Head of Economic section Rebecca 2015 1
UN Organisation Forestry Management & 
Conversation Specialist
Julius 2016 1
Total aid actors 9
Auditing body A Country coordinator Maxwell 2016 1
Auditing body B Auditor Eric 2015 1
Auditing body C Auditor Patrick 2016 1
Private Consultant A Executive  Director Edward 2016 1
Private Consultant A Executive  Director Edward 2015 1
Private Consultant B Consultant  for certified  
POs and LBCs
Evans 2016 1
Standard Setter A Country representation Kofi 2016 1
Standard Setter B Partnerships and member 
services manager
Kwasi 2016 1
Standard Setter B Partnerships and member 
services manager
Kwasi 2015 1
Standard Setter C Liaison officer Emily 2016 1
Standard Setter D Region Manager Joel 2016 1
Total certification 
actors 
11
Chocolate company A Social responsibility 
programme manager 
William 2016 1
Chocolate company A Social responsibility 
programme manager 
William 2015 1
Chocolate company B Cocoa Life manager Mark 2016 1
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Chocolate company C Head raw materials and 
sustainability 
Bridget 2017 1
Cocoa trader A Cocoa Sustainable 
Sourcing Manager
Richard 2016 1
Cocoa trader A Cocoa Sustainable 
Sourcing Manager
Richard 2016 1
Multi-stakeholder 
industry institutions  Country coordinator 
Victor 2015 1
LBC A Sustainability programme 
manager
Sandra 2015 1
LBC B sustainability/certification 
manager
Ibrahim 2016 1
LBC C Special assistant to the 
MD
Collins 2016 1
LBC D District Manager Bernard 2016 1
LBC E Regional Sustainability 
Officer
Alexander  2016 1
LBC F CEO Gideon 2016 1
LBC D Communications Officer Jacob 2016 1
Total cocoa-chocolate 
actors 
14
COCOBOD A Research, Monitoring & 
Evaluation Director 
2015 1
COCOBOD B Project Coordination Unit 
manager 
Mike 2016 1
COCOBOD C Cocoa Health and 
Extension Division 
manager
Felix 2015 1
COCOBOD D Agricultural Extentionist Elizabeth 2016 1
Total government 
actors
4
Research institute Senior Research Fellow Seth 2015 1
Total research actors 1
Asunafo North PO Board Adam 2015 1
Kukuom PO Board Rauf 2015 1
Suhum PO Board Benjamin 2015 1
Osino PO Board George 2015 1
Total POs 4
Total number of interviews 43
Industry/ institution  Position of interviewee Interviewee Code 
Year of 
interview
N of 
interviews 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire used for structured interviews  
Individual Question Sheet 
1. Getting to know the farmer 
1.1.Name (a) and Community (b) 
1.2.Respondent’s sex (1=male, 2=female) 
1.3.What is your age? (Record in years) 
1.4.What is the highest level of education that you have completed?  
1=none, 2=primary, 3=Middle/JSS, 4=SSS/Tech/Com, 5=Post sec/Nursing/Poly/Train'g 
col. 6=Higher 
1.5.What is your marital status? 
1= single, 2=single parent, 3=married, 4=divorced, 5=widowed, 6=domestic 
partnership, 7=other 
1.6.Including yourself, how many people live in your home – those who eat and 
sleep there regularly? (record number)? 
1.7.What is your religion? 
1.8.To which ethnic group do you belong? 
1= Asante, 2=Akwapim, 3=Fanti, 4=Other Akan, 5=Ga-Adangbe, 6=Ewe, 7=Guan, 
8=Nzema, 9=Hausa, 10=Dagomba, 11= Mamprusi, 12=Gonja, 13= Grusssi/Frafra, 14= 
Dagarti, 15=Kusasi, 16= Kassena-Nankani, 17=Konkomba, 18=Namumba, 19=Builsa, 
20=Other (Specify) 
1.9.Where you born here? 
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1= indigene (born here), 2=migrant (born here), 3= Not born here  
1.10.If not born here, how long ago did you move to this place? 
a. Years b. months 
1.11.Where have you migrated from? 
1= Ashanti, 2=B.Ahafo, 3=Central, 4=Eastern, 5=G,Accra, 6=Northern, 7=Upper East, 
8=Upper West, 9=Volta, 10=Western, 11= Outside village (this district), 12=Outside 
district (this region) 
2. Cocoa farming 
2.1 How many cocoa farms do you cultivate? (Record number) 
a. record number, b. record size in acres 
2.2 How did you obtain the use of each farm? 
1= inherited farm from father, 2=inherited farm form mother's family, 3= received farm 
as gift, 4= inherited farm from husband/wife, 5=purchased farm, 6= inherited land from 
father, 7=inherited land form mother's family, 8= received land as gift, 9= inherited land 
from husband/wife, 10=purchased land,  11= Abusa, 12= Abono, 13=Other 
sharecropping agreement (specify), 14= Farm is/was pledged, 15= allocated by 
government, 16= other (specify) 
2.3 How many bags did each farm produce last year?  
3. Labour and non-labour inputs 
3.1 Do you have a sharecropper for any of these farms? (Record contractual 
arrangement for corresponding farms) 
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3.2 Did you use any household labour in the last 12 months for any of these farms? 
(record tasks: 0=No,  1=land preparation, 2= planting, 3= Maintenance (Weeding), 4= 
Applying Inputs, 5= Harvesting  
3.3 Did you employ any paid labour in the last 12 months? 
(record tasks: 0=No, 1=land preparation, 2= planting, 3= Maintenance (Weeding), 4= 
Applying Inputs, 5= Harvesting  
3.4 Did you use any of the following inputs in the last 12 months? 
1=fertilizer, 2=insecticides, 3=spray machine, 4=other  
4. Cocoa Marketing 
4.1 Can you tell me the number of PCs you sold your cocoa to in the last crop season? 
(Record corresponding LBC) 
4.2 Did any of these PCs provide any credit? 
a. amount of credit b. use of credit 
4.3 Did any of  these PCs provide any inputs on credit? 
4.4 Do you currently owe to any PC? 
4.5 What price did you get last time from these PCs for each bag sold? 
4.6  Are you participating in any certification programme? 
a. Name of Programme  b. Joined since (Year)  
4.7 Can you tell me how/why you have joined this certification programme?  
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5. Non-Cocoa Income 
5.1.Apart from cocoa do you have any other sources of income? 
1=None, 2=Pension, 3=Other cash crops, 4= remittances, 5= help from other family 
members, 6= professional, 7= shop, 8=other  no agric occupation. 
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Appendix 4: Protocol for life history interviews  
1. Protocol for Oral Consent to be recorded: 
A. Explain the objective of the research. 
B. Explain the nature of the individual’s requested participation. 
C. Read the following statements to the individual: 
• You are under no obligation to participate in this research – your involvement 
should be completely voluntary. Do you understand?  
• You are free to stop or leave the interview at any time and for any reason. Do you 
understand? 
• We will anonymise all information you provide. Your identity will be hidden – there 
will be no links between the information and you. This is to protect your right to 
privacy. Do you understand? 
• If we take any pictures of you, your home or your work environment, we will only 
use these pictures in future research reports or publications with your consent. Do 
you understand? 
D. Ask the individual: 
• Do you understand all of these statements? Do you have any questions about them? 
• Do you agree to participate in the research on this basis? 
2. Facilitation of life histories 
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Can you please tell me your life story. All the experiences and the events which were 
important for you (as a cocoa farmer) up to now.  
• Start wherever you like 
• Please take the time you need 
• I'll just listen first, I will not interrupt 
• I will just take some notes in case I have further questions for after you've 
finished telling me about it all.  
3. Issues to explore  
1. Family life: Marriages, deaths, children, loans and village collections  
2. Economic life: inheritance and loans, acquisition of land and other assets.  
3. Cocoa farming life: How cocoa farming started, how cocoa farm was acquired, 
upgrading and expansion strategies in terms of cocoa farming land; future plans 
regarding cocoa farming  
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Appendix 5: Interviews with farmers  
Name Sex Age Schooling Labour sellers 
farmers  (Group 
A)/ Labour 
buyers  (Group 
B)  
Land 
entitlements 
Certification 
Programme 
Coco
a Life
Tout
on-
PBC
Aisha F 27
Primary 
School Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No  No
Abdulai M 29
No 
Schooling Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No No
Mustapha M 32
No 
Schooling Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No No
Patrick
M 33
Junior High 
School Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No No
Loretta F 35
No 
Schooling Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No No 
Moses M 37
No 
Schooling Sharecropper
 Abunu in 
process No Yes
Kwasi 
M 39
Junior High 
School Sharecropper
 Abunu in 
process Yes Yes
Alhassan M 39
No 
Schooling Sharecropper 
No land 
entitlements Yes No
Dennis
M 41
Senior High 
School Sharecropper
No land 
entitlements No No 
Josephin
e F 42
No 
Schooling 
Sharecropper’s 
wife
 Abunu in 
process No No 
Emelia F 42
No 
Schooling Sharecropper 
 Abunu in 
process No No
Yvonne F 50
No 
schooling 
Ex-
sharecropper 
Owner 
(completed 
abunu) Yes No
Anita F 53
No 
Schooling 
Ex-
Sharecropper
Abunu in 
process Yes No 
Obed M 55
Primary 
School Sharecropper 
 Abunu in 
process Yes Yes
Kwame 
M 60
No 
Schooling Sharecropper
Owner 
(completed 
abunu) Yes No
Farm 
Owners 

(Group 

Kofi 
M 48
No 
schooling Family labour 
Owner 
(completed 
abunu) Yes No 
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Farm 
Owners 

(Group B)
Madia 
F 33
Junior High 
School Family labour Owner’s wife No No 
King
M 45
Junior High 
School N/A
Owner 
(inheritance- 
land on press) Yes No 
Owusu
M 58
Junior High 
School Family labour 
Owner 
(inheritance) Yes Yes
Nora F 38
Primary 
school Family labour 
Abunu in 
process Yes No 
Ebenezer
M 55
Junior High 
School Sharecropping 
Owner 
(completed 
abunu) No Yes
Constanc
e F 54
Junior High 
School Sharecropping 
Owner 
(inheritance & 
purchase) Yes No 
Christian
M 53
Junior High 
School Sharecropping 
Owner 
(inheritance) Yes Yes
Lisa 
F 34
Junior High 
School Family labour 
Owner’s wife & 
abut in process Yes Yes
Clement
M 43
Junior High 
School Shareropping 
Owner 
(inheritance,  
purchase, 
Abono) Yes No 
Ama F 50
No 
schooling Sharecropping Owner’s wife Yes No 
Joseph 
M 56
Junior High 
School Sharecropping 
Owner 
(completed 
abunu) Yes Yes
Solomon 
M 60
Junior High 
School Sharecropping 
Owner 
(inheritance) Yes No 
Angela
F 53
Junior High 
School Family labour 
Owner 
(inheritance) Yes No 
Felix 
M 62
Junior High 
School
No use of 
labour 
Owner 
(inheritance) No No 
Name Sex Age Schooling Labour sellers 
farmers  (Group 
A)/ Labour 
buyers  (Group 
B)  
Land 
entitlements 
Certification 
Programme 
Coco
a Life
Tout
on-
PBC
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Appendix 6: List of interviews informing the content analysis 
Actor category Type of institution Number of interviews 
Cocoa & chocolate industry Chocolate manufacturers 1
Cocoa processors and traders 1
Multi-stakeholder industry 
institutions  
1
LBCs 4
Cocobod 2
Aid industry NGOs 5
UN 1
Certification industry Standard Setters 3
Private consultants 1
Total 19
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Appendix 7: Example of coding process for the content analysis  
Meaning unit Condensed 
meaning unit 
Code Sub-category Category 
“They concentrated in the 
areas where they could 
have more cocoa. This 
district produces more 
cocoa.
Interest in areas 
with more 
cocoa 
Local cocoa 
production 
capacity 
Cocoa 
production 
volumes 
Volumes
“There was a bush fire, so 
this is how come they lost 
a to of cocoa, but now 
they are rejuvenating. So 
we don't have much cocoa 
here. So it does not make 
business sense. “
Young farms 
not fully 
productive 
Trees too young Cocoa 
production 
volumes 
Volumes
“LBCs look where they 
can get big groups of 
farms, where they can get 
a lot of beans, a lot of 
farms to operate.”
Big groups of 
farms together 
Concentration 
of farms 
Concentration 
of cocoa 
volumes 
Volumes 
“They set the projects 
where they think they can 
get the cocoa volumes. So 
in terms of placement, I 
would say it depends on 
their [sourcing] capacity 
or strength”
Sourcing 
capacity or 
strength 
LBC capacity to 
source cocoa 
volumes 
Capacity to 
source volumes 
Volumes 
“And for the private 
sector, we realised that 
their main focus was first 
and foremost on where 
they can achieve the 
highest or the biggest 
volumes, where the 
farmers were committed, 
because you know the 
competition is so much” 
Farmer’s 
commitment to 
beat 
competition 
Sourcing 
capacity & 
farmers’ loyalty 
Capacity to 
source volumes 
Volumes 
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“Programme placement 
depends on volume 
expectations. Cargill, or 
any other buying 
company sets targets for 
volumes, i.e. 20,000 of 
certified beans. The buyer 
will guarantee selling 
these beans as certified, 
the LBC will chose areas 
that can produce these 
volumes”. 
Production and 
sourcing 
capacity needs 
to match 
demand for 
certified beans
LBC capacity to 
match volumes 
to demand
Capacity to 
source volumes 
Volumes 
Meaning unit Condensed 
meaning unit 
Code Sub-category Category 
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Appendix 8: Description of variables (access to Kuapa Kokoo) 
Variable Definition and measurement
Dependent Variable
Kuapa Kokoo access 1= if farmer has access to Kuapa Kokoo, 
0=if not 
Cocoa sold (kg) Kgs of cocoa sold during the previous 12 
months 
Area of cocoa plot (ha) Total area of land used for cocoa farming 
(ha) 
N of buyers Number of LBCs the farmer sold the cocoa 
to in the last crop season
N of LBCs in village Number of LBCs operating in the village 
(excluding Kuapa Kokoo)
Years in village Years of residence of household head in the 
village
Savings (Yes:1) 1= if farmer saved money in the last 12 
months for planting material and/or new 
equipment, 0= if not 
Years of schooling Household head years of schooling (years)
Household size Number of household members
Adult household labour (days) Number of adult household members labour 
days per year (days)
Caretaker (Yes:1) 1= if the farmer has a sharecropper, 0= if 
not
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 1= if household has other sources of 
income, 0= if not 
N of Livestock (sheep & goats) Number of sheep and goats owned by the 
farmer
Sex (Male:1) 1= if household head is male, 0=if 
household head is female
Child labour (days) Number of child labour days per year (days)
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Appendix 9:Patterns of missing values (access to Kuapa Kokoo).  
The effect of missing data on qualitative analysis can be serious, particularly if the omission of 
data is not random but systematic (Dong and Peng, 2013). For this reason, patterns of missing 
data were investigated in order to assert whether data were missing in a systematic way and 
therefore posing a validity threat to the analysis. Following Humphries (no date) the 
questionnaire used by the GCFS was examined to assert whether the variables with the most 
missing values (i.e. cocoa sold; adult household work; non-cooca income) were linked to any 
skip pattern in the questionnaire. It was concluded that this was not the case. Moreover the 
patterns of missing data were investigated in State using the command mvpatterns. This showed 
that most observations  w miss data on only one variable, with only 9 observations missing data 
on two variables (different combinations). Finally, data were visually inspected to explore 
whether there were any links between missing observations and other variables of interest (i.e. 
access to Kuapa Kokoo, farm size, gender, etc.). Again, no systematic pattern was detected. 
Therefore, the author concludes that data are missing at random and therefore pose no validity 
risk to the analysis. 
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Appendix 10: Descriptive statistics, by district (access to Kuapa Kokoo) 
Descriptive statistics, Ashanti
Ashanti 
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Cocoa sold (kg) 110 1044.927 1072.658 30 5000
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 118 4.936 4.392 0.180 27.924
N of buyers 118 1.381 0.5534 1 3
Number of LBCs in village 118 2.661 1.322 1 6
Years in village 118 49.042 19.922 4.000 85.000
Savings (Yes:1) 118 0.381 0.4877 0 1.000
Years of schooling 118 6.746 4.946 0.000 15.000
Household size 118 7.593 2.756 2.000 13.000
Adult household  labour 
(days)
111 78.98 97.43 0.000 448
Caretaker (Yes:1) 117 0.3932 0.4905 0.000 1.000
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 104 0.923 0.267 0.000 1.000
N of Livestock (sheep & 
goats) 118 3.016 7.284 0 55
Sex (Male:1) 117 0.795 0.406 0.000 1.000
Child labour (days) 118 6.245 28 0.000 254
Descriptive statistics, Brong Ahafo
Brong Ahafo
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Cocoa sold (kg) 98 1003.857 1008.723 62.5 5750
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 111 5.794 5.809 0.135 36.827
N of buyers 111 1.387 0.6898 1 6
Number of LBCs in 
village
111 2.685 1.321 1 6
Years in village 109 34.073 20.185 2.000 98.000
Savings (Yes:1) 110 0.3727 0.4857 0.000 1.000
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Years of schooling 110 4.664 4.884 0.000 14.000
Household size 111 6.973 2.798 1.000 13.000
Adult household  labour 
(days)
108 87.40 0.000 576 262
Caretaker (Yes:1) 111 0.1622 0.3702 0.000 1.000
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 107 0.869 0.338 0.000 1.000
N of Livestock (sheep & 
goats) 111 5.828 9.224 0 46
Sex (Male:1) 111 0.829 0.378 0.000 1.000
Child labour (days) 111 11.45 35,05 0.000 320
Descriptive statistics, Brong Ahafo
Brong Ahafo
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Descriptive statistics, Western Region
Western
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Cocoa sold (kg) 231 1500.531 1722.488 5 11875
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 263 7.036 6.380 0.275 40.065
N of buyers 263 1.513 0.775 1 5
Number of LBCs in village 263 3.639 1.385 1 6
Years in village 262 35.992 17.922 1.000 90.000
Savings (Yes:1) 263 0.5323 0.4999 0.000 1.000
Years of schooling 262 7.279 4.272 0.000 16.000
Household size 263 6.426 2.493 1.000 14.000
Adult household  labour 
(days)
261 83.81 122.13 0.000 786
Caretaker (Yes:1) 261 0.2644 0.4418 0.000 1.000
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 255 0.819 0.385 0.000 1.000
N of Livestock (sheep & 
goats) 263 4.961 10.476 0 80
Sex (Male:1) 263 0.847 359794 0.000 1.000
Child labour (days) 262 7.85 24.8 0 198
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Appendix 11: Mean characteristics by access status, Ashanti region
Mean characteristics by access status, Ashanti
Non-access Access
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev T-test p-value
Cocoa sold (kg) 110 746.2 903.202 1132.79 1107.06 -2.296** 0.0217
Ha of cocoa plot 118 5.024 4.629 4.91 4.349 -0.192 0.8480
N of buyers 118 1.115 0.326 1.456 0.58 -2.83*** 0.0047
N of LBCs in 
village*
118 1.5 0.7616 1.9891 1.2623 -1.547 0.1219
Years in village 118 41.846 19.847 51.076 19.573 -2.219** 0.0265
Savings (Yes:1) 118 0.3846 0.496 -0.3804 0.488 0.0015 0.969
Years of schooling 118 7.115 5.1948 6.641 4.898 0.101 0.9197
Household size 118 7.5 3.228 7.62 2.63 -0.036 0.9713
Adult household 
labour (days)
111 41.956 47.278 88.659 104.78 -1.621 0.1050
Caretaker (Yes:1) 117 0.4615 0.5084 0.374 0.4864 0.655 0.418
Non cocoa income 
(Yes:1)
104 0.9545 0.213 0.9146 0.2811 0.3891 0.533
N of Livestock 
(sheep & goats) 
118 4.7692 6.9242 2.5217 7.3432 2.411** 0.0159
Sex (Male:1) 117 0.84 0.374 0.7826 0.415 0.397 0.529
Child labour (days) 118 0.038 12.8077 7.152 30.976 -1.037 0.2997
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo / Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-
score./*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 12: Mean characteristics by access status, Brong Ahafo region
Mean characteristics by access status, Brong Ahafo 
Non-access Access
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev T-test p-
value
Cocoa sold (kg) 98 888.6724 794.281 1170.87 1249.14 -0.977 0.329
Ha of cocoa plot 111 5.365 5.315 6.498 6.545 -1.290 0.197
N of buyers 111 1.304 0.523 1.524 0.89 -1.418 0.156
N o f L B C s i n 
village*
111 2.0579 0.8555 2.7143 1.3119 -2.545**
*
0.010
9
Years in village 109 31.955 19.542 37.585 20.979 -1.392 0.164
Savings (Yes:1) 110 0.3478 0.4797 0.415 0.499 0.4910 0.483
Years of schooling 110 3.1176 4.389 7.166 4.643 -4.116*** 0.000
Household size 111 6.3188 2.887 8.048 2.295 -3.04*** 0.002
Adul t househo ld 
labour (days)
108 92.651 109.429 109.357 113.368 -1.163 0.245
Caretaker (Yes:1) 111 0.1159 0.3225 0.2381 0.4311 2.867* 0.090
Non cocoa income 
(Yes:1)
107 0.8261 0.3818 0.9474 0.226 3.1695** 0.075
N of Livestock 
(sheep & goats) 
111 6.4782 10.2808 4.7619 7.1493 0.378 0.706
Sex (Male:1) 111 0.768 0.425 0.928 0.261 4.7379** 0.030
Child labour (days) 111 9.579 20.38 14.524 50.906 0.561 0.574
6
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo /Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-
score./ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 13: Mean characteristics by access status, Western  region 
Mean characteristics by access status, Western region
Non-access Access
Obs 
Mean St.dev Mean St.dev T-test p-value
Cocoa sold (kg) 231 1444.836 1638.86 1540.85 1785.57 -1.06 0.289
Ha of cocoa plot 263 5.9698 5.9017 7.8394 6.6237 -3.46*** 0.005
N of buyers 263 1.3894 0.6187 1.6067 0.8662 -1.8* 0.0718
N of LBCs in 
village*
263 2.7079 1.1777 3.34 1.0857 -4.598*** 0.0000
Years in village 262 37.1504 18.6036 35.1141 17.3989 0.844 0.3987
Savings (Yes:1) 263 0.5664 0.4978 0.5067 0.5016 0.9228 0.337
Years of schooling 262 6.4107 4.6159 7.9266 3.8861 -2.471** 0.0135
Household size 263 6.1504 2.515 6.6333 2.4643 -1.714* 0.0866
Adult household 
labour (days)
261 85.0536 142.998 82.88 104.364 -0.999 0.3176
Caretaker (Yes:1) 261 0.2212 0.4169 0.2973 0.4586 1.9060 0.167
Non cocoa income 
(Yes:1)
255 0.8125 0.3921 0.8252 0.3811 0.0682 0.794
N of Livestock 
(sheep & goats) 
263 4.8584 8.1458 5.04 11.9618 1.978** 0.0480
Sex (Male:1) 263 0.8495 0.3591 0.8467 0.3615 0.0042 0.948
Child labour (days) 262 10.3125 29.2149 6.0067 20.8145 1.582 0.1137
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo /Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-
score./*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 14: Results of Shapiro Will test (access to Kuapa Kokoo) 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
Cocoa sold (kg) 439 0.69002 92.759 10.825 0.00000
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 492 0.74058 86.007 10.700 0.00000
N of buyers 492 0.92953 23.362 7.569 0.00000
N of LBCs in village* 492 0.98641 4.506 3.616 0.00015
Years in village 489 0.98191 5.965 4.289 0.00000
Years of schooling 490 0.90054 32.854 8.387 0.00000
Household size 492 0.99232 2.547 2.246 0.01235
Adult household labour (days) 480 0.72648 88.689 10.762 0.00000
Livestock 492 0.71877 93.239 10.894 0.00000
Child labour (days) 491 0.49777 166.204 12.281 0.00000
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo 
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Appendix 15: Statistically non-significant results (access to Kuala Kokoo) 
Dependent variable:  Farmer has access to  Kuapa Kokoo (1=yes)
Full Sample 
(1)
Ashanti 
(2)
Brong Ahafo 
(3)
Western 
(4)
Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME
Cocoa 
sold 
(kg)
-2.88e-05 -9.90e-06 0.00017 3.57e-05 -0.000204 -4.67e-05 -3.28e-05 -1.08e-05
(6.41e-05) (2.20e-05) (0.0002) (4.53e-05) (0.000230) (5.18e-05) (7.92e-05) (2.60e-05)
Ha of 
cocoa 
plot
0.00760 0.00261 -0.0720 -0.0148 -0.0220 -0.00503 0.0257 0.00846
(0.0153) (0.00524) (0.0484) (0.00988) (0.0292) (0.00657) (0.0209) (0.00681)
Saving
s (Yes:
1)
-0.0640 -0.0220 -0.152 -0.0314 0.639 0.146 -0.288 -0.0950
(0.142) (0.0489) (0.360) (0.0752) (0.430) (0.0948) (0.197) (0.0640)
Non 
cocoa 
income 
(Yes:1)
0.223 0.0766 -0.500 -0.103 0.388 0.0887 0.220 0.0724
(0.202) (0.0693) (0.592) (0.124) (0.619) (0.138) (0.250) (0.0819)
Child 
labour 
(days)
-0.000903 -0.000311 0.00041 8.52e-05 0.00796 0.00182 -0.00309 -0.00102
(0.00229) (0.000788) (0.0142) (0.00293) (0.00645) (0.00149) (0.00351) (0.00115)
Observ
ations
396 396 92 92 87 87 217 217
Pseudo 
R²
0.1086 0.2528 0.3876 40.04
Wald 
chi² 
56.39 27.17 42.31 40.04
Prob>c
hi²
0.0000 0.0183 0.0001 0.0003
% 
correct
ly 
predict
ed 
65.66% 83.70% 81.61% 70.05%
* Excludes Kuapa Kokoo. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for Probit Coeff. Standard 
errors in parentheses for Predicted. prob. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 16: SSC programmes by cocoa district and certification scheme  
Region Cocoa 
District 
Fairtarde Rainforest 
Alliance 
Utz Total 
Ashanti Agona Kuapa Kokoo 1
Ampenim Kuapa Kokoo 1
Antoakrom Kuapa Kokoo; 
Cooperative 
Amansie West
Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
3
Bekwai Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom 2
Effiduase Kuapa Kokoo 1
Juaso Kuapa Kokoo PBC & 
Touton 
2
Konongo Kuapa Kokoo Kuapa 
Kokoo
2
Tepa Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom; 
Kokoo pa & 
FEDCO 
3
Mankranso Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom 2
New 
Edubiase 
Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom; 
Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc 
3
Nkawie Kuapa Kokoo Yara Glover Cargill; PBC 
& Touton ; 
Kokoo pa & 
FEDCO 
7
Nsokote Kuapa Kokoo PBC & 
Touton 
2
Nyinahin Kuapa Kokoo 1
Obuasi Kuapa Kokoo Conservation 
Alliance 
Agro Ecom; 
Agro Ecomm 
& AA; PBC 
& Touton 
5
Offinso Kuapa Kokoo PBC & 
Touton (2); 
Kuapa 
Kokoo 
4
Brong 
Ahafo 
Asumura Kuapa Kokoo 1
Dormaa Kuapa Kokoo 1
	 	
 248
Goaso/Mim Kuapa Kokoo; 
Cooperative  
Asuanfo North 
PBC & 
Touton 
3
Hwidiem Kokoo pa & 
FEDCO 
1
Kasapin Kuapa Kokoo PBC & 
Touton 
2
Kukuom Kuapa Kokoo 1
N’kwanta 0
Sunyani Agro Ecom 
& AA; PBC 
& Touton
2
Sankore Kuapa Kokoo 1
Central Asikuma Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom 
& AA; Agro 
Ecom 
3
Assin Breku Kuapa Kokoo 1
Cape Coast Kuapa Kokoo Conservation 
Alliance 
2
Assin Fosu Kuapa Kokoo Olam & 
Conservation 
Alliance; 
Conservation 
Alliance  
Agro Ecom 
& AA; Mars, 
GIZ & Agro-
Eco
5
Nyinase Kuapa Kokoo 1
Twifo Praso Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
2
Ag. Swear Kuapa Kokoo 1
Eastern Achiase Kuapa Kokoo 1
Asamankese Kuapa Kokoo; 
Cooperative 
West Akim
Agro Ecom 3
Kade 0
Kibi/
Anyinam 
Kuapa Kokoo; 
Cooperative 
Fanteakwa
2
K’dua/Tafo Kuapa Kokoo; 
Cooperative 
New Juaben
Region Cocoa 
District 
Fairtarde Rainforest 
Alliance 
Utz Total 
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Nkawkaw Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom
Akim oda Kuapa Kokoo Agro Ecom 2
Ak. Akoase 0
Ak. Ofoase Kuapa Kokoo 1
Suhum Kuapa Kokoo; 
Yayra Glover 
& Agro-Eco; 
Cooperative 
Suhum 
Agro Ecom 
(2); Yayra 
Glover 
6
Western 
North 
Adabokrom Kuapa Kokoo 1
Akontombra Kuapa Kokoo 1
S/Anhwiaso Cargill 1
Asawinso Kuapa Kokoo Cargill 2
Asempaneye Kuapa Kokoo 1
B/Nkwanta Kuapa Kokoo PBC & 
Touton 
2
Debiso Kuapa Kokoo 1
Essam Olam & 
Conservation 
Alliance; 
Conservation 
Alliance  
1
Fosukrom Kuapa Kokoo 1
Bodi Kuapa Kokoo 1
Juabeso Kuapa Kokoo Olam & 
Conservation 
Alliance; 
Conservation 
Alliance  
2
S/Wiaso Kuapa Kokoo Olam & 
Conservation 
Alliance; 
Conservation 
Alliance  
Cargill ; 
Olam 
2
S/Bekwai Kuapa Kokoo Cargill 2
S/Kaase 0
Western 
South 
Ag. Amemfi Kuapa Kokoo 1
Region Cocoa 
District 
Fairtarde Rainforest 
Alliance 
Utz Total 
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Asakragwa Kuapa Kokoo Mars, GIZ & 
Agro-Eco; 
Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc; 
FEDCO
4
Bogoso Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
2
Diaso Kuapa Kokoo 1
Dunkwa Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
2
Enchi Kuapa Kokoo 1
Dadieso Kuapa Kokoo 1
M/Amanfi Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
2
Samreboi Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodities 
Ghana Ltc
2
Tarkwa Kuapa Kokoo 1
Takoradi Cooperative 
Mpohor wassa
Olam & 
Conservation 
Alliance
2
W/ Akropong Kuapa Kokoo Unicom 
Commodties 
Ghana Ltd
2
Volta Hohoe 0
Region Cocoa 
District 
Fairtarde Rainforest 
Alliance 
Utz Total 
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Appendix 17: Shapiro Will test for cocoa volumes and LBC presence 
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
Average cocoa volumes purchased 
between 2010-2015 (tons) by 
cocoa  district 
68 0.87952 7.243 4.299 0.00001
Number of LBCs by cocoa district 68 0.99305 0.418 -1.894 0.97086
Number of certification 
programmes by cocoa district 
68 0.88746 6.766 4.151 0.00002
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Appendix 18: Description of variables (Kuapa Kokoo membership) 
Variable Definition and measurement
Dependent Variable
Kuapa Kokoo membership 1= if member of Kuapa Kokoo, 0=if not a 
member
Independent Variables
Area of cocoa plot (ha) Total area of land used for cocoa farming 
(ha) 
Owned land/total land (%) Percentage of land owned over total land 
used (%)  
Age Household head age (years)
Sex (Male:1) 1= if household head is male, 0=if 
household head is female
Years of schooling (n) Household head years of schooling (years)
Household labour contribution (days) Number of household labour days per year 
(days)
Caretaker (Yes:1) 1= if the farmer has a sharecropper, 0= if not
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 1= if household has other sources of income, 
0= if not 
Livestock (n) Number of sheep and goats owned by the 
farmer
Farming equipment (Yes:1) 1= if farmer owns tree felling equipment , 
0= if not
Savings (Yes:1) 1= if farmer saved money in the last 12 
months for planting material and/or new 
equipment, 0= if not 
Loans (Yes:1) 1= if farmer has ever borrowed money, 0=if 
not
Years in village Years of residence of household head in the 
village
N of buyers Number of LBCs the farmer sold the cocoa 
to in the last crop season
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Appendix 19: Descriptive statistics(Kuapa Kooko membership)  
Full sample
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 284 6.6924 6.093 0.135 40.065
Owned land as a share of total 
land (%)
284 0.87 0.28 0 1
Age 282 50.75 14.70 22 98
Household head sex (Male:1) 284 0.84 0.37 0 1
Years of schooling (n) 284 7.4 4.37 0 16
Household labour contribution 
(days)
280 94.24 111.35 0 642
Caretaker (Yes:1) 281 0.313 0.465 0 1
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 263 0.87 0.336 0 1
Livestock (n) 284 4.18 10.07 0 80
Farming equipment (Yes:1) 280 0.125 0.33 0 1
Savings (Yes:1) 283 0.45 0.5 0 1
Loans (Yes:1) 282 0.54 0.50 0 1
Years in village 282 40.68 19.98 1 98
N of buyers 284 1.55 0.79 1 6
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Appendix 20: Descriptive statistics, by region (Kuapa Kooko membership)  
Obs Ashanti 
Mean St.dev Min Max
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 92 4.68 4.25 0.18 27.92
Owned land/total land (%) 92 0.88 0.27 0 1
Age 91 59.1 14.89 24 81
Sex (Male:1) 92 0.80 0.40 0 1
Years of schooling (n) 92 6.84 4.82 0 14
Household labour contribution 
(days)
88
98.16 118.6
1
0 621
Caretaker (Yes:1) 91 0.37 0.49 0 1
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 82 0.91 0.29 0 1
Livestock (n) 92 2.6 7.57 0 55
Farming equipment (Yes:1) 92 0.081 0.27 0 1
Savings (Yes:1) 92 0.38 0.49 0 1
Loans (Yes:1) 91 0.45 0.5 0 1
Years in village 92 50.88 19.87 4 81
N of buyers 92 1.45 0.59 1 3
Brong Ahafo
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 42 6.88 6.77 0.135 36.82
Owned land/total land (%) 42 0.83 0.32 0 1
Age 42 51.84 15 29 98
Sex (Male:1) 42 0.95 0.23 0 1
Years of schooling (n) 42 7.34 4.69 0 14
Household labour contribution 
(days)
42 114 116.84 0 510
Caretaker (Yes:1) 42 0.24 0.43 0 1
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 38 0.94 0.24 0 1
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Livestock (n) 42 5.26 7.34 0 25
Farming equipment (Yes:1) 40 0.053 0.23 0 1
Savings (Yes:1) 41 0.42 0.5 0 1
Loans (Yes:1) 42 0.5 0.50 0 1
Years in village 41 38.76 21.3 3 98
N of buyers 42 1.53 0.92 1 6
Brong Ahafo
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Western
Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 150 7.68 6.15 1.011 37.23
Owned land/total land (%) 150 0.88 0.26 0 1
Age 149 45.35 12.22 22 83
Sex (Male:1) 150 0.85 0.35 0 1
Years of schooling (n) 150 8.05 3.8 0 16
Household labour contribution (days) 150 84.2 101.86 0 642
Caretaker (Yes:1) 148 0.30 0.46 0 1
Non cocoa income (Yes:1) 143 0.84 0.37 0 1
Livestock (n) 150 5.14 12.17 0 80
Farming equipment (Yes:1) 148 0.17 0.37 0 1
Savings (Yes:1) 150 0.52 0.50 0 1
Loans (Yes:1) 149 0.59 0.49 0 1
Years in village 149 34.71 17.27 1 81
N of buyers 150 1.58 0.86 1 5
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Appendix 21: Mean characteristics by membership status, Ashanti region  
Non- member Member T-test 
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev
(1) Area of cocoa plot (ha) 92 6.077 5.357 3.639 2.343 2.523**
(2)
Owned land/total land 
(%)
92 0.902 0.242 0.855 0.311 0.166
(3) Age 91 61.687 12.988 56.465 15.881 1.353
(4) Sex (Male:1) 92 0.8125 0.394 0.75 0.438 0.527
(5) Years of schooling (n) 92 7.083 4.889 6.159 4.917 0.950
(6)
H o u s e h o l d l a b o u r 
contribution (days)
88 126.13 136.878 63.286 82.908 2.128**
(7) Caretaker (Yes:1) 91 0.458 0.503 0.279 0.454 3.114*
(8)
Non cocoa income (Yes:
1)
82 0.952 0.215 0.875 0.335 1.571
(9) Livestock (n) 92 2.79 8.939 2.227 5.157 -0.515
(10) Farming equipment (Yes:1) 92 0.021 0.144 0.159 0.369 5.527**
(11) Savings (Yes:1) 92 0.458 0.503 0.295 0.461 2.584*
(12) Loans (Yes:1) 91 0.479 0.505 0.465 0.505 0.018
( 1 3
)
Years in village 92 54.958 18.355 46.84 20.18 1.901*
(14) N of buyers 92 1.3125 0.55 1.614 0.579 -2.731***
Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-score.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 22: Mean characteristics by membership status, Western region 
Non- member Member T-Test
Obs Mean St.dev Mean St.dev
(1) Ha of cocoa plot 150 7.040 5.54 9.70 8.42 -1.633
(2)
Owned land/total land 
(%)
150 0.88 0.265 0.894 0.238 -0.088
(3) Age 149 44.028 11.22 49.2 13.811 -2.04**
(4) Sex (Male:1) 150 0.886 0.32 0.755 0.435 4.11**
(5) Years of schooling (n) 150 7.809 3.821 8.2 4.065 -0.608
(6)
H o u s e h o l d l a b o u r 
contribution (days)
150 75.61 98.568 119.87 120.09 -2.42**
(7) Caretaker (Yes:1) 148 0.257 0.439 0.395 0.495 2.789*
(8)
Non cocoa income (Yes:
1)
143 0.851 0.357 0.762 0.431 1.65
(9) Livestock (n) 150 4.381 10.186 6.577 15.357 -0.824
(10) Farming equipment (Yes:1)
148 0.125 0.332 0.25 0.438 3.556*
(11) Savings (Yes:1) 150 0.524 0.502 0.466 0.504 0.4115
(12) Loans (Yes:1) 149 0.596 0.493 0.555 0.50 0.2131
(13) Years in village 149 32.144 16.904 41.97 16.743 -3.1***
(14) N of buyers 150 1.419 0.757 2.044 0.952 -4.4***
Note: For the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test,  test statistic is z-score.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 23: Shapiro Will test (Kuapa Kooko membership)  
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
Area of cocoa plot (ha) 284 0.74208 52.346 9.266 0.00000
Owned land/total land (%) 284 0.89581 21.145 7.144 0.00000
Age 282 0.96496 7.066 4.576 0.00000
Years of schooling (n) 284 0.89966 20.365 7.056 0.00000
Household labour contribution 
(days)
280 0.78412 43.268 8.814 0.00000
Livestock (n) 284 0.64175 72.708 10.035 0.00000
Years in village 282 0.97521 5.000 3.767 0.00008
N of buyers 284 0.91208 17.843 6.746 0.00000
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Appendix 24: Statistically non-significant results (Kuapa Kooko 
membership)  
Dependent variable:  Farmer is affiliated to Kuapa Kokoo (1=yes)
Full Sample 
(1)
Ashanti 
(2)
Western 
(3)
Coeff AME Coeff AME Coeff AME
Owned land/total 
land (%)
-0.0460 -0.0148 0.251 0.0677 -0.424 -0.108
(0.330) (0.106) (0.625) (0.170) (0.521) (0.130)
Age -0.00155 -0.0005 -0.0283 -0.00765 0.0142 0.00362
(0.0103) (0.0033) (0.0178) (0.00469) (0.0139) (0.0035)
Caretaker (Yes:1) 0.127 0.0408 0.230 0.0622 0.149 0.0379
(0.212) (0.0677) (0.411) (0.111) (0.304) (0.0770)
Livestock (n) 0.00411 0.00132 0.00359 0.000971 0.00420 0.00107
(0.00841) (0.00269) (0.0216) (0.00583) (0.0101) (0.00255)
Loans (Yes:1) -0.0435 -0.0139 -0.161 -0.0434 0.0681 0.0173
(0.180) (0.0576) (0.344) (0.0931) (0.285) (0.0725)
Years in village 0.00565 0.00181 -0.00201 -0.000542 0.00906 0.00230
(0.0071) (0.0023) (0.0125) (0.00337) (0.0098) (0.0025)
Observations 249 249 78 78 137 137
Pseudo R² 0.1026 0.3004 0.2439
Wald chi² 30.77 39.02 32.69
Prob>chi² 0.0060 0.0004 0.0032
% correctly 
predicted 
73.09% 69.23 76.64
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for Probit Coeff. Standard errors in parentheses 
for Predicted. prob.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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